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PEACE AND WAR IN LEBANON

Namani

Nelson

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1920 - 1990

Bassam A.K.Namani, Ph.D.

Dar Nelson

Peace and War in Lebanon, 1920-1990 : The Interplay of Domestic,Regional and Interenational Politicas is an attempt to study the complex intricacies of sectarian Lebanese politics within the context of the surrounding regional developments and the far reaching international and global changes which had directly influenced the country, for better or worse. **The central** theme is basic and logically simple, but not without arousing dire complexities once ascertained : the stability and permeability of Lebanon rests on an interplay between the maintenance of a delicate setarian balance, a limitation to the intervention of regional powers, and the availability of international support.

PEACE AND WAR IN LEBANON, 1920–1990: THE INTERPLAY OF CONFESSIONAL, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Bassam Abdel Kader Namani

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Dar Nelson

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To the Memory of My Father

ABDEL KADER ANIS NAMANI (1908-1981)

Dean and Professor of Mathematics, American University at Cairo

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Four of the hand-drawn maps included in this book appear for the first time in that particular form in a historical work: the stages of expansion of the Ma'nid and Shihabist amirates, and the 1970 Cairo agreement in the eastern, central, and western sectors. I have drawn these maps by rereading the respective sources and later superimposing the details on the maps indicative of the period. Otherwise, for the rest of the maps, the references used have been listed in the pertinent annotations.

Having said so, I wish to thank Dr. Elie Salem who, in his capacity as foreign minister, had originally approved the publication of this book on 12 April 1983, conjointly with Secretary General, a.i., Ambassador Abd al-Rahman S. al-Sulh. I also extend my appreciation to Minister Gebran Basil and to Secretary General Ambassador Wafic Rheimi, who have reconfirmed the said permission on 3 July 2014. All in all, however, the views expressed in this work are solely my own, and in no way represent a systematic rendering of official government policy.

Professor J.C. Hurewitz has supervised the early development of this manuscript as partial fulfillment of my Ph.D. thesis at Columbia University (nominated for the 1982 Bancroft Award). He had always demanded from his students rigorous adherence to academic scrutiny and objectivity, and hopefully this work would not disappoint these

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND SOURCES

For the purists of romanized Arabic transliteration, this work will not meet their approbation. The diacritical marks (’) and (ء) for the *hamza* (ء) and the *‘ayn* (ع) have been retained. Those of (h̲ā’) or (ح), the emphatic consonants (s̲ād) or (ص), (d̲ād) or (ض), (t̲ā’) or (ط), and (z̲) or (ظ), and the long vowels *’alif mamdudah* (ā) or (ا), *ya’ maqsurah* (ī) or (ي), and *waw madmumah* (ū) or (و) have been discarded.

For English readers, most proper names are written in their pronounced Anglicized or Gallicized version rather than in their transliterated Arabic forms: Joumblat and Gemayel instead of Junblatt and Jumayyil. For ease of transcribed pronunciation and to avoid undue cluttering, titles of works in Arabic containing the two adjoining letters *li-al* (لأل) and *wa-al* (وأل) have been combined to form *lil* (لل) and *wal* (وال). Lastly, for the benefit of Western readers not familiar with Arabic, the translation of books and articles cited in that language have been rendered between brackets[ ].

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADF	Arab Deterrent Forces.
ALF	Arab Liberation Front.
ANM	Arab Nationalist Movement.
AUB	American University of Beirut.
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency.
FRUS	U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, (Washington, D.C., --) .
LCP	Lebanese Communist Party.
LF	Lebanese Forces.
MNF	Multinational Buffer Force.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NLP	National Liberal Party.
NSF	National and Socialist Front.
PDFLP	Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
PFLP-GC	PFLP-General Command.
PLA	Palestine Liberation Army.
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization.
PPS	Parti Populaire Syrienne.
PSP	Progressive Socialist Party.
SLA	South Lebanon Army.
SSNP	Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party.
UPWF	Union of Popular Working Forces.

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(1)
THE CONFESSIONAL STRUCTURE OF LEBANESE SOCIETY

Since the outbreak of the third Arab Israeli war in 1967, Lebanon and the immediate region have been plagued by continuous upheavals and armed conflicts. Perhaps the Lebanese had fared worse because of their weak national military prowess in comparision to their neighbours. Their country, though, has become a civil and regional battleground. For a small population not exceeding three million, the losses up to the end of the year 1990, are staggering: 170,000 dead, 1 million wounded, ¼ million casualties with severe handicaps, massive destruction to the built up areas of the capital Beirut and other cities such as Sidon, Tripoli, Zahleh, al-Damur, Bhamdun, and Aley, 100 villages erased, 80,000 buildings destroyed, 800 factories eradicated, and the grim list goes on[(1)]. Until the promulgation of the Ta'if accord in the autumn of 1989, all the efforts to bring the conflict to a close have faltered, as evidenced by the 927 unadhered to ceasefire agreements[(2)]. And to top the misery and complexity of it all, no faction achieved or could have achieved outright victory to console the defeated that they had fallen through insurmountable odds, or for the victor to establish his version of peace. If one is to go forward in time beyond the scope of this book and include the massive Israeli attacks in July 1993, and April 1996, and the Lebanon-Israeli war of 2006, then 1,479 deaths and 4,759 wounded can be added to the toll, not mentioning the wide swath of destruction to the country's built up areas in Beirut and southern Lebanon.

There is a "great debate", among the Lebanese and the scholars of Lebanon, of whether to classify the 1958 crisis and the events that started since 1975 as "civil wars." Inasmuch as these incidents involved the active participation of Lebanese factions and individuals on the sides of opposing combatants, whomsoever they may be, these events could certainly be described as such. But whether the issues had involved purely Lebanese or even sectarian issues, then the answer is certainly naught. Indeed, in most instances the crisis of 1958, is commonly referred to by Lebanese commentators as the "incidents," or hawadith حوادث, while the post-1975 period has for long been described simultaneously in local parlance as the "crisis" or azmah أزمة and the quintessentially unsolved "problem" or al-qadiyyah القضية.

Usually political advantage accrues to that party whose view on the nature of the conflict prevails, but the debate, nevertheless, is bound to continue[(3)]. To claim that both external and internal stimuli are at work may sound analytically superfluous, but in the absence of a definitive or

exhaustive treatment of that question, the theme of this book will emphasize the complex interplay between domestic, regional, and international politics. In particular, it will emphasize how seemingly inordinate internal Lebanese squabbles in reality mirror the wider regional and international politics at play.

It will be very difficult to dispel the myth among Western observers that what had been unfolding is purely an internal conflict. That it is far more complex may be quite analogous to describing the incidents that ravaged Germany from 1605 to 1640 as the German civil war while in fact it is known to posterity as the Thirty Years War because of all its international and religious ramifications. At the same time it will be difficult to dispel what many Lebanese believe to be the sole foreign progenitor of their troubles. If there is no doubt that the Lebanese should shoulder part of the blame, one has to conclude that every political system will be destroyed from within and without if it fails to heed the signs of its own corruption and decay.

Struck by the confessional nature of the Lebanese society, some critics have repeated the notion that Lebanon is an artificial creation based on the transposition of inappropriate Western political norms(4). Since there is an apparent absence of consensus on fundamental national issues, the Lebanese nation itself is perceived as a myth(5). In a study by David C. Gordon, he calls Lebanon a marginal state, because the population feels only partial identification with the domination of a sectarian minority that has transcended the convention and traditions of the mainstream Arab culture(6). But the question as to whether confessionalism stands barrier to the emergence of a nascent Lebanese nation is largely inconsequential. The state of Lebanon exists, no matter how unstable this existence is rendered, or how precarious this improbable configuration of religious sects is considered to be(7).

Indeed, Lebanese historians and politicians disagreed fundamentally over the origin of Lebanese nationhood and the geopolitical context of the word "Lebanon"(8). Professor Kamal Salibi had noted that "the Lebanon of Ottoman times could be historically defined as the whole territory, from the crest of the Anti-Lebanon to the sea, which normally felt the impact of Maʿn and Shihab government--a territory which, in extent, did not differ much from present-day Lebanon" (9). Other revisionist historians, of a more pan-Arab or pan-Syrian persuasion, argue that the major coastal cities of Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, and Tripoli had been attached to the Syrian hinterland and only occasionally felt the grip of the mountain amirs, notwithstanding the fact that in the nineteenth century, Mount Lebanon retained special autonomous prerogatives under the rule of the Ottoman empire(10). Conversely, the mountain or parts of it suffered from the contending jurisdictions and rivalries that permeated among the local Ottoman governments of Tripoli, Sidon, Beirut, and Damascus.

Consequently, the unabated crescendo of violence that has engulfed Lebanon since 1975, had proven beyond doubt that the confessional system is the Achilles' heel of the Lebanese polity. Whether inviting manipulations by external powers or constituting an eternal arena for the local power contest to unravel, confessionalism is a perennial source of weakness. A definition of confessionalism, or its interchangeable term "sectarianism", is that of "a political arrangement whereby different ethnic and religious groups (confessions) are balanced to perpetuate the status quo"[(11)]. In Lebanon, with its seventeen officially recognized sects, the religious predominate.

The division between the Christian and Muslim communities, the "two wings of the nation," constitute the first vertical schism in the social edifice. By general assumption, the Muslim population now supersedes the Christian, but that increase is rendered harmless by the fractured nature of the two communities-Christian sects divide into Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholic while the Muslim branch into Sunni, Shi'i, 'Alawis, and Druze. Because the distribution of government posts in Lebanon had always in principle followed a rigorous sectarian quota, the more numerous sects naturally expect to be invested accordingly with the privileges due to them[(12)]. But one cannot fail to recognize the irony that the Lebanese constitution had stipulated that the assignment of government and civil, service posts according to religious sect is only a provisional measure to ensure justice and social harmony without prejudicing the general welfare of the state.

Each sect has spurted out roots of its very own political, social-economic, and ecclesiastical institutions that reinforce the loyalty of the citizen to his religious confession instead of encouraging the development of a common Lebanese civic loyalty[(13)]. Alternatively, this does not prevent the emergence of horizontal, or perhaps oblique, interconfessional coalitions at all social levels, thereby preventing exclusive fragmentation along purely confessional lines. Collective survival of the sects necessitates it. Moreover, it eases the pursuit of a classic balance of power situation where the flexibility of alliance formation serves to deter, albeit for the moment, the politically aggressive sect.

That the president be a Maronite, the speaker of parliament a Shi'i, his premier a Greek Orthodox, and the prime minister a Sunni, had not been based, before the Ta'if agreement in 1989, on constitutional stipulation, but on an unwritten binding custom. Similarly, that the top national security posts, the commander of the army, the heads of the directorate general of national security and military intelligence, and the secretary general of the foreign ministry, be held mostly by Maronites had been another unwritten rule. The other posts in the government and the civil service down to their lowest grade have likewise fallen under the preserve of one sect or the other, and have not been surrendered usually without provoking acute political and

administrative crises. In part, this whole edifice had been anchored to the six Christian to five Muslim ratio amongst the deputies in parliament (later becoming a 50-50 ratio after Ta'if) which guarantee that none of these unwritten binding rules may be constitutionally upturned or defied for the expressed purpose of maintaining justice and social harmony(14).

Historically speaking, the codification of the distribution of power according to sect had begun with the establishment, under European-Ottoman stewardship, of the ruling councils of the two governorships of Mount Lebanon (al-qa'immaqamiyyatayn) in 1840, and that of the autonomous governorate known as al-mutasarrifiyyah in 1860. Some detractors of confessionalism have concluded that this whole system is a Western invention under the guise of the Ottoman capitulations, designed to promote local fragmentation and pave the way for European imperial control. Others apologize for the necessity of Western intervention by highlighting Ottoman misrule and mistreatment of the Christians under the millet system. The autonomous, taxpaying, and self governing millets had also been based on the concept of the dhimmis, or the various protected Christian and Jewish communities under Islamic rule who paid tribute but were exempted from military service. And the rise of Islam itself in the seventh century had occurred at a time of great turbulence and schismatic splits in the Christian church.

Thus the thread of historical continuity may go infinitely backwards, and the sources of primordial religious conflict can be extrapolated indefinitely into the future. One thing is clear, nonetheless, is that the civil wars in Lebanon in the 19th and 20th centuries, though intersectarian or intrasectarian in nature, had not been fought over issues of religious doctrine(15). Religious symbols have been heavily utilized, but only for the purpose of sectarian mobilization for the sake of communal self-defense.

One has to conclude, a priori, that the confessional system has not only been tailored for specifically sui generis Lebanese conditions, but also for regional and international stipulations. Confessionalism and the Lebanese situation do not and in all probability will never exist in a vacuum(16). The country, therefore, becomes an ideal subject for experimentation because of its labyrinthine complexities. France's interest in her Maronite clients and in expanding its influence in the Middle East, for example, had played a crucial role in the historical and geographical formation of Lebanon, as well as in patronizing some form of sectarian quota that would guarantee their allies a preponderant influence in government. Similarly, in the Ta'if agreement of 1989, the Arab states succeeded in guaranteeing international support for their peacemaking endeavors and engineered a new sectarian quota, albeit temporarily, that would guarantee a fairer distribution of political power.

This may have prompted David and Audrey Smock to conclude in their book The Politics of Pluralism that it is sectarianism, rather than the

confessional component, which remains the major obstacle to political reform. By this, they mean that the mere presence of a plurality of religious confessions does not lead to political impediments. It is sectarian quota which does so by instilling in political actors the desire to promote the exclusive interests of their own confessional communities. For the Smocks, the political and religious realities must be separated, so that confessional politics may not impinge on political sectarianism[17].

The Lebanese historiographer, Youssef Choueiri, has sharply criticized the practice of treating sects as independent political entities with a psychological and cultural mind of their own[18]. While *nihil est dictum quod non est dictum prius*[*], it has been unavoidable to begin any introduction of pertinent developments in Lebanon without such a rendering of the country's confessional constellations and their impact on the historical and political landscape.

The Maronites perhaps lead all others in their contribution to modern Lebanon's élan[19]. They trace their origins to two saints, the hermit from Homs, Maron (d. 410 A.D.) and more succinctly, the patriarch of the Church of Antioch, Yuhanna Maron (d. 707 A.D.). They resisted together with other Eastern Christians, commonly called monotheletes, Byzantine orthodoxy. In the seventh century, Jacobite persecutions destroyed their monastery along the Orontes river and drove them further south toward the Qadisha valley in northern Lebanon[20]. The arrival of the Crusaders (1095-1291), ushered in an era of cooperation with the Maronites, interrupted by occasional armed conflict as the latter strove to maintain some semblance of communal independence. They finally swung fully toward union with the Latin patriarch of Antioch in 1182, hereafter suppressing all their supposedly schismatic past as far as Rome was concerned. In the thirteenth century, the Maronites aligned themselves with Papal authority as a Uniate church with its own priesthood and liturgy[21]. In 1584, the Catholic connection strengthened with the establishment in Rome of a Maronite college to educate Maronite priests.

Contacts with European powers, especially Catholic France and the Italian merchant republics, guaranteed the Maronites temporal patronage and occasional protection against the long Ottoman governorship of Mount Lebanon (1516-1918). Having from the outset identified themselves with Europe politically and religiously, the Maronites developed a sharp anxiety over their independence against the surrounding Muslim milieu. One is inclined to state that some historians have overdeveloped the thesis that they had been in perpetual revolt against Islamic rule and, as a result, had suffered severe reprisals and persecutions which constricted their presence in Syria

[*] nothing has been said that has not been said before.

and Upper Mesopotamia. This had adduced them to seek an autonomous haven in the steadfastness of Mount Lebanon[22].

When France occupied Lebanon in 1918-19, it seemed that the moment of fulfilling Maronite national aspirations was at hand. The French granted their clients privileges within the state, expecting Maronite acquiescence to the mandate. After independence in 1943, these privileges remained unaltered, when the other sects conceded to their protagonists' ascendancy in order to allay Maronite fears after the withdrawal of their protégé France.

The second largest Christian Lebanese community, the Greek Orthodox, follows the Byzantine rite. Generally known as Melchites, they constituted those Christians of Egypt and Syria who followed the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) and henceforward catered to Constantinople after the great schism between the Eastern Church and Rome. Up to the nineteenth century, the Greek Orthodox used the Greek language in their liturgy, after which they later switched to Arabic. This doctrinaire flexibility reflects the absence of a rigorous and centralized hierarchy in their church, thereby easing the integration of the Greek Orthodox with their surrounding communities. It follows that the ecclesiastical leadership wields less temporal power than is the case among other sects in Lebanon, say the Maronites, encouraging the Greek Orthodox to seek a wider national cosmopolitanism. They had played a leading role in propagating via political parties the secular ideologies of Syrian and Arab nationalism, as well as radical Marxist ideologies seeking to dismantle the sectarian polity altogether[23]. In doing so, the sect does not operate en masse but prefers instead to witness passively the individual efforts of its most talented sons.

Quite analogous to the Maronite connection with France, the Greek Orthodox community in the past developed close contacts with imperial Russia, which until the Bolshevik Revolution regarded itself successor to the Byzantine heritage. Otherwise they did not perceive themselves threatened and constricted to Mount Lebanon as the Maronites did. Forsaking agriculture and mountaineering, they emigrated to the cities of Lebanon where they adopted urban tasks and a distinctly metropolitan way of life.

In the seventeenth century a group of Melchites separated from the Greek Orthodox sect and joined the Roman church. Called Greek Catholics, they mostly live in the small town of Zahleh in the Beqa‘ valley and around the city of Sidon. As a minority they follow the Maronites in their larger political orientations[24]. Other "less-than-one-percent" Christian minorities include Jacobites, Latins, Nestorians, and Protestants. The latter had been converted by British and American missionaries in the nineteenth century and may be considered, comparatively speaking, the most modern religious sect. Nestorians, popularly referred to as Assyro-Chaldeans, tore apart from the Syrian Orthodox Church after Chalcedon and became known as

Chaldeans. They in turn united with Rome in the eighteenth century. Latins are simply Catholics converted at the hands of Jesuits who consider Rome as their See[25], while the Jacobites are Monophysites who follow the Syrian Orthodox Church based in Antioch.

Two newcomers to the Christian sects of Lebanon constitute the Orthodox, or Gregorian, and Catholic Armenians. The Turkish persecution of these peoples peaked at the end of World War I, to a level many Armenians consider as outright genocide. Since France forfeited the resuscitation of a greater Armenia in the neighborhood of Cilicia, many managed to escape to Lebanon and conducted themselves initially as foreign refugees. But they confidently immersed themselves in the country's politics and acquired through their industrious efforts several seats in parliament and in the cabinet. Two parties traditionally compete for their loyalties: the centrist Dashnak Party and the more leftist Hunchak Party[26].

At the other end of the communal spectrum, the Sunni Muslims enjoy a comfortable representation in the state, surpassed only by the Maronites, and lesser so the Shi‹ites. Sunnis dominate the coastal cities of Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli, while a few reside in the ʻAkkar region in the rugged northeastern corner of the country. Since independence in 1943, they persistently held the prime ministry, the second highest post in the executive. Claiming to represent orthodox Islam, they reputedly follow the *sunnah*, or the oral tradition and works of the Prophet Muhammad. The fairly long uninterrupted Sunni rule of Lebanon by the Seljuks (1070-1092), the Ayyubids (1171-1250), the Mamluks (1282-1516), and the Ottoman Turks, identified the sect considerably with the "state religion", for lack of a better interpretation. However, the French mandate reversed this local political supremacy in favor of the Maronites. Nevertheless, the Sunnis exert confident strength by virtue of the simple fact that the majority of Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa are fellow Sunnis. Thus they may suffer in Lebanon's political fortunes, but they rest assured that their regional majority ensures somehow the exoneration of these losses.

The Lebanese Shiʻis, called by some contemporaneous historical sources *al-Matawilah*, live mostly in the Beqaʻ valley and in southern Lebanon, but differ doctrinally from the Sunnis by insisting that the political and spiritual succession to the Prophet Muhammad rest with his cousin ʻAli ibn Abi Talib and his line of descendants who had set the standard of pure Islamic zeal in the face of the worldly power exerted by the Ummayyad and ʻAbbassid caliphs. Most of the Lebanese Shi‹is follow the orthodox Ja‹afari code of Islamic law and belong to the *ithna ‹ashari* (twelvers) or imami faction, piously referring to ‹Ali and eleven of his reverential lineal descendants as the Twelve Imams. The martyrdom of Hussein, son of ‹Ali and the third imam, at the hands of an immorally corrupt Umayyad ruler, holds a special significance in their historical consciousness. Shi‹ism as a political doctrine had always been popular among the underprivileged and

unrepresented Muslim populations, and, despite persecutions, they would remain for long a vocal opposition against the "state".

Isma‹ili Fatimid conquest of North Africa and Egypt (909- 969), finally ushered a strong proto-Shi‹i state which began to contest Palestine and Syria from the ruling Seljuk Turks. This Isma‹ili branch of Shi'ism had split away from the *ithna ‹ashari* in 760, and had followed instead the primogeniture line of the sixth imam. Their eclectic doctrines synthesized neoplatonic philosophy with an esoteric interpretation of the Qur'an. Three other localized Lebanese Shi‹i dynasties would hold sway during that period: Ibn Mirdas in Sidon in 1021-1028, Ibn 'Ammar in Tripoli in 1058-1109, and the Abi 'Uqayl in Tyre in 1058-1124[27]. The Fatimids would intersperse with Isma'ili and other factions in the coastal mountain ranges of the eastern Mediterranean: the revolutionary Qaramitah, the Assassins, the Druzes, the ‹Alawites, and finally the Christian Maronites. The 'Alawites are considered to be the most extreme of Shi‹i groups in their veneration of 'Ali, and their secret teachings are allegedly contained in an extant work called the kitab al-majmu' al-'ayad[28]. They had been expelled from Lebanon and Palestine in the fourteenth century and have ensconced themselves in the Nusayriyyah mountains in western Syria and in the northernmost regions of Lebanon. With the coming of the 'Alawites to power in Damascus, they have reinforced their numbers in Tripoli in the 1970's, and have demanded and were subsequently accorded, rights and representation in the Lebanese political system.

With the collapse of Fatimid rule in Egypt and Syria in 1292, and partly because of dissimulation, the Shi‹is, over the centuries, slowly reverted into minority status[29]. The Mamluks in particular, after defeating the Crusaders, had launched severe punitive raids against the Isma‹ilis and the Shi‹is in the Kisrawan in central Lebanon in 1300-1305. The latter, however, continued to play a crucial role from their bastion in Jabal 'Amil, east of Tyre, in support of the local rulers of Sidon and Acre, and from the Beqa‹ and the Hirmil in support of the governors of Tripoli and Damascus. The Shi'i Himadah family also ruled large parts of northern Mount Lebanon, until demographic increases by the Maronites and military pressure by the Druze ousted them in 1770. But Shi'i writ extended even beyond these geographic confines, when a mass conversion to Shi‹ism took place in Safawi Iran in the sixteenth century by religious scholars from the renowned jurisprucence school of Jabal 'Amil; a witness to the strong ancient affinity between the Shi‹is of Iran and Lebanon.

The Fatimids, the Isma‹ilis, and perchance the Qaramitah[30], provide the origin of the third Muslim sect in Lebanon, the Druze. Living in the Shuf, Wadi al-Taym, Safad, and the Jabal Druze, they number a total 500,000[31]. They believe that the sixth Fatimid ruler, al-Hakim bi-AmrAllah (996-1021), revealed himself as the divinely incarnated Imam. Al-Hakim disappeared in mysterious "mystical" circumstances, and upon the

subsequent persecution of his followers, Druzes sought protection as well as converts in the Lebanese mountains and in Palestine and Syria. They prefer to be called *muwhaddun* (unitarians) in part because one of their preachers and onomatopoeiac namesake, Nashtakin al-Darazi, later betrayed the cause and his assassination was ordered by their prime missionary, Hamzah ibn ʻAli al-Zuzani. Like the Isma‹ilis, they believe in metempsychosis, but unlike them, they forbid proselytizing, having satisfied themselves with their early converts. They follow a special code of esoteric beliefs unknown to all except a chosen few called the Elders or *ʻUqqal*. So much so, that they no longer consider themselves part of the Isma'ili branch of Islam.

Because of their raids against the Crusader states from their forward base of al-Gharb overlooking Beirut, and because of their proven military prowess, the Tannukhid Arslani (900?-1137?) and Buhturi (1187?-1516) Druze amirs received titles and fiefs from the succession of Sunni dynasties(32), making them the acknowledged rulers of the Shuf mountain. The third ruling Druze dynasty, the Ma‹nids (1516-1697), entered-into a long and bloody competition with the local Kurdish rulers of Tripoli and northern Lebanon, the Banu Sayfas, which eventually resulted in the latter's demise in the sixteenth century and the Maronites gradually filling the power vacuum in northern Mount Lebanon.

Druzes had traditionally polarized between two clans, the Qaysis and the Yamanis. The battle of ‹Ayn Dara in 1711, established the victory of the former clan and ushered, for the first time, the political promotion of Maronite chieftains to fill the gaps caused by the immigration of the Yamanis to the Hawran in Syria. The Druze's supremacy over, but close interaction with the Maronites, lasted up to the nineteenth century, whereupon the Maronites steadily supersceded them in power and numbers by simple demographic growth and by virtue of European stewardship. Internal migration to various feudal districts of Mount Lebanon resulted in a steady expansion of the Maronite presence at the expense of their neighbors which ultimately led to a bitter civil war in 1860(33).

The Jewish community, sometimes called *al-Musawiyyun* or *Isra'ili*, had also been officially recognized and played an active participant in Lebanon's political life since the early 20th century despite their small number. In 1958, estimates indicate that 12-15,000 lived mostly in the urban centers, especially the Wadi Abu Jamil sector of Beirut. Given Lebanon's liberal climate, the immigration of Arab Jews to Israel in the fifties used Beirut and the south occasionally as a clandestine jumping point. On the morrow of the l967 June war, the Jews numbered 6-7,000, and their numbers continued to dwindle by an indirect exodus to Israel or by immigration to Europe and the United States. In 1986, a rash of kidnapping of prominent Jewish community leaders by a militant Shi‹i fundamentalist organization revealed that only a few hundreds remained by that time(34).

The list of confessional groups remains incomplete without mentioning the foreign presence of the Kurds and the Palestinians. Mostly Sunni muslims, the Kurdish people had always figured a prominent place in the history of the Ottoman empire. A continuous stream of Kurds from Turkey and Iraq entered Lebanon between the two world wars. They are estimated to number only 13,000, but with the recent exodus of Kurds from the Syrian war in 2012, their number is on the rise[35]. Underprivileged and unrepresented, they have shown eagerness to participate militarily, ostensibly on an individual basis, in the battles of 1975-76. They possess a party of their own called *Razkari*, but its role in the labyrinth of domestic politics is not profound.

The Palestinians initially entered Lebanon as refugees after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. A census of the Palestinians in Lebanon carried by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian Refugees showed that 211,102 refugees registered with that office as of 10 June 1979. Having taken into account only the demographic growth of the 1948 refugees and their descendants, UNRWA neglected those who had already acquired Lebanese nationality (around 100,000), and those who escaped Jordan during the 1970 civil war. As a result, some estimate the total number of Palestinians to have reached 400,000 and even an exaggerated 700,000[36].

Up to 1969, the state treated the Palestinians as dispossessed aliens, keeping them under the close scrutiny of the security police and the intelligence services for fear of potential disruption. The Palestinians reciprocated with political immobilism. The rise of the PLO, on the one hand, brought an abrupt turnabout in the refugees' fortunes. The organization, and not without Lebanese governmental resistance, successfully set up in the refugee camps an autonomous infrastructure that catered to the political as well as social-economic needs of the refugee population -- a virtual state within the Lebanese state.

Such a sizable specter, unrepresented and unaccounted for in the confessional system, threatened at the time the precarious equilibrium which had for so long nurtured the Lebanese status quo. When the confessional system ultimately disintegrated in the mid-seventies, supplemented by other non-Palestinian causes, the PLO occupied a central role in the war on behalf of its Muslim and leftist allies. Rebuffing accusations to the contrary, the Palestinians disqualify interest in permanently settling Lebanon or in gaining dominant political representation. They claim that as a national liberation movement, their single *raison d'être* is to regain Palestine; no one cares to forecast the full implications to the country's fate should the act of liberation be postponed indefinitely into the future.

Finally, a sizable new entry of late, has been the mass exodus of refugees and displaced persons in the lingering Syrian civil war of 2012-14. By the end of 2014, it is estimated that the number of Syrian refugees would

reach 1.5 million. And though during the heyday of Syria's hegemony over Lebanon in the years after Ta'if up to the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, Syrian seasonal workers reached close to 1 million, the wholesale immigration of families evokes in many Lebanese quarters the fears of a quasipermanent settlement similar to that of the Palestinians, harping the now familiar refrain that they would harbor dangers to the country's permanence and fragile sectarian balance.

If the above exposé has dealt with the sectarian "building blocks" of Lebanese society, then what of the emergence of the geopolitical entity of modern Lebanon itself? In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the feudal structure of that society living in Mount Lebanon had solidified enough to lead to the emergence of the amirate, or principality, as a central unifying institution under the rule of the Maʿn family[37]. Fakhr al-Din II al-Maʿni (1586-1635), expanded the territorial boundary of his Shuf amirate, with the help of neighboring Maronite, Sunni and Shiʿi tribal chiefs, to include much of present Lebanon and parts of northern Palestine at the expense of the vilayets of Tripoli and Damascus. The Ottomans grudgingly bestowed upon him the grandiose title of lord of the lands of ʿArabistan, stretching from the borders of Aleppo to the borders of Jerusalem, and watched helplessly as he encouraged Florentine and French influence. At an opportune time, the Ottomans launched a military expedition against the amir, took him prisoner, and would later execute him in 1635[38].

The Shihabs, like their predecessors the Maʿns, a Sunni family with a Druze following from Wadi al-Taym, succeeded them in 1697, and in 1788, a figure comparable to Fakhr al-Din, Bashir II al-Shihabi, (1788-1840) rose to power. He too built a strong central state and ruled over roughly the same area of the first amirate. Bashir's reign, however, witnessed the ascendancy of the Maronites. An official count taken in 1840, revealed the Maronites had clearly exceeded the Druze in population and that there were only 12,023 Druze in the amirate, compared to 87,727 of their Maronite brethren[39].

Conversely, Bashir exploited the dissension and internal strife that racked within the Druze aristocracy to enhance his local authority. He allied himself (1832-1840) with the ruler of Egypt, Mehmet Ali Pasha, and with French assistance, attempted to overthrow Ottoman rule. The European powers yet unwilling to solve in that manner the Eastern Question, as the repercussions of the progressive disintegration of the Ottoman Empire became known, intervened to expel the Egyptians from Syria, restoring thereby the beleaguered Ottomans. Great Britain in particular seized the military initiative and assisted a largely Druze revolt that defeated and overthrew Bashir[40].

Fakhr al-Din and Bashir were both regarded, as was their counterpart Mehmet Ali in the case of Egypt, as the founders of modern Lebanon. This despite the fact that their motivations were primarily of a

feudal nature in terms of their competing with other local rulers for power and influence under Ottoman suzerainty[41]. The Maʿn and Shihab regimes, in other words, satisfied the need for Lebanese proto-nationalist dogma to identify with a strong central authority which held sway over much of what are today the natural boundaries of Lebanon.

But the central authority exerted by Bashir II increased the stress on the mountain's society. The separation of the mountain in 1840, into two governorships, or *qa'immaqamiyyatayn*, through European insistence and in spite of Ottoman objections, enhanced the rift between the Druze and the Maronites[42]. The territorial division did not contribute ultimately to political and social stability. In 1858, the Maronite peasants, under the leadership of Tanyus Shahin, revolted against their feudal lords in the northern *qa'immaqamiyyah*. The revolt soon spread in 1860, into the Druze governorate in the south. No sooner had it done so, than the social upheaval turned into an unabated religious war between the two communities. The Druze, fewer in number but better organized and well prepared, meted out heavy massacres to their antagonists.

The 1860 civil war, though in the main a Druze-Maronite affair in Mount Lebanon, culminated in the unprovoked attack on the Christian quarter of Damascus, where many thousands lost their lives. Accusations were levelled against the Ottoman government that it had played second fiddle to the entire episode, as evidenced by the collusion of local officials to facilitate the Druze attack on the Maronites, or worse still, that the Turks had intentionally refrained from separating the combatants in Mount Lebanon, as its responsibility for internal security clearly dictated. This had been stimulated for the express purpose of destroying the Maronites and later the independence prone Druze, as some contemporaries of the time had contended[43].

The five European powers in the Concert of Europe- Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary - would not let the incidents of 1860 pass without overseeing a general settlement of their own that would favor the Christians. The French had landed troops on a temporary basis and proceeded to draw a map of Lebanon that would later be used by pro-French Lebanese nationalists as a demonstration of the country's natural and historical frontiers. Already each European state had attempted to establish durable ties with the different religious communities: France with the Maronites and other Uniate Christians, Russia with the Greek Orthodox, Austria with the Greek Catholics, and Britain, by default for lack of Christian communities, with the Druze[44].

The rivalry between the powers necessarily reflected itself in the rivalry between the religious sects. In their capacity as protectors of the Christian communities, the powers finally forced the Sublime Porte to sign a protocol on 9 June 1861, authorizing the administrative reorganization of Mount Lebanon (later modified on 6 September 1864). It reunited the

mountain into a single autonomous governorate, the *mutasarrifiyyah*, headed by an Ottoman but non-Lebanese Christian governor general. Yusuf Karam, one of the Maronite leaders from Ihdin, North Lebanon, attempted unsuccessfully to resist this arrangement, calling instead for the appointment of a Lebanese Christian amir. His efforts faltered, and he later went into permanent exile in 1866, a heroic symbol of Maronite resistance to Ottoman rule and their pristine quest for independence [(45)].

Political censorship and the obscurantism of the mountain confines, however, did force Lebanese expatriates to emigrate abroad where they formed quasi-secret nationalistic societies which, together with their compatriots at home, opposed the central rule of the Ottoman Turks. Some developed exclusive Christian aspirations for extending the Lebanese frontiers beyond the mountain and saw in Syria the natural extension of the Lebanese nation [(46)]. They included the *Comité Libanais de Paris* (1909) (*aka* the Lebanese Union Party), Lebanese Renaissance (New York, 1911), *Le comité central syrien* (Paris, 1912), and the National Lebanese-Syrian League for Liberation[(47)]. Others strove for Syrian or Arab nationalist goals to bring about reform to the empire: *La ligue de la Nation Arabe* (Paris, 1904), the Young Arab Society (Paris, 1906-1911), the Literary Club (Istanbul, 1909), *al-Qahtaniyyah* (Istanbul, 1909), the Covenant (Istanbul, 1913), the Arab Congress (Paris, 1912-1913), and the Beirut Reform Society (1913)[(48)]. Naturally, there were other Lebanese leaders who remained loyal Ottoman citizens and joined organizations such as the Arab Ottoman Fraternity (Istanbul, 1908) and the Ottoman Decentralization Party (Cairo, 1911?) [(49)].

As might be surmised, some of the above nationalistic societies based in France found encouragement and support from their hosts. Diplomatic observers noted that the French government between 1912 and 1914, in pursuing its self appointed *mission civilisatrice*[(50)], continued to extend its influence in Lebanon through financial grants to French educational establishments, numerous visits to Beirut by French warships to show the flag, and occassional interference by the resident French consul general. The Parisian colonial press kept public opinion informed of impending threats to France's standing in the Levant (French diplomatic usage referring to Syria and Lebanon), especially since Great Britain's attention to the strategic importance of the area for the defense of the Suez Canal did not go unnoticed in French quarters[(51)].

Indeed, the main imperial initiatives for Lebanon and Syria did not come from the notoriously weak French government of the Third Republic, but rather from the colonialist societies known by contemporaries at that time as the *Parti colonial*[(52)]. In their eyes, the most important criterion of their standing in the Levant remained the "romanticized" and "orientalist" attachment to the French spearheading the Crusaders' Latin kingdom and much later, Bonaparte's Egyptian campaign. It also encompassed the

customary role of France as protector of the Catholic and Christian minorities in the Ottoman empire(53), and the moral imperative to spread French language and culture.

The impending demise of the Ottoman empire had encouraged the French in 1912, to toy with the idea of a general insurrection in Lebanon(54). The European powers had already intervened several times in the 19th Century to dictate the means by which Mount Lebanon was to be governed. But it was the Turkish entry into the world war on the side of the Central Powers which immediately anticipated the partitioning of the archaic empire. By early 1914, the last French consul general in Beirut, Charles François George-Picot, revived the idea of an indigenous revolt in secret conversations with the Maronite patriarch and urged his foreign ministry at the *Quai d'Orsay* to dispatch an expeditionary force to Lebanon.

Thus France, along with her European allies, had set their sights on superseding Ottoman power in the Levant and extending their imperial presence. The only means available by which they sought to do so, was to partition the area into spheres of influence, if not by outright annexation. Although the extension of France's writ rested on the alliances it had established with indigenous nationalistic and sectarian groups, the ultimate formation of modern Lebanon rested entirely on the fortunes of the Allies in the world war. A revolt against Ottoman authority would certainly provide the pretext for and hasten European entry into the Levant. Unfortunately for the French, Britain's Arab allies provided that excuse, thereby greatly complicating the plans set for Lebanon.



Map 1: Expansion of Amirate under Fakhr al-Din II al-Ma'ni (1590-1635)



Map 2: Expansion of the Shuf Amirate under Bashir II al-Shihabi, (1788-1840)



Map 3: Feudal Provinces of the Double Qa'immaqamiyyah, 1845



Map 4 Feudal Provinces of the Mutasarrifiyyah 1864 (Based on Isma'il Haqqi, Lubnan: Mabahith 'Ilmiyyah wa-Ijtima'iyyah [Lebanon: Scientific and Social Inquiries] (Beyrut, 1969) and Iliya Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845 (Princeton, N.J., 1968)).

Map 4: Feudal Provinces of the Mutasarrifiyyah, 1864

1. Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 10 September 1987.
2. Ibid., 13 May 1989.
3. George Modelski, The International Relations of Internal War (Princeton, 1961), p. 22.
4. A view shared by Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (New York, 1965), p. xxvii of Introduction and Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon (New York, 1968), pp. 3-9.
5. David Gordon, Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation (London, 1980), p. 17.
6. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, op. cit., p. 219.
7. Zaki al-Naqqash, Lubnan Bayn al-Haqiqah wal-Dalal [Lebanon Between Truth and Error) (Beirut, 1965), p. 21.
8. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, op. cit., p. xiii of Introduction.
9. Wajih Kawtharani, Al-Itijihat al-Ijtimaʿyyah al-Siyasiyyah fi Jabal Lubnan wal-Mashriq al-ʿArabi 1860-1920 [The Social-Political Trends in Lebanon and the Arab East 1860-1920] (Beirut, 1976), p.15.
10. Enver M. Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese system: confessionalism and Chaos (Washington, D.C., 1976), p. 1.
11. A matter of contention and conjecture, the exact number of each sect provides a source of friction between local politicians. In the summer of 1975, three private sources declared the following confessional distribution to be the most up to date and the most accurate. Although diametrically opposed to each other, they convey a fairly rough image of the sectarian population.

Lebanese Population by Sect, 1975

	Figures of Imam Musa al-Sadr	Figures of Newspaper al-'Amal	Figures of Kamal Junblatt
Shi'is	970,000	467,000	800,000
Sunnis	690,000	454,000	600,000
Druze	343,000	121,000	350,000
Maronites	496,000	557,000	500,000
Greek Orthodox	230,000	193,000	350,000
Greek Catholics	213,000	152,000	
Armenians		115,000	
Naturalized		164,000	
Total Lebanese	2,942,000	2,223,000	2,100,000

(See Antwan Butrus *et. al.*, Wathiqah Harb Lubnan [Document of the War of Lebanon] (Beirut, 1977), p. 345).

12. See for example the hierarchy of sectarian loyalties in John P. Entelis, Pluralism and Party Transformation in Lebanon: Al-Kataib, 1936-1970 (Leiden, 1974), p. 39.
13. The electoral law specifically allocates the number of seats in parliament according to regional district and sect. Civil service recruitment likewise scrupulously observes the rule of parity between Muslim and Christians, while closely adhering to the ratios set forth by the electoral law.
14. Ghassan Salame, Lebanon's Injured Identities: Who Represents Whom During a Civil War (Oxford, 1986), p. 3. For a comparison between the

civil wars of the last two centuries, see Leila Fawaz, "Understanding Lebanon," The American Scholar 54 (Summer 1985): 382.

15. Helena Cobban, "Thinking about Lebanon," American Arab-Affairs 12 (Spring 1985): 65.
16. David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana (New York, 1975), p. 171.
17. Youssef M. Choueiri, Arab History and the Nation State: A Study in Modern Arab Historiography, 1820-1980 (London, 1989), pp. 148ff.
18. Frank Stoakes, "The Super Vigilantes," Middle Eastern Studies, (1975), p. 215-36.
19. Salibi argues that it is the Byzantines who expelled the Maronites during their invasion of Syria in the years 969-1071 (Kamal S. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (London, 1988), p. 91).
20. For a detailed study of the Maronites' relations with the holy see, see ibid., op. cit., 75-85.
21. Popular tradition has it that the Maronites are the ethnic mixture of the ancient Aramaic Christians of Syria and the Anatolian Maradaites (al-Maradah) peoples who used to launch Byzantine sponsored raids into the Arab provinces (Matti Moosa, "The Relation of the Maronites of Lebanon to the Mardaites and al-Jarajima," Speculum, 44 (1969): 597-608). For a refutation of this belief, see Kamal Salibi, Muntallaq Tarikh Lubnan, 634-1516 M. [The Point of Departure to the History of Lebanon, A.D. 634-1516] (Beirut, 1979), pp. 41ff. For a modern "romanticized" and voluminous interpretation of Maronite history see Butrus Daw, Tarikh al-Mawarnah al-Dini, wal-Siyasi, wal-Hadari [The Religious, Political, and civilizational History of the Maronites] 5 vols., (Beirut, 1970-1978).
22. See article by Riyad Najib al-Rayyis, "'Awdah al-Ruh Marah Thaniyyah: Arthudhiksiyyah al-Qawmiyyah al-'Arabiyyah! [Return of the Spirit a Second Time: The Orthodoxy of Arab Nationalism!]" in al-Mustaqbal (Paris), 11 February 1984.
23. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Greek Catholics had been at the forefront of the Arabists who revived the stirrings of Arab literature and nationalism (Salibi, op. cit., p. 44).
24. For a modern exposure of the Latins' history, see the article "Al-Latin wa-Lubnan [The Latins and Lebanon]," in al-Nahar, 9 December, 1985.
25. Michael Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture (Ithaca, 1965), pp. 190-99.
26. George Adib Karam, L'opinion publique libanaise et la question du Liban (1918-1920) (Beyrouth, 1981), p.39.
27. Great Britain, Naval Intelligence Division, Syria: April 1943 (Oxford, 1943), p. 160.
28. Helena Cobban, The Shia Community and the Future of Lebanon (Washington, D.C., 1985), p.2. See also Meir M. Bar-Asher, "Nosayris," in Encyclopædia Iranica available online at http//:www.iranicaonline.com (accessed online at July 20, 2003).

29. Sulayman Taqy al-Din, al-Mas'alah al-Ta'ifiyyah fi Lubnan: Al-Judhur wal-Tatuwar al-Tarikhi [The Confessional Problem in Lebanon: Roots and Political Developments], (Beirut, 1980), p. 80. See also Nejla M. Abu-Izzedine, The Druzes: A New Study in their History, Faith and Society (Leiden, 1984), p. 10.
30. "The Shi'ites," Fiches du Monde Arabe (Beirut), No. 1526 (5 March 1980).
31. Najla M. Abu-Izzeddin, The Druzes, op. cit., p. 10.
32. William Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840: A Study of the Impact of the West on the Middle East (Cambridge, 1963), p. 140.
33. Luc-Henri de Bar, Les communautés confessionnelles du Liban (Paris, 1983), pp. 157f.
34. "Population Data: Resident Foreigners", Fiches du Monde Arabe, No. 324 (9 July 1975); Wathiqah, op. cit., p. 345.
35. Al-Nahar, 2 September 1980.
36. James Alexander Shaw, "Test of Pluralism in Lebanon" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Africa, 1976), pp. 1-7.
37. Kamal Salibi, "The Secret of the House of Maʿn," International Journal of Middle East Studies 4(1973): 272-287.
38. For a historical and military background to the Maʿni period see Col. Yassine Soueid, Histoire militaire des muqata'as libanais à l'époque des deux emirats, 2 Vols (Beyrouth, 1985).
39. Michel Chebli, Une histoire du Liban a l'époque des emirs (1635-1841) (Beirut, 1984), pp. 250, 437.
40. C.E. Ferah, "The Lebanese Insurgence of 1840 and the Powers," Journal of Asian History 1 (1967): 105-32.
41. Kamal Salibi's interview in al-Hawadith (Beirut), 10 February 1978. See also Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, 'Urubah Lubnan: Tatwuriha fi al-Qadim wal-Hadith [The Arabism of Lebanon: Its Development in the Ancient and Modern Period] (Beirut, 1969), p. 88; Adel Ismail, Lebanon: History of a People, trans. Shereen Khairallah (Beirut, 1972), pp. 96, 105ff. See also Stefan Winter, The Shiites in Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1788 (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 38f, 53ff.
42. It was Prince Klemens von Metternich of Austria who suggested the partition (Muhammad Ahmad Tarhini, Al-'Usus al-Tarikiyyah li-Nidham Lubnan al-Ta'ifi [The Historical Foundation of Lebanon's Confessional System] (Beirut, 1981), p. 47).
43. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, gen. eds., British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Part I: From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War: Series B: The Near and Middle East, 1856- 1914: Vol. 6: The Ottoman Empire in Asia, 1860-1880 (Frederick, Md., 1986), p. 14.

44. J. C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record: Vol. 1: European Expansion, 1535-1914 (New Haven, 1975), pp. 28, 315, 344. For British-Druze relations see in particular Shakeeb Salih, "The British-Druze Connection and the Druze Rising of 1896 in the Hawran," Middle Eastern Studies 13 (May 1977): 251-57.
45. Iliya F. Harik, Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845 (Princeton, N.J., 1968), p. 149.
46. See also Marwan Buheiry, "Bulus Nujaym and the Grand Liban Ideal, 1908-1919," in Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890-1939, ed. M. Buheiry (Beirut, 1981), pp.62-83.
47. 'Isam Kamal Khalifah, Abhath fi Tarikh Lubnan al-Mu'asir [Studies in Lebanon's Modern History] (Beirut, 1985), pp.100-124.
48. Ibid., pp.74-99.
49. Hassan Saab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire (Amsterdam, 1958), pp. 227-34. One of the most prominent Lebanese Ottomans of the early twentieth century remains Shakib Arslan. See William L. Cleveland, Islam Against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism (Austin, 1985), pp.25f.
50. See Matthew Burrows, "'Mission Civilisatrice': French Cultural Policy in the Middle East, 1860-1914," Historical Journal 29 (1986): 109-135.
51. Jukka Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East (London, 1969), pp. 7f. The British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, declared in December 1912, his country's '*désintéressement*' to Raymond Poincare, French prime minister and foreign minister, specifying that Britain had no political aspiration of any kind as far as Syria and Lebanon were concerned (Christopher M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya Forstner, France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion (London, 1981), p.50).
52. These include the Groupe colonial in the chamber of deputies, Comité de l'Asie française, Ligue colonial française, Comité de defense des intérêts française en Orient, Comité d'action française en Syrie, Comité de l'Orient, Société de géographie, and the Marseilles and Lyons chambers of commerce (Andrew *et. al.*, ibid., passim) .
53. For analysis of French role as protector of religious minorities in Lebanon see John P. Spangnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1914 (London, 1977), pp. 5-23. For a presentation of their perceived influence in the Levant, see Zadig Khanzadian, Atlas de géographie économique de Syrie et du Liban (Paris, 1926), pp. 22-29.
54. Andrew, op. cit., p. 49.

I

THE CRISIS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1920-1945

(2)
British-French Supremacy in the Middle East and the Advent of Le Grand Liban

The following sections deal with the crisis of independence in the period 1920-1945, with particular emphasis on the struggle of the various Lebanese national and sectarian groups to bring about independence from French imperial control. But in the interim, Lebanon's present frontiers and political system took its final recognizable and cognizant form. In the light of the theme of this book of the interplay of domestic, regional and international politics, this process over time had been shaped by France's stewardship over Lebanon, the struggle to establish independent Arab governorship over geographic Syria, and the competing demands of the different Lebanese national and sectarian groups.

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, of which Lebanon formed an autonomous province, the two entente allies, Britain and France, established a political supremacy in those former Arab provinces of West Asia that effectively lasted for two decades and a half(1). Other European states with imperial interests in the Middle East failed to gain a foothold because of defeat in the world war, internal revolution, or because they simply forfeited their share in the Ottoman spoils. The United States, the only non-European power actively interested in the area, relapsed into traditional isolation subsequent to a brief participation in the postwar settlement. Lacking credible competitors, Britain and France were left to their own devices.

The demarcation lines that separated what belonged to France from what belonged to Britain ultimately rested on how "vital" an interest each had cultivated in the Arab provinces. The scope of French interests in Syria, and particularly in Lebanon, reached such extensive, continuous, and determined proportions; that other powers found it difficult to claim a similar presence. Clearly the French adjusted their interests to include all these remotely assembled provinces commonly referred to as geographic Syria, or what the French termed *la Syrie intégrale*: the autonomous Mount Lebanon *mutassarrifiyyah*, the vilayets (Ottoman administrative units) of Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo, and the *sanjak* (provincial district) of Jerusalem south of the 32nd parallel.

The French intended basically to carve up Syria, perhaps with the intention of taming the interior, while enlarging Lebanon, which they regarded as their bastion of influence. The Syrian pan-Arab nationalists, however, would succeed in arresting the division of their land into 'Alawi, Druze, and Sunni states. None of these communities in any case possessed

traditional and enduring relations with France. In Lebanon, however, French prodding after 1920, succeeded in transferring power to candidates from the Maronite sect through the application of overt sectarian quotas for the holding of government positions.

The partitioning of the Ottoman empire was given impulse when Russia initiated between 4 March and 10 April 1915, an understanding with Britain and France to the effect that the Straits and Constantinople would be transferred to her control in exchange for a recognition of her allies' claims over Asiatic Turkey. In the diplomatic exchanges the British desiderata called for an intentionally vague "preservation" of the Muslim holy places: Mecca, Medina, and Kerbala. The French, alternatively, put their claims more precisely: Cilicia, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine(2).

Having separately defined their maximalist objectives, France and Great Britain proceeded to negotiate a final settlement of their interposing frontiers. The former consul general in Beirut, Charles George François-Picot assumed his country's *démarche* in November 1915, and after lengthy negotiations, reached a series of agreements (3 January-26 April 1916) with his British counterpart Sir Mark Sykes(3). The secret agreement stipulated that Lebanon, though not mentioned specifically, fell under direct French authority in a "Blue Zone" encompassing the coastal strip between Alexandretta and Acre, while the British controlled the two vilayets of Baghdad and Basra in a "Red Zone." The Syrian hinterland, the upper Galilee, and Mosul, would be further divided amongst a confederation of Arab states under alternately French or British protection. The rest of Palestine formed a "Brown Area" under an international administration, a concession the French colonialist party later criticized as a truncated version of their cherished *la Syrie intégrale*(4).

The British Foreign Office insisted to the French that the Sykes-Picot agreement would come into effect only after the declaration of the Arab revolt(5). The British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, had encouraged Sharif Husayn ibn ʻAli, amir of Hijaz and guardian of the holy places in Mecca and Medina, to lead a revolt on 10 June 1916, with promises for an independent Arab state covering all of Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine. But the secret treaties with France and Russia, and the diametrically conflicting offer to Ibn Saʿud, ruler of Nejd, for portions of eastern and central Arabia, raises serious questions over Britain's true motives as expressed by McMahon. Sykes later presented on 2 November 1917, the Balfour Declaration to the leader of the Zionist movement, Chaim Weizmann, promising British assistance to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

In retrospect, the British needed the Sharifians to provide the pretext to split the Islamic solidarity between Arab and Turkish citizens of the Ottoman state and justify the partitioning of the Arab vilayets themselves. The French during the war, never displayed much enthusiasm for Arab

separatism, and indeed Picot doubted whether an Arab state would, if ever, materialize[6]. French troops occuppied the small island of Arwad off the coast of Lebanon in August 1915 to maintain contacts with their agents in the mainland. However the early seizure of Picot's consular archives, left by sheer neglect, yielded an unexpected boon to the Turks: the names of pro-French and ironically enough, pan-Arab national leaders. On 21 August 1915, and on 6 May of the following year, Jamal Pasha, commander of the Fourth Army in Syria, sent thirty-one Muslim and Christian notables to the gallows in Beirut and Damascus[7]. To add to Turkish repression, the Allied sea blockade, war deprivations, and Ottoman inefficiency, led to the outbreak of famine, wiping out one third of the Lebanese population according to some counts[8].

French colonialists demanded military intervention in Mount Lebanon to save their Christian allies from what they considered a deliberate Turkish policy of annihilation. But the French general staff could not spare troops from the hard pressed Western front or from their efforts spent close to the Turkish jugular in Salonika and Gallipoli. Jittery colonialists turned to the Paris based *Comité central syrien*, founded by Shukri Ghanim, a Maronite dramatist in French letters, and George Samné, a Greek Orthodox physician from Damascus, to recruit volunteers from the Syrian *emigrés* communities in South America in May-November 1917. The *comité* believed in the *Quai d'Orsay* version of a federated Syria under French protection, with limited autonomy for Mount Lebanon[9]. The Maronite patriarch's representative in Paris, however, held more ambitious goals and continued to lobby for an enlarged independent Mount Lebanon. When the recruitment drive dissipated, the French had to suffice for the moment with the dispatch of the *Détachement francais en Palestine* to join the British army in Egypt[10].

When the British ruptured the Turkish front in Palestine in 1917-18, the Arab forces under Amir Faysal, son of the Sharif Husayn, stole to Damascus on 1 October 1918, and proceeded unilaterally to announce an Arab military government over Syria and Lebanon. The Sharifian endeavor to establish a *fait accompli* in Ba'bda, the government seat of autonomous Mount Lebanon, and in Beirut, the capital of the vilayet of Beirut, fell to naught. On 8 October 1918, French naval troops landed in Beirut and proceeded to replace the Sharifian advance guard stationed there.

The French standing in the Levant, however, remained precarious because Britain still possessed preponderant military superiority. This advantage reflected itself in the understanding reached between the British prime minister, David Lloyd George, and his French counterpart, George Clemencau, in December 1918. The Frenchman, contrary to his inimical position in the peace conference a few months later, and fixed solely on postwar European affairs, gallantly ceded the vilayet of Mosul, formally within the French zone of influence, to Britain. He similarly acceded to

Lloyd George's pro-Zionist policy and no longer insisted that Palestine be internationally administered; it would fall under British protection. To compensate for this readjustment of the territorial provisions of the Sykes-Picot agreement, the British promised the French premier a share of the Mosul oil and at the same time recognized the right of France to extend its direct administration from the Blue Zone to Syria proper. Insistent French prodding failed to convince the British to transform this other secret understanding into a written agreement for fear lest the Sharifian cause suffer irreparable damage[11]. The Bolshevik revolutionaries in Moscow had already exposed the details of the secretive Sykes-Picot agreement in late 1917, and the revelation caused a stir amongs the Arab populations over the true intentions of the Allies for the area.

Thus the succession of secret British-French agreements forfeited whatever residual claims the Arab government in Damascus held over Lebanon. It followed, a priori, that the Arab governorship of Syria itself possessed no authoritative standing. This Faysal set out to reprieve in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. He and the Arab-Syrian nationalist societies wanted complete independence for Syria, with the understanding that Lebanon and Palestine formed an inalienable part of Syria's political geography[12].

For their part, the French mustered one more time the *comité central syrien*, to counter Faysal's *démarche* in the Peace Conference. Ghanim, heading the commission that included several Lebanese members, pleaded in straight forward manner that France be charged with the destiny of Syria, but his embarrassing performance greatly discredited his thesis. A few days later, on 15 February 1919, a native delegation from Mount Lebanon submitted its own pro-French version. Dawud 'Ammun, president of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, the legislative body of the mutasarrifiyyah and for the time being the de facto ruling body, requested French help in developing Lebanon's resources. He pleaded, furthermore, that Syria should profit by the same French collaboration since Lebanon, while retaining a distinct personality, could partake of an integrated Syria[13].

French insistence on *la Syrie intégrale*, however, angered some Christian protonationalists who, on the one hand wanted to assert the full independence of Lebanon from Syria[14], albeit under French protection, and on the other, called for the restoration of Lebanon to its "historical and natural frontiers". By that they meant the enlargement of Mount Lebanon to its approximate Ma'nist-Shihabist size, thereby incorporating the fertile Beqa', Safad, and Bilad Bisharah in southern Lebanon and for the declared express purpose of preventing future famines. They also demanded the inclusion of the littoral cities of Sidon, Beirut, and Tripoli for the purpose of facilitating trade with Europe[15].

The British and the French, while actively promoting the divergent Lebanese, Syrian, and Arab delegations against one another, clashed

seriously over the extent of the projected Jewish homeland. Lloyd George produced a map on 8 February 1919, that extended the boundaries of Palestine northwards up to the river Litani to placate Zionist demands for more territory. The French categorically turned it down[16]. In a private meeting between Clemenceau and Lloyd George on 7 March, a second map further delineated the French area of partition solely to Mount Lebanon. Clemenceau angrily rejected that proposal too, and in a crucial meeting on 20 March of the Council of Four, the two prime ministers clashed over what each considered a breach of faith.

Lloyd George finally relented in September 1919, especially since the United States withdrew from the postwar settlement thus removing the only serious power that could temporize allied penchant for bilateral hegemony of the Middle East[17]. He arranged with Clemenceau for the British troop withdrawal from Syria. Already searching for an alternate and credible Lebanese *protegé* to Ghanim, Paris had invited the Maronite Patriarch, Ilyas al-Huwayyik, to present his case to the Peace Conference[18]. The patriarch had emerged as the most effective pro-French spokesman for the enlargement of Mount Lebanon "to its natural and historical frontiers and return the Beqa' which Turkey had stripped from it"[19]. Smarting from past British ruses, the typically anticlerical Clemenceau received the patriarch with great fanfare and pledged independence and better suited frontiers for Lebanon. On 16 November French troops under General Henri Gouraud, hero of Gallipoli and commander in chief in Lebanon, enlarged their military administration by occupying the Beqa' valley. The Sharifians perceived the last French act as a belligerent one, and thereupon a state of undeclared, though minisculed, guerrilla warfare prevailed. Ironically, in the process of their expansion, the French relinquished Safad to British military administration and ultimately to British-governed mandatory Palestine. Traditionally the area, with its largely Druze population, constituted a part of the Ma'ni-Shihabist amirate, but several Jewish settlements had already been set up there near Lake Hula, and thus it became part of the Palestinian patrimony[20].

The British persisted in lobbying for the enlargement of Zionist claims in Palestine up to the Litani River. In December 1919, they demanded that their military administration be extended further north at French expense[21]. The new premier who replaced Clemenceau, Alexandre Millerand, proved as intransigent as his predecessor and no major change of the Palestine-Lebanon boundaries ensued[22]. The Arab nationalists defied the *fait accompli* and, furthermore, swayed Faysal away from a possible rapprochement with France. A conference in Damascus on 20 March 1920, proclaimed unilaterally the independence of the whole of Syria, including Palestine, and while issuing special guarantees for Lebanon, called for federal union with Iraq. It seemed that these conditions pleased the Administrative Council, which henceforth declared Lebanon's independence

two days later, while declaring a willingness to cooperate with an independent Syria[23]. The French reacted promptly by dissolving the council and sending most of its members into exile[24].

As a riposte to the challenge of Arab nationalism, the Allied Supreme Council, meeting at San Remo, Italy, on 28 April, offered the French mandatory powers over Syria and Lebanon. With Russia in turmoil, Millerand forsook Armenian claims in Cilicia to the Turkish nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal Pasha and withdrew his troops to Lebanon. General Gouraud made use of these fresh reinforcements to quell the guerrilla raids of the Sharifian bands. Following the guidelines of Robert de Caix de Saint Amour, one of the staunch colonialists of the 'Syrian party' at the *Quai d'Orsay*, Gouraud sent an ultimatum to Faysal on 14 July. Despite Faysal's resignation to the imposed terms, de Caix ordered Gouraud not to temporize. The French *armée du Levant* invaded the Syrian hinterland, defeating the Arab forces at Khan Maysalun path on 24 July 1920.

In humiliating and removing the Arab government from Damascus by drastic measures, the French secured for themselves the liberty to reorganize the mandated territories at will. Indeed the ardent catholic Gouraud had already established cordial relations with the Maronite patriarch and had received from him a congratulatory note on 1 August for the happy and rapid end of the campaign which, the patriarch wrote, witnessed the enhancement of French prestige[25]. On 3 August 1920, the French general decreed that the four qazas (provinces) of the Biq'a and its extensions: Hasbaya, Rashaya, Ba'albak, and al-Ma'alqah-- which the Lebanese protonationalists had in the past claimed had been unfairly stripped from the *mutasarrifiyyah*, now formed part of Lebanon's administration[26].

At this stage, French imperial policy wavered over the issue of the borders of Lebanon and its exact political status *vis-à-vis* Syria. De Caix recommended setting up a Lebanese federation under direct French control comprising Mount Lebanon, Beirut with its largely Sunni population, and the former *sanjak* of Sidon with its largely Shi'i population. The rest of Syria would be divided into several administrative provinces modeled on the Swiss 'cantons' to incorporate the 'Alawis, the Druze, and other minorities in a federation. Gouraud accepted the principle of carving up Syria, but into four autonomous states linked in a confederation that would include a 'Greater Lebanon' encompassing, in addition to de Caix's proposals, Tripoli with its largely Sunni population[27]. Millerand agreed with his general, and on 21 August authorized him to extend Lebanon's borders[28]. Pursuing his policies to their natural conclusions, Gouraud established the state of Le Grand Liban on 31 August 1920, and followed it on 1 September with the formal declaration of independence and the promulgation of a provisional statute which concentrated powers in the hands of a French governor. The modern state of Lebanon was born.

In their mastery over Syria and Lebanon, the French catholic lobby regarded themselves as a power bent on progress and on the protection of their Christian and minoritarian subjects[29]. They felt that their long association with the Maronites qualified them to play that role and that in turn, Maronite enthusiasm for their "beloved mother, الأم الحنون" a sympathetic panegyric for France, reflected the dire need of French patronage in the face of pan-Arab claims[30]. The French formed an administrative council in which the Maronites constituted the majority, [31] proceeded to ease the entry of Maronites into the civil administration and sought in general to defend their clients' interests in the state.

It was often maintained that the French intentionally enlarged the horizons of Lebanese sovereignty in order to weaken Lebanese politics, their Maronite allies included, and strengthen their own mandatory power[32]. Hence the Maronites, who constituted a majority in the mountain, were now reduced to a minority among minorities, comprising at the most a quarter of the total population of Greater Lebanon. But the Arab nationalists, and particularly Muslim politicians, initially refused to participate in the civil administration, questioned the legitimacy of the Lebanese state and their own citizenship in it, and demanded the return of the coast and the four regions of Hasbaya, Rashaya, Ba‹albak, and al-Ma‹alqah to Syria[33]. Some Lebanese leaders derogatively called these policies "negativist", and their opposition retorted that pro-french leaders pursued "separatist" policies in an attempt to isolate Lebanon from the Syrian and Arab hinterland" [34].

According to plan, Syria was divided into a Druze, an 'Alawi and a Jazirah state, as well as the states of Damascus and Aleppo, lending credence to the postulate that the French aimed to facilitate minority rule wherever possible. In Lebanon, de Caix, in his new capacity as secretary general to the high commissioner, Gouraud, persisted in his proposals to detach Tripoli from Greater Lebanon, or, at least to grant Beirut and Tripoli municipal autonomy. The Maronite patriarch, however, would have none of it, and successfully lobbied against the street agitation of the Tripolitanians who were demanding to be reincorporated into Syria. The issue rose again upon the arrival of the new high commissioner, General Maxime Weygand (May 1923-December 1924), who, though as ardent a Catholic as his predecessor, tried to follow an impartial policy toward all religious communities[34].

The Maronite patriarch did not fail to understand the implications when the first serious crack in the French alliance occurred only four years after the establishment of the mandate. General Maurice Sarrail, superseding Weygand in November 1924, launched a violent anticlerical campaign that mirrored the leftist tendencies of the new government in Paris. His heavyhanded methods of local government in Lebanon and Syria, and his overzealous eagerness for territorial "divide and rule" finally culminated in the outbreak of the 1925 Druze revolt in the Hawran district. It soon

turned into a national revolt against the French, with rebel military operations spreading into Lebanon as well.

While the difficult suppression of the revolt culminated in halting the dismemberment of Syria, it alternatively accelerated French efforts toward framing a new model constitution for Lebanon, approved on 23 May 1926, which transformed the state of Greater Lebanon into the Lebanese Republic[36]. Although in theory it created the institutions of a modern democratic state, it also called in the same breath for the equitable representation of the sects in government, albeit as a provisional measure, and specified the number of delegates from each sect that formed the new legislative body[37]. The French allowed the formation of nascent political blocs, but the ruling infrastructure remained an almost crude extension of the Ottoman millet system. Otherwise, the constitution greatly enhanced the authority of the French high commissioner. He possessed the right to veto any legislation, dissolve the legislature, suspend the constitution itself, rule by decree and appoint advisers in all civil administration.

Surprisingly, the subsequent uproar against the constitution did not focus on either the areas of confessionalism or French powers. Rather, it related to the question of the Lebanese frontiers which the constitution inadvertently confirmed, to the chagrin of the Arab nationalists who now were now clamouring for unity with Syria on a decentralized basis[38]. As a result, in 1928, an Arab nationalist delegation from Lebanon left for Syria and pleaded that it incorporate into its own constitution, which was then being promulgated, an article laying claim to the said districts of Lebanon[39]. The French disapproved of the whole venture because of its basically antimandate overtones. They subsequently countermeasured by dissolving the Syrian constituent assembly and reissuing the constitution without those articles which confirmed virtual Syrian independence or, a priori, Syrian territorial claims in Lebanon.

But not all the pan-Arab and Muslim politicians displayed unionist sentiments. For instance Shaykh Muhammad al-Jisr, a religious judge from Tripoli, chose to participate in the Lebanese political process in spite of the general Muslim prohibition. He duly presided over the senate and his stature grew as he used his position to offer a wide range of services and patronage to his community[40]. In the same vein, and in order not to overantagonize other religious sects, the French did not chose a Maronite candidate as the first president of the republic, but a member of the Greek orthodox community, Charles Debbas (1926-1931). A prominent lawyer and journalist, Debbas had joined one of the delegations from Mount Lebanon to the Paris Peace Conference. However, four prime ministers who formed the cabinet under him, Auguste Adib Pasha (May 1926-May 1927, August-May 1928, March 1930-May 1932), Habib Pasha al-Sa‘d (August 1928-May 1929), Emile Eddé (October 1929-March 1930), and Bisharah al-Khuri (May 1927-January 1928, May-October 1929) were all Maronite candidates[41].

When the second term of Dabbas came to an end in March 1931, both al-Khuri and Eddé aspired to succeed him. Successful practitioners of law, a profession closely related to advancement in the political arena, they both heralded from Mount Lebanon, and had earnestly cultivated partisan support during their public service in office.

Because Eddé had displayed his animosity toward Arab nationalism, his rival could automatically count on the vote of the Muslim deputies in the chamber. Eddé, for example, encouraged the ideas of Charles Corm, a Lebanese writer in the French language who insisted that the Lebanese people were of Phoenician, not Arab origins(42). Thus al-Khuri seemed assured of victory. However, in what was considered at the time a master political stroke, Eddé withdrew his candidacy in support of none other than Shaykh al-Jisr. This ensured al-Jisr a winning majority. In vain al-Khuri attempted to persuade al-Jisr to withdraw, but he himself eventually pulled reluctantly out of the presidential race(43).

Shaykh al-Jisr threw his French friends into disarray for "Lebanon stood apart from the Arab countries mainly by virtue of its internationally recognized Christian character"(44). The French had tried their utmost to create what they considered a balanced sectarian form of government and here a sole Muslim candidate was about to be elected into office by the propriety of Western-modeled democratic institutions(45). The mandatory authority greatly resented the inter-Christian squabbling for the highest executive office, and felt that over the long run, a Muslim president would definitely alienate them with the Christians without necessarily endearing them to the Muslims(46). Partly to justify the constitutionality of a Christian president by validating a Christian majority in Lebanon, the French organized a census on 31 January 1932, notwithstanding article 96 of the constitution which had already set the quota of proportional representation in all administrations and which evidently substantiated Christian predominance(47). The importance of that census was that it became the *terminus a quo* that set the numerical yardstick by which all future distribution of sectarian quotas in government would be subsequently based.

Jisr and other Muslim politicians contested the results of the census. They adduced that it excluded large numbers of Muslims either by sheer neglect or by complying with those who refused Lebanese citizenship for the sake of a forlorn hope to unite their districts with Syria(48). In other words, the census failed in convincing Jisr to withdraw his candidacy. This left the high commissioner, Herni Ponsot (1926-1933), no other choice but to suspend the constitution, dissolve the chamber of deputies and indefinitely postpone the presidential elections. The action on the one hand confirmed Muslim reluctance to grant the Lebanese state legitimacy, while on the other, it accentuated the rationale of Christian exclusivity. Thus, aside from exacerbating Muslim-Christian tensions over holding the office of the chief

executive, the French preferred the "unwritten rule" of sectarian distribution of power to the "fiction" of a democratic process of political representation.

This contrasted with the performance of a neighborly mandatory power, Great Britain, which signed a treaty with Iraq in 1930, nominally ending the mandate two years later. Such a precedent in a country ruled by the Sharifian Faysal, the former king of Syria, necessarily produced repercussions in the latter two countries where demands for a similar treaty with the French arose. In Lebanon, al-Khuri encouraged these demands among his parliamentary supporters, henceforth named the Constitutional Bloc, while Eddé grouped around him those who believed in Lebanon's independence under French protection, referred to as the National Bloc.

In response to Syrian demands first, the French submitted a draft treaty for review by Damascus, which formalized the separation of the Druze and 'Alawi states, while at the same time perpetuated the authority of the mandate itself. The Syrian nationalist leaders denounced the draft treaty and convinced their chamber to refuse it on 23 November 1933; whereupon the high commissioner dissolved that chamber also, and suspended the constitution [(49)].

The high commissioner allowed the creation of a new chamber in 1934 for Lebanon, and in January 1936, convoked it to elect a new president. The rivalry between Eddé and al-Khuri persevered, but this time Eddé carefully lured the majority to his side. Al-Khuri, hence, became more adamant in calling for the full restoration of the constitution and the negotiation of a French-Lebanese treaty which would effectively replace the mandate responsible for his electoral defeat. In this posture, al-Khuri could count on the support of the Maronite patriarch, Butrus 'Aridah, who had instigated several strikes against the monopoly of commercial French enterprises in the country, and thus gained nationalist sympathy (and French chagrin). Next year, he would unequivocally declare support for Syrian strikes against the French.

When violent demonstrations and strikes broke out in Syria demanding the restitution of constitutional life and the conclusion of a treaty with the mandatory, an all-Muslim congress met in Beirut on 10 January 1936, and called again for the reattachment of the "four districts" to Syria. Patriarch 'Aridah responded with a Maronite conference of his own on 6 February calling for the preservation of the Lebanese entity within its present borders. However, events in Damascus outstripped the pace of Lebanese politicians. In April 1936, the French finally agreed under the pressure of the Syrian disturbances to negotiate a treaty along the Iraqi model. The Lebanese pan-Arabists accordingly held another meeting in the house of the Sunni politician from Beirut, Salim 'Ali Salam, and called for the reintegration of the "four districts" with the Syrian state. This "Conference of the Coast,"[(50)] more an appeal to Syrian negotiators that they press for the restoration of the areas concerned, exhibited ample proof that after the

passage of 15 years, that "Greater Lebanon" had not yet achieved universal consensus.

When the negotiators finally signed a draft French-Syrian treaty on 9 November 1936, the Arab nationalists in Lebanon had no occasion to rejoice. Syrian negotiators had decided that in their pursuit of independence, they were prepared to release all standing claims against Lebanon(51). They would recognize, implicitly at least, the separate existence of Lebanon in its present boundaries, and dutifully proceeded to enter into negotiations with the Lebanese government over common fiscal and administrative matters(52).

Preempting the reversal of their Syrian allies, the Lebanese pan-Arabists had earlier held another "Conference of the Coast" the previous October. They issued a declaration to the French high commissioner in favor of unity with Syria, which they regarded as a first step toward comprehensive Arab union. They demanded the representation of Muslim unionists among the negotiators for a Franco-Lebanese treaty(53). But in reality, the conference participants had fallen out among themselves. The members of Tripoli withheld support altogether from the resolutions reached because they felt that the principle of pan-Arab union had been forsaken, and because they believed that their city of Tripoli could never attain economic viability unless it rejoined the Syrian hinterland.

One other dissenting but prescient opinion was that of Qazim al-Sulh, a journalist member of the politically active Sulh family. He perceived the issue of unity with or separation from Syria as a strictly national one to be settled with the Syrians, not with the French high commissioner. In his opinion, the crux of the problem rested in that Greater Lebanon was a creation of the common interest of France and a large number of Christians. Protonationalism would triumph if the Christians discovered the economic benefits that might accrue from cooperation with Syria and if the Muslims realized the importance of reaching an internal settlement with the Christians. Qazim pointed out the significance of the convergence of 'Aridah with the Syrian nationalists: for the first time the highest Francophile Maronite quarter challenged the idea of French protection(54).

Al-Sulh similarly stressed that Arab unity would in all probability lead to a scheme of cooperation extending beyond Syria and Lebanon, where each Arab state might preserve its own entity. For these reasons, Arab nationalism must attempt to rise above the particularities of local politics and confessionalism. Al-Sulh argued that an independent Lebanon was better than the *status quo ante* 1920: the unity of the vilayet of Beirut with Damascus and the secession of Mount Lebanon(55). These were fresh ideas that would eventually break through the sectarian impasse. It would, in a few years, usher forth the cross-confessional National Pact that would bring about independence in 1943.

On 13 November 1936, Lebanese and French negotiators signed a treaty (later left unratified by the French senate) which promised Lebanon

independence within three years after which France would sponsor Lebanese membership in the League of Nations. In exchange, the two states would enter into a military alliance that placed no limit on the type or size of lingering French forces. In this confirmation of Lebanon's final territorial composition and sovereignty, Arab nationalist irredentism expressed itself in violent demonstrations and strikes in most of the littoral cities, with pro-French counter-demonstrations erupting in reply.

These clashes heralded the emergence of new political parties beyond the spectrum of the representation offered by the politicians and the notables of the early mandate period. While professing secularistic objectives, these nascent parties took on increasingly sectarian overtones by virtue of Lebanon's special setup. Pierre Gemayel formed the Lebanese Phalangist Party after a visit to Central Europe where he witnessed the effectiveness of Fascist paramilitary youth organizations at close hands. The Phalangists stood for the complete separateness and integrity of Lebanon. They hence became inadvertently associated with political representation of the Maronite sect(56). The Muslim colleague of Gemayel in his European trip, Husayn Saj'an, formed a similar organization called the *Najjadah* (Helpers) which purported to represent the Arab nationalist idea in conjunction with other parties such as the League of National Action and the Arab National Party(57).

Two other ideological parties of note also formed during this period. Antun Sa'adah, a Greek Orthodox university teacher, established the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, popularly and erroneously known as the *Parti populaire syrien* (PPS) (58). The party, more an expression of secular Syrian nationalism than of traditional Muslim or pan-Arab politics, believed in the unity of geographical Syria and the Syrian people under a nonsectarian regime. Michel 'Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, two Syrian educators studying in France, formed during World War II the Ba'th, or Renaissance Party which believed in secular Arab nationalism and the unity of the Arab nation. In 1936, the communist party of Syria and Lebanon made its first public appearance under a tolerant Popular Front government in Paris. The party, nevertheless, had operated clandestinely since 1925. Most of these ideological parties proved their durability politically, and provided a challenge both to the confessional system, to the personalized politics of the bosses, or *zu'ama*, and to the mandatory authorities themselves.

But the atavistic polarization in Lebanon, in spite of party agitiations in the streets, persisted amongst the political bosses who represented their individual sects. In part to allay Muslim sensitivities in conformity with the spirit of 1936 draft treaty, and in part to split the Arab nationalists in Tripoli(59), Emile Eddé appointed a pan-Arab unionist, Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab (5 January 1937-21 March 1938), as prime minister. More importantly, Eddé and al-Ahdab established the tradition that every later

prime minister would come from the Sunni Muslim community while the presidency remained the exclusive reserve of the Maronites.

The pressures for a Christian-Muslim rapprochement on national grounds came from Christian quarters as well. Such halfmeasures used by Eddé in employing Ahdab, or his successors, Amir Khalid Shihab (21 March-1 November 1938), ʻAbdallah al-Yafi (2 November 1938-21 September 1939), and Ahmad al-Daʿuq (10 April 1941-27 July 1942), did not suffice to clear sectarian irreconcilabilities. One such effort for reconciliation emanated from Yusuf al-Sawda, a prominent Maronite politician and historian known for his anti-mandatory views. In May of 1939, a meeting of intellectuals held in his home terminated with the signature of a "Lebanese National Pact." It called for drastic reforms within the state, for the complete independence of Lebanon within its original boundaries, and for strengthening relations with neighboring Arab countries on condition that each state retain its own sovereign entity(60). Both Qazim al-Sulh and al-Sawda, so far remote voices in the Lebanese political wilderness, held strikingly similar views. In a few years, however, their ideas would gain wide currency and lay the ground for the 1943 National Pact.

The legacy of French and British partitioning of the Middle East proved too durable for the Lebanese Arab nationalists to overturn despite the popular strength of their movement. They now faced other rival Lebanese and pan-Syrian nationalist currents which aimed at preserving the territorial status quo or altering it in directions other than what the proponents of the early Arab societies had in mind when they launched their revolt against the Turks. The structure of government in Lebanon, furthermore, intensified the sectarian cleavages of domestic Lebanese politics and delayed the emergence of a united national bloc against the French mandate. Nevertheless, the release of French-British hold over the Levant came not from any internal or regional process, but from the approaching conflagration of the Second World War.



Map 5: Allied Entry into Syria and Lebanon, 28 September-30 October 1918



Map 6: Lebanon's Southern Borders, 1920-1923

1. The British-French agreement of 1904, generally known as the *Entente cordiale*, was initially a colonial agreement: France secured British rule in Egypt in exchange for similar recognition of French hegemony in Morocco. The rapprochement persisted as a military alliance against Germany in the years 1914-18 (Jukka Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East (London, 1969), p. 1. For 1904 British-French agreement see J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, vol. 1: European Expansion, 1535-1914 (New Haven, 1975), pp. 507-10.
2. To surmise French claims in Lebanon beyond the vagaries of diplomatic notes, more expert advice was needed. A special senate committee drew up a memorandum known as the Flandin Report, which delineated French territory as a continuous belt of territory on the Eastern Mediterranean littoral. Stretching from Cilicia in the north to Palestine in the south, the widely quoted report envisaged the area in swooping strategic terms as necessary for the defence of France. The railroad networks of Syria and their extension into Palestine (built with French assistance), supplied an additional imperial motive for French claims (Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924 (New York, 1964), pp. 163f.). The British also sequestered expert advice. The cabinet formed an interdepartmental "Committee on Asiatic Turkey" headed by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, a foreign office official, joined by Lieutenant Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, an expert on the Middle East and the personal representative of the secretary of state for war, Lord Kitchener. The committee's report in June 1915, presented four possible solutions for parcelling Ottoman territory. In all four, Lebanon passed unequivocally under French control (For text of de Bunsen's report see J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record: vol. II: British-French Supremacy 1914-1945 (New Haven, 1979), pp. 26ff).
3. The French-British understanding later extended in May-October 1916, into a tripartite understanding with the inclusion of Russia.
4. Andrew, op. cit., p.106.
5. Ibid., p.97.
6. François Georges-Picot to Albert Defrance, 1 August 1916, AMAE, MSS 2, as cited by Andrew, ibid., p.101.
7. Hakim, op. cit., p.238.
8. The French general staff estimated that 80,000 Lebanese had starved to death (Andrew, op. cit., pp.107f).
9. For the confusion between Arabism and Syrianism, see Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, op. cit., p. 46.
10. The French contributed to the Arab revolt by stationing Lieutenant Colonel Edouard Brémond with a body of 356 Berber troops in the Hijaz (Sachar, op. cit., p. 135).
11. Hurewitz, II, op. cit., pp. 184, 202, 211.
12. Faysal's efforts found relief in President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, America's terms for a peace settlement, primarily Point Twelve which promised autonomy for alien peoples under Turkish rule. Though the significance of Wilson's crusade for self-determination has sometimes

been questioned, the United States temporarily reduced the prospects of applying the Sykes-Picot arrangement and supported the Arab interpretation of a postwar Middle East. Faysal's efforts also met the sympathies of British officials who desired to see the French out of the Middle East, or at least debilitated beyond measure. People such as Lawrence of Arabia, General Edmond Allenby, and members of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, who distributed wartime propaganda in the Middle East and considered the Arab Revolt as their brainchild, resisted French diplomacy in Paris.

13. See Lyn Lohéac, Dawud Ammoun et la creation de l'état libanais (Paris, 1978).
14. The demands were raised in Egypt, and paradoxically speaking, with British prodding, by August Adib Pasha and Yusuf al-Sawda's al-Ittihad al-Lubnani (Khalifah, op. cit., pp. 100-106).
15. Khairallah Khairallah's revamped Comité libanais de Paris (1917) and Na'um Makarzil's al-Nahda al-Lubnaniyyah had earlier advocated these claims ('Isam Kamal Khalifah, Al-Hudud al-Janubiyyah li-Lubnan: Bayn Mawaqif Nukhab al-Tawa'if wal-Sira' al-Dawli (1908-1936) [Lebanon's Southern Borders: Between the Positions of the Confessional Elites and International Rivalry (1908-1936)] (Beirut, 1981), pp.148-156). The French naturally had a hand in encouraging Lebanon's enlargement. Henri Lammens, missionary and historian, seemed to have advocated such proposals back in 1902, and to have greatly influenced his Lebanese contemporaries (Khalifah, idem, p.19). And in October 1918, French agents were ordered to encourage the union of Tripoli, Beirut, and the Beqa', with Lebanon (Andrew, op. cit., p. 161).
16. Nevakivi, op. cit., pp. 119f.
17. The United States did not lack Lebanese champions to extend its very own mandate over the area, such as George Khairallah and Philip Hitti's Nouvelle ligue nationale syrienne (Khalifah, Abhath fi Tarikh Lubnan al-Mu'asir, op. cit., p. 99).
18. See "Les revendications du Liban Memoire de la délégation libanaise a la Conference de la Paix, II 25 October 1919" in Antoine Hokayem and Marie Claude Bittar, Collection l'histoire par les documents: Vol. VI: L'empire ottoman, les Arabes, et les grandes puissances. 1914-1920 (Beyrouth, 1981), pp. 197-207.
19. 'Abd al-Aziz Sulayman Nuwar, Watha'iq Asasiyyah min Tarikh Lubnan al-Hadith. 1517-1920 [Basic Documents from the Modern History of Lebanon, 1517-1920] (Beirut, 1974), p. 530.
20. The British interest in northern Palestine rested on championing the Zionist claims for settling the area. Maximalist Zionist demands for a viable but later unattainable "historic" Palestine included parts of Lebanon south of the Litani River as well as the Beqa'. In Syria, it included the regions of Jabal al-Druze, the Hawran, the water sources of the Yarmuk River, and Mount Hermon. (Sachar, op. cit., pp. 281-84).
21. Nevakivi, op. cit., pp. 223-249.
22. Ibid., p. 195.

23. Not all Christians supported the council's policy. See memos protesting the declaration of the Syrian kingdom in Yusuf Mizhir, Tarikh Lubnan al-'Am [General History of Lebanon] vol. 2, (Beirut, n.d.), p. 916.
24. The French accused 'Arif al-Na'mani, a rich Sunni merchant from Beirut and a friend of Sharif Faysal, of bribing the council with 12,500 gold pounds. The French subsequently arrested al-Na'mani and banished him for one year and a half to the island of Corsica (Zeine, op. cit., p. 166; Qurban, op. cit., pp. 147f).
25. Karam, op. cit., pp. 252f.
26. Nuwar, op. cit., p., 545- 48.
27. Zamir, op. cit., pp. 92ff.
28. Prime Minister Millerand promised a third Lebanese delegation in Paris on 23 August 1920, that the cities of Beirut and Tripoli will similarly become part of Lebanese territory without compromising the special privileges of Mount Lebanon.
29. Philips Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945 (Princeton, N.J., 1987), pp. 28, 53.
30. Longrigg, op. cit., p. 376.
31. The sectarian distribution of the council was as follows: 6 Maronites, 3 Greek Orthodox, 1 Greek Catholic, 2 Sunnis, 2 Shi'is and 1 Druze. See Hassan al-Hallaq, Al-Tayyarat al-Siyasiyyah fi Lubnan, 1943-1952 [Political Currents in Lebanon, 1943-1952] (Beirut, 1981), p. 59.
32. Mas'ud Dahir, Tarikh Lubnan al-Ijtima'i, 1914-1926 [Lebanon's Social History, 1914-1926] (Beirut, 1984), pp. 51-55. It could hardly be expected of the French not to take advantage of the divisiveness of Lebanon's political climate to perpetuate their imperial control or, as they perceived it, to prevent violent internal strife. See for example the statement by the French ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, to Georges-Picot over the need for external authority to curb the various rites and religions in the Orient as cited in Andrew, op. cit., p. 93.
33. For early pan-Arab military resistance to the French occupation, see Hasan Muhammad Sa'd, Jabal 'Amil bayn al-Atrak wal-Firinsiyyin. 1914-1920 [Mount 'Amil between the Turks and the French, 1914-1920] (Beirut, 1980).
34. Bisharah al-Khuri, Haqa'iq Lubnaniyyah [Lebanese Realities] vol. 1, (Beirut, 1960), p. 309; Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, Al-Naza'at al-Siyasiyyah bi-Lubnan 'Ahd al-Intidab wal-Ihtilal, 1918-1945 [Political Tendencies in Lebanon in the Mandate and Occupation Period, 1918-1945] (Beirut, 1977), p. 11.
35. Al-Khuri, ibid., pp. 116-120.
36. Other measures that dealt with confessionalism under the mandate included two statutes issued on 13 March 1936 (No. 60 R.L.) and on 18 November 1938 (No. 146 R.L.). The first law declared two types of religious sects: communautés de statut personnel (personal status communities) and communautés de droit commun (common law communities). The former constituted the following "historical" sects among the Christians: Maronites, Greek orthodox, Melchite Catholic (Greek Catholic), Gregorian Armenian (Orthodox), Armenian Catholic, Syrian Orthodox, Syrian

Catholic, Chaldea-Assyrian (Nestorian), Chaldean (Catholics) and the Latin. The Muslim sects constituted the Sunni, Shi'i (Mutwali or Ja'fari), 'Alawi, Isma'ili, and Druze. The Yazidis were left unrecognized. Lastly, the historical sects included the Israeli (Jewish) sect. The second law (No. 146 R.L.) augmented the Christian list of personal status communities with the Protestant and the Anglican. The common law communities referred to those who wished to form a new religious sect for whatever purpose, (although hardly anyone exercised this right to exercise religious freedom throughout the mandatory period concerned). The importance of the laws lie not only in ordaining the equality of political rights between Muslims and non-Muslims, or dhimma as some Muslim jurists call them; it also equalized them in "confessional" rights. Hence the Sunni and Shi'i sects became equivalent under law to the Christian sects although Islamic law recognized no such intersectarian Muslim division. This resulted in the outbreak of violent demonstrations in Syria and similar protestations in Lebanon. Yielding to pressure, the high commissioner amended the statute on 30 March 1939 (No. 53 R.L.) declaring that the earlier statute (No. 146 R.L.) did not apply to the Muslim community. Esoterically, this meant that only the Christians were recognized as divided into religious sects. See excellent study by the constitutionalist expert Edmond Rabbat, La formation historique de Liban politique et constitutionnel: Essai de synthèse (Beirut, 1973), pp. 91-97.

37. Article 95 stated,

> *As a provisional measure and according to Article one of the Charter of the Mandate and for the sake of justice and amity, the sects shall be equitably represented in public employment and in composition of the Ministry, provided that such measures will not harm the general welfare of the state*.

While Article 96 followed with the stipulation that,

> *According to Articles twenty-two and ninety-five, the seats of the Senate shall be distributed among the sects as follows: five Maronites; three Sunnis; three Shi'is; three Greek Orthodox; one Catholic; one Druze; one minorities (sic).*

38. For a breakdown of sectarian positions *vis a vis* the French mandate see Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, p. 169; for sectarian attitudes toward union with Syria, see Meo., op. cit., pp. 56-59.
39. Some historians consider that the meeting in Damascus on 23 July 1928, as constituting the first 'Conference of the Coast'. See Raghid Solh, "The Attitude of the Arab nationalists towards Greater Lebanon during the 1930's," in Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus (London, 1988), p. 154. Attempts to reach a Muslim-Christian rapprochement persisted, such as the meeting held at Najib Sursuq's house on 6 March 1926, but to no avail (Zamir, op. cit., pp. 212f.).
40. This might have prompted the historian Kamal Salibi to note that the system of political clientele began with French assistance to its Muslim friends in power and that Christian leaders subsequently followed in emulation (Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, op. cit., p. 192).

41. Ilyas al-Dayri, Man Yasnaʿ al-Ra'is? [Who Makes the President?] (Beirut, 1982), p. 40. For list of cabinets formed under the mandate, see Mizhir, op. cit., pp. 133lff.
42. Eliahu Elath, "ʻPhoenician Zionism' in Lebanon", Jerusalem Quarterly 42(1987), pp. 40-43.
43. Khuri, op. cit., 1: 175-79.
44. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, op. cit., p. 176.
45. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 233.
46. Al-Hallaq, op. cit., p.77.
47. The result of the census from which all subsequent official estimates of Lebanon's populations were henceforth derived, yielded the following:

Lebanese Population by Sect according to 1932 Census

Sect	Resident in Lebanon	Emigrant Abroad
Maronites	227,800	123,397
Greek Orthodox	77,312	57,031
Greek Catholics	36,709	29,627
Armenian Orthodox	25,462	1,970
Armenian catholic	5,695	454
Protestants	6,869	2,931
Jews	3,588	415
Syrian Catholics	2,675	312
Syrian Orthodox	2,723	97
Roman Catholics	--	--
Chaldean Catholics	548	25
Chaldeo-Assyrians	190	--
Latins	--	--
Sunnis	178,130	17,205
Shiʻis	155,035	10,910
Druze	53,334	8,750
Others	6,393	1,160

Earlier French census in 1922 and 1930, had also raised acrimonious debate over the validity of each sect's total population (Dahir, op. cit., p. 55).

48. Longrigg, op. cit., p. 202.
49. The president of Syria, Shaykh Taj al-Din al-Hasani, supported these French measures and ensured himself the continuity of his office and the enmity of the national leaders (Edmun Rabbat, Al-Wasit fi al-Oanun al-Disturi al-Lubnani [Introduction to Lebanese Constitutional Law] (Beirut, 1970), p. 384).
50. See Hassan al-Hallaq, Mu'tamar al-Sahil wal-Aqdiyyah al-Arbaʻah, 1936: Munaqashat Jalsat al-Mu'tamar wal-Oararat [The Conference of the Coast and the Four Qazas: Conference Discussion Sessions and Resolutions] (Beirut, 1983), p. 24 et. seq.
51. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 237. See also Salim ʻAli Salam, Mudhakkarat Salim ʻAli Salam (1868-1938) [Memoirs of Salim ʻAli Salam (1868-1938)] (Beirut, 1982), p. 81.

52. A.H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London, 1946), p.202.
53. Rabbat, Al-Wasit fi al-Qanun al-Disturi, op. cit., pp. 393f.
54. Basim al-Jisr, Mithaq 1943: Limadha Kan? Wa-Hal Saqat? [The 1943 Pact: Why was It? And Has It Collapsed?] (Beirut, 1978), pp. 81-85, 466-77.
55. See full text of Qazim al-Sulh's monograph issued on 5 April 1937, "Mushkilah al-Itisal wal-Infisal fi Lubnan [The Problem of Linkage and Secession in Lebanon]," in al-Hallaq, op. cit., pp. 75-89.
56. Entelis, op. cit., p. 46.
57. Suleiman, op. cit., pp. 201-13; Solh, op. cit., p. 155.
58. See Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (Cambridge, Mass., 1966).
59. Fadia Kiwan, "La perception du Grand-Liban chez les Maronites dans la periode du mandat," 11 in Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus (London, 1988), p. 137. The 1936 draft treaty had also contained a provision (6 and 6 bis), which enjoined a "just" representation for all regions in Lebanon. This was explained as insuring equitable Christian-Muslim representation, in the sense that the country's geographic structure mirrored some form of confessional, and by implication, sectarian balance (Yusuf Qazma al-Khuri, Al-Ta'ifiyyah fi Lubnan min Khilal Munaqashat Majlis al-Nuwwab, 1923-1987 [Confessionalism in Lebanon from the Debates of the Chamber of Deputies, 1923-1987] (Beirut, 1989), pp. 33-36).
60. Jisr, op. cit., pp. 84ff.

(3)
The Second World War, Independence, and the National Pact

In congruence with the central theme of this study on the interplay between domestic, regional and international politics, French withdrawal from Lebanon would ultimately bring forth a new sectarian formula in the redistribution of power. The quintessential role played by the different sectarian "building blocs" by which each sect had knitted cultural, religious, economic and ultimately political cords with regional and international sponsors, meant that any change in the regional and international settings ultimately would bring about a shift in sectarian "checks and balances," if one might term it so. By implication, these changes had to be far reaching and permeable enough to ensure that the sectarian redistribution of power in Lebanon be eduring to meet external challenges.

Accordingly, the defeat of metropolitan France in the Second World War could not be considered a reversible historical event. Neither France nor her imperial rival, Great Britain, could any longer shoulder the strategic burden of the mandates in the Middle East, and that fact would ultimately force them to proffer independence upon Lebanon and Syria and beyond. It was symptomatic of the loss of power by a predominantly European international system and its replacement by the new one dominated by the bipolar rivalry between two emerging superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The sectarian distribution of power in the wake of French withdrawal would close the gap between Christian and Muslim representation in the state, and would confirm the existing parcelling of power whereby a Maronite would hold the position of the presidency and a Sunni would hold the post of prime minister. This 1943 internal rapprochement, known as the National Pact, found the Maronite leadership acquiescing to the denial of French military protection in a potentially restricted Christian Lebanon in favor of complete independence. In exchange, the Arab nationalist and Muslim leadership forsook traditional calls for unity with Syria in favor of regional cooperation as would be promulgated in a few years by the Arab League.

Upon the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939, the French high commissioner, Gabriel Puaux (1938-1940) suspended the constitution and dismissed the ministry and the chamber while retaining Emile Eddé as president of Lebanon. Puaux, known for his intellectual vacillation, replaced the stubborn Count Damien de Martel (1933-1938) who had vigorously pressed Paris to adopt the 1936 French-Lebanese draft treaty. The approach of war, however, meant his demise, for the *Quai d'Orsay* required someone

who could assuage local apprehensions without necessarily weakening the mandate authority; hence Puaux[1].

The shattering fall of France under the German blitzkrieg in June 1940, which ushered in a collaborationist Vichy government naturally predirected a change of French administration in Syria and Lebanon. General Henri Dentz, one of the officers whose harsh treatment of the native population led to the 1926-1926 Syrian revolt, replaced Puaux as high commissioner. He took command of the French army of occupation, *l'armée du Levant*, reduced after the armistice to 40,000 officers and men out of an original 120,000[2]. On 4 April, General Dentz replaced Eddé with Alfred Naqqash, a politically unknown lawyer, as head of state.

The British decided to launch a preemptive invasion of Syria and Lebanon when they realized that the combined strategy of nationalist agitation in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and the Axis offensives in North Africa and the Mediterranean could very well upturn their presence in the area[3]. The leader of the Free French resistance movement, General Charles de Gaulle, falsely assumed that his aide, General Georges Catroux, would easily march on Damascus and Beirut and retrieve the situation in concert with exclusively French forces[4].

On the eve of "Operation Exporter," the codename for the British-staffed invasion of the Levant, Catroux heralded the independence of Syria and Lebanon. De Gaulle had designated him Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary, instead of high commissioner, in order to eliminate any allusion to the mandatory office. On 14 July 1941, a defeated Dentz signed an armistice in which he specifically surrendered to British and not to Gaullist military command, receiving in return generous terms to repatriate his army to France. Alternatively, de Gaulle particularly vied for another part of that army, the *Troupes spéciales de Levant*, or locally recruited volunteer units, considered indispensable for the maintenance of internal order and continued French mandatory control. These, however, fell under British command, giving credence to the worst Gaullist fears that Dentz had effectively handed Syria and Lebanon to the British[5].

Prime Minister Winston Churchill attempted to assure de Gaulle that France must have the predominant position in Syria and Lebanon over any other European power. The Free French would administer the mandate while the British kept the overall military command. De Gaulle and Catroux hence proceeded to contact local political leaders in Lebanon on the subject of their new status. The two men succeeded in narrowing the issue to the election of a new president. Screening potential candidates, the Frenchmen discovered that the personal rivalry of al-Khuri and Eddé, a preindependence phenomenon, permeated the contest for the post. Surprisingly Catroux decided to bypass both candidates, and reconfirmed the head of state, Alfred Naqqash, as the new president of an "independent" Lebanon.

French officials clarified to querying Lebanese statesmen that war exigencies, territorial security, and the needs of the Allied forces prevented French magnanimity from going any further[6]. But there was to be no explicit transfer of powers to local rule. The delegate-general could legislate by decree, impose strict press censorship, and retain the "*intérêts communs*" department. The department administered proceeds of taxes to both Syria and Lebanon on such items as currency, customs, concessions, posts, and telegraphs, which next to direct taxation, constituted the largest sources of revenue.

With the Allied dispensations of promises for independence, Arab states began to play an increasingly active role in Lebanon. The British had encouraged their client Arab states, Egypt and Iraq, to intervene in the Levant situation by having them supporting the indigenous pan-Arab nationalists there. The two Arab governments, thus, refused to recognize the new Free French regimes. Saudi Arabia granted a formal recognition and this to Syrian independence alone, thereby honoring Syrian political demands against the territorial legitimacy of the Lebanese state[7]. The Gaullists mistakenly assumed that the United States would support their version of the new status of the mandated territories. But the American government took an identical position to that of Iraq and Egypt, abashing French expectations in the process.

Moreover, Catroux's troubles multiplied when Major General Edward L. Spears, head of the British liaison mission to the Free French in the Levant, conducted a unilateral campaign against the French mandate amongst Lebanese politicians. He found an extremely potent ally in Bkarki, the seat of the Maronite patriarchate, where demands for unconditional independence resurfaced. Patriarch 'Aridah organized an all-Christian conference on 25 December 1941, attended by a few Muslim personalities. The conference issued a series of demands calling for the transferal of the administration to Lebanese nationals, for free elections, and for declaring null and void every action taken by the Naqqash government which might limit the country's independence[8].

The British additionally encouraged the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, to invite Bisharah al-Khuri and the Syrian nationalist leader, Jamil Mardam Bey, to Cairo on 3 June 1942. The topic was to be the future of Arab cooperation. Al-Khuri emphasized in the talks that Lebanon wanted complete independence within its existing boundaries and only on that basis would it cooperate with Arab states. He admitted that some Christians might oppose Arab cooperation and seek European protection, but nevertheless he and his colleagues in the Constitutional Bloc endorsed the doctrine of an enlarged Arab association. In reply, Mardam Bey reiterated that when and if Syria became confident of the sincerity of the Lebanese desire for independence, it would abandon its demands for Lebanese

territory, and might even support the transfer of additional territory to Lebanon if need be *(sic)*[9].

President-to-be al-Khuri did not exactly gamble away his political future by throwing his lot in with the British but his dallying with ideas of Arab regional cooperation forced him to undertake an apologetic retreat in front of his Maronite constituency, ever fearful of the Islamic underpinnings of Arab unity. Indeed certain pro-French critics argued that the 1943 National Pact, the unwritten agreement between al-Khuri and the Arab nationalist leader from Sidon, Riyad al-Sulh, over independence from France in exchange for rearranging the confessional distribution of power, was the brainchild of that June 1942 meeting in Cairo[10].

Notwithstanding the combined pressure of British administrators and opposition nationalists meticulously circumventing the Free French, Spears bluntly urged Naqqash to expel the French from Lebanon. The British Foreign Office realized to their mortification that Spear's personality, his Francophobia, and the manner by which he sought to uphold British prestige created parsimonious friction with the French in Lebanon[11]. Toward the end of July the British resident minister of state advised Spears to abandon his personal crusade on behalf of the Arabs, and apologized to Catroux in the name of the British government[12].

General de Gaulle for his part, refused to modify his insistence on a preferential treaty that would assure France a privileged position in Lebanon as his price for full independence. In a visit to Syria and Lebanon in August 1942, he declared that there would be no cession of any portion of French patrimony until a regularly constituted government in Paris could take such a decision. Needless to say, his intransigence precipitated a crisis with Britain, by which he attempted once and for all to forestall further British interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon and Syria. In two meetings with Churchill on 8 August and 27 September 1942, both men held fast to their respective positions and their wartime collaboration almost came to an end[13].

Churchill finally convinced the Gaullist French National committee to declare before the passage of the year that elections in Lebanon would be held by the spring of 1943. On 18 March 1943, Catroux announced the restoration of the constitutional regime in Lebanon and appointed a provisional government headed by Dr. Ayyub Thabit, Eddé's former secretary of state and one of his close supporters. With elections fixed for 29 August 1943, Naqqash viewed the above developments as a manifestation of French dictatorship and refused to resign on the basis that his was the legitimate government of an independent state. The smooth execution of Catroux's measures indicated that this was not so, and President Naqqash reluctantly stepped down.

Under pressure to restore normal constitutional life, the French encouraged President Thabit to float ideas of a smaller, predominantly

Christian Lebanon, independent of but in close economic relations with the Muslim hinterland, and enjoying international rather than exclusively French guarantees and protection. Bitterly outspoken against any federation with Syria or other Arab states, he perceived pan-Arabism, the advocacy of a political alliance of all Arab states, as disguised pan-Islamism[14]. Thabit insisted Lebanon must endure a Christian settlement[15].

Emile Eddé thought along similar lines[16]. For him, Lebanon was and would always be a mountain of potential refuge, retaining its communal social structure, its strengthening nationalism, and the best Western principles of government. It followed that independence meant no ties or federation with what he considered a culturally backward Muslim hinterland. And for that reason, Lebanon needed the protection of a strong friendly power[17].

Thabit therefore issued two decrees on 17 June 1943, fixing the number of deputies to be elected to the chamber at fifty-four, of which thirty-two seats were assigned to the Christian sects and twenty-two to the Muslim. Originally in 1936, the ratio was only twenty-two to twenty. President Thabit derived the new figures by enfranchising those emigrants abroad who had retained their Lebanese nationality and who were in their majority Christian[18].

The pan-Arabist Muslims quickly reacted to the projected diminution of their representation with violent demonstrations and protest. On 21 June 1943, they held a conference in Beirut wherein the Arab nationalist leaders, such as al-Sulh and the deputy from Tripoli, ‘Abd al-Hamid Karami, threatened to reactivate traditional calls for unity with Syria if Lebanon refused to recognize its Arab character[19]. As if in harmony with these utterances, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt instantly protested Thabit’s measures, declaring their diplomatic support for the Lebanese Arab nationalist position[20].

The Maronite patriarch, who had otherwise supported Thabit’s decrees[21], denounced the attitude of the Arab nationalist leadership as an attack against both the Christian majority and the integrity of the state itself. Against the flurry of charges and countercharges, a compromise solution was worked out through the intervention of Spears and Egyptian Prime Minister Nahhas. It narrowed the difference in the chamber by reallocating only thirty seats to the Christians and twenty-five to the Muslim sects - a ratio of six to five[22]. For his having displayed an untimely partisanship, Thabit had to go, and the French removed him on 21 June after only a few months in office. They replaced him with Petro Trad, a Greek Orthodox lawyer, on 3 July 1943.

Because Bisharah al-Khuri’s Constitutional Bloc did not possess the same reservations that Eddé and Thabit held *vis-à-vis* the Muslim hinterland, French agents propagated against the Constitutionalists in the subsequent electoral campaign, with charges that they had sold Lebanon out to the

Arabs. The elections of 29 August 1943, therefore, were marred by an obstreperous competition between the Eddé and Khuri blocs. Jean Helleu, who had replaced Catroux as delegate general on 3 June, supported Eddé, while Spears did not conceal his endorsement of al-Khuri[23]. The Constitutional Bloc and the Arab nationalists, however, carried the day, winning a clear majority everywhere except in Mount Lebanon.

No sooner had the parliamentary elections ended than commenced the maneuvers for the selection of a president. Spears, who no doubt exercised a newly found power, surprisingly felt unenthusiastic about al-Khuri as president, preferring a new Maronite figure, such as Camille Chamoun, a young and promising lawyer in the Constitutional Bloc. Helleu, in a dire attempt to capture the initiative, tried to persuade al-Khuri to withdraw in favor of Eddé. Al-Khuri, in a deft riposte, signed a paper declaring that he and Eddé withdrew their candidacy in Chamoun's favor. The Frenchman, so horrified at the prospect that Chamoun, a man he considered subservient to the British, might reach the highest office in a territory under French control, pursued the matter no further[24].

Eddé, in realizing his traditional weak support among Muslim representatives in the chamber, met with Karami and 'Adil 'Usayran, a Shi'i leader from southern Lebanon, and apparently promised them that he would federate Lebanon with Syria. Perhaps he had in mind a more constricted but autonomous Christian presence, leaving the Muslim districts free rein to rejoin Syria in some sort of loose yet undefined arrangment. When the Muslim deputies in turn submitted this proposal to al-Khuri, he flatly rejected it but said that he had promised to cooperate with the Arab states and that promise he would keep[25]. Riyad al-Sulh himself began to lean toward Eddé, with whom he had struck a concordance during preelectoral maneuvering, while Sa'ib, son and political heir of Salim Salam, retained his preference for al-Khuri[26]. Riyad's mind began to change after a meeting in Damascus with his Syrian nationalist friends, who emerged victorious from their July 1943 elections. He set up a meeting between them and Eddé in Sawfar, but they were not swayed. The Syrians unambiguously preferred al-Khuri for president.

Indeed, the willingness of the Lebanese pan-Arabists to forsake the long standing demands for Syrian unity greatly surprised Spears himself, who could only interpret it as the growing prestige of the office of the prime minister in the perceptions of the Arab nationalists in Lebanon and hence their willingness to compromise on that time-honored pan-Arab issue[27]. It was for that reason, perhaps, that Spears leaned toward Bisharah for president and toyed, for a time, with the idea of Sa'ib for prime minister instead of Riyad[28].

Faced with the coalition of Constitutionalists and Arab unionists, Eddé attempted as a last resort to repeat his 1932 tactic and nominate the Sunni leader Sami al-Sulh for the presidency. The attempt failed to gain the

required momentum[29]. Sensing a coalition, al-Khuri had his first serious conference with Riyad al-Sulh on 19 September 1943. The Maronite candidate promised him the premiership in exchange for Muslim and Arab nationalist recognition of and loyalty to the new Lebanese regime. Riyad answered that if the agreement on Lebanese independence was open and honest, preserving the dignity of both Muslims and Christians, allocating equal rights for Muslims in the new regime, he guaranteed its dutiful acceptance by the Lebanese Muslims and by the Arab rulers, especially those of Syria.

The Syrians for that matter, while convinced of the desirability of al-Khuri as president, were not totally persuaded that Lebanon should become completely sovereign and independent. Al-Sulh promised al-Khuri he would solve this matter if long-standing Arab nationalist grievances were addressed. Al-Khuri, on the other hand, promised that should an agreement be reached confirming the permanence of Lebanese sovereignty then it would be possible for Lebanon to participate in some form of regional arrangement[30].

On 21 September 1943, the chamber met and elected al-Khuri president of the Lebanese republic by forty-four votes to nil. The president conferred with his new prime minister designate, Riyad al-Sulh, sometime between 21 September and 7 October in the mountain resort of ‘Aley. They allegedly agreed on the principles that Lebanon would achieve complete independence unfettered by a security treaty with France, that the special cultural ties with the West be retained, and that cooperation with the Arab states would be conditional on their recognition of the present Lebanese boundaries. In allocating governmental positions, justice would be observed in any newly proposed power sharing among the sects.

Al-Sulh embodied his version of the agreement in his ministerial address on 7 October 1943[31]. He stressed that his government, despite British-French presence, assumed all powers as the legitimate constitutional authority of an independent state. The crucial statement that defined Lebanon’s Arab policy, and repeatedly quoted as al-Sulh’s finest, was that “we do not want Lebanon to be a foothold for imperialism and they do not want it to be a bridge leading imperialism to them.” In addition, he wanted to make some concession to Christian political opinion with regard to the special nature of Lebanon and equally satisfy Muslim opinion that the country was Arab. It is claimed that he originally wanted to declare “Lebanon is a Christian country with an Arab face” [32], or “an Arab country with a Christian face” [33]. He finally opted for “Lebanon is a country with an Arab face.” In a sense, he included his contribution to the confusion of Lebanon’s identity, and the Arabism of Lebanon in 1943 was never in itself conceptually clarified[34].

There extended beyond the verbal agreement between the two leaders another unwritten understanding whose substance articulated an

acceptance of the inner dynamics of the sectarian system[35]. Whereas the first detailed part of the agreement could be found in the official declarations, speeches, and memoirs of the various politicians of the era, the second part retroactively applied to all manifestations of the French-inspired sectarian government before and after 1926. Although al-Sulh condemned in his address to the chamber the "poisonous" institution of confessionalism and hoped for its eventual demise, he well nigh conceded to its survivability as a temporary challenge to the Free French presence in Lebanon.[36].

Thus the National Pact clinched a package deal that engrossed Lebanon's independence from France, its adherence to a nascent Arab regional system, and a redistribution of sectarian privileges. Here again one encounters the interplay of domestic, regional, and international politics, so vital to Lebanon's sovereignty and permeability. A popular but erroneous contention had been that the pact formalized the practice of allocating the top political offices on a sectarian basis such that the president must be a Maronite and the prime minister a Sunni[37]. Notwithstanding that he principle of sectarianism had been institutionalized under the French mandate in the 1926 constitution, the Maronites of all Christian sects had monopolized the post of the presidency which they had held intermittently since 1933. The prime ministry, on the other hand, had been a Sunni reserve since 1936. Perhaps the only "genuine" sectarian contribution of 1943 was that the presidency of the chamber henceforth became the prerogative of a member of the Shi'i community[38]. Thus the pact reconfirmed, rather than abandoned, the tradition of dividing political jurisdiction among the various sectarian religious groups[39].

That famous 7 October 1943 ministerial address by al-Sulh escalated the challenge to the Free French presence in Lebanon. His government did not waste time in meeting with the Syrians on 20 and 25 October 1943, after which the two governments jointly submitted identical notes to Helleu requesting the conversion of the French delegations into diplomatic missions, the surrender of the intérêts communs, and the transfer of all attributes of sovereignty to the local authorities. The British government thought the announcement untimely and a mistake. Spears alone seemed to disregard caution and egged the nationalists onwards[40].

These measures could hardly have disposed the French to docile acquiescense. Helleu warned al-Khuri on 22 October that the mandate was still in force and that the Algerian-based Free French National Committee would not accept the proposed constitutional amendments. The delegate general left six days later to Algiers for further consultation. There he received an inner directive from de Gaulle and Catroux to the effect that no transfer of powers was to be accepted without reaching a contractual arrangement with the Levantine states[41].

The Lebanese chamber defiantly took occasion of the delegate general's absence to push for a sitting on 8 November. The deputies

subsequently met and unanimously passed a bill amending the articles of the constitution by deleting all references to the French mandate.[42]. Taking into consideration the likely possibility that the French would resort to a forceful closure of parliament, Lebanese officials consulted with British and American representatives in an attempt to gain their diplomatic support[43].

The French reaction, however, was more brutal than expected. At 4 a.m. on 11 November, Helleu ordered security agents to arrest the president, the prime minister, and the ministers, which they proceeded to do in a rough and undignified manner. The French arrested deputy ‘Abd al-Hamid Karami later during the day. This the delegate general carried out despite his explicit promise to Spears the night before that he would do nothing to disturb the peace[44]. On the eve of the arrests, Helleu broadcast a speech in which he dissolved the chamber, appointed Eddé head of state, and accused the prime minister of being a German agent[45]. These *coup d’état* tactics were probably instigated with the full knowledge and complicity of de Gaulle in Algiers. They were certainly unknown to the veteran and more amenable Catroux who initially thought the whole affair a British joke. Upon confirmation, he took leave immediately for Beirut to rectify the situation on the spot. His first reaction upon arrival was to sharply curtail Helleu’s powers on 17 November[46].

The Lebanese reacted to the French measures in a manner far exceeding any previous confrontation with the mandate authority. The *Kata’ib* and the *Najjadah* forgot their rivalries, close ranks, and organized violent demonstrations and strikes. This merited the arrest of Pierre Jumayyil, the leader of the *Kata’ib*. The Maronite patriarch and the Sunni mufti protested strongly to diplomatic agents. The only two ministers to escape arrest reformed the government in Bshamun, in the Shuf, and contested the legitimacy of Eddé’s provisional rule. Colonial Senegalese troops, perhaps the largest body of French troops concentrated in Lebanon and Syria, fired amuck on protesting civilians. The Druze hastened to form ad hoc military units. A few deputies braved the cordon of French troops around the chamber and held a meeting in which the new flag replaced the old one with the French-inspired tricolor.

Arab reaction was equally adamant. Demonstrations broke out in Damascus, Cairo, Alexandria, and Baghdad. The Saudi monarch, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud protested to Churchill, Roosevelt, and de Gaulle. The prime minister of Iraq and the Egyptian monarch warned the British that their prestige would be seriously damaged if they took no measures to restore the legitimate Lebanese government. Nahhas Pasha held a ‘Day of Struggle with the Lebanese People’, pledging support for beleaguered Lebanese independence.

As the Lebanese crisis had suddenly become internationalized and ‘Arabized’, the British demanded from Free French officials in Algiers the immediate release of the Lebanese politicians. On 17 November London

decided that a time limit must now be imposed. On 19 November the British informed Catroux that if he failed to release the Lebanese by 10 a.m., 21 November, they would declare martial law in Lebanon and release the ministers by force. The Americans shared British indignation, releasing a vigorous diplomatic protest on 13 November[47].

Though he hoped to salvage the situation by stalling until Helleu's decrees became immutable, Catroux discovered that Emile Eddé's government lacked popularity. He therefore met with al-Khuri in gaol, before receiving the British ultimatum, and offered to reinstate him if he would dismiss Riyad al-Sulh. The president refused, adding that he acquiesced to every word delivered in the ministerial statement that had stirred the whole crisis[48]. After failing to split the national front, Catroux tried to convince al-Sulh to write an explanatory note retracting his government's policies. On that same day, a vindicated Spears presented the British ultimatum which shook and angered the Free French representative but left him no other alternative. On 22 November the French released all the Lebanese ministers. The next day, the president and his ministers simply took over their official functions and reopened parliament without further ado[49].

The victory of the national forces in Lebanon was not without repercussion in neighboring Syria. On 27 November the Syrian chamber passed constitutional reforms identical to the Lebanese, but this time with the French powerless to intervene. On 23 December al-Sulh declared triumphantly that the French had finally agreed to hand Syria and Lebanon effective powers, including the Common Interests, and that the transfer would be concluded on 1 January 1944.

Lebanon's new Arab policy had already fallen under the watchful scrutiny of her pro-British neighbors. The Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Sa'id, a veteran officer of the Arab Revolt, submitted the first serious proposal for Arab union in early 1943, in what was known as the "Fertile Crescent Project." He suggested that Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan reunite into one state and that an Arab League be created to which Iraq and Syria should belong. He added that the Maronites in Lebanon, if they so desired, be granted a privileged administration such as the one they enjoyed during the last years of the Ottoman Empire.

'Abdallah of Trans-Jordan submitted a similar proposal which called for a unified or federated state comprising Syria, Trans-Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon. After the establishment of this state, it would form together with Iraq an Arab federation or confederation that would coordinate foreign policy and defense. If the Lebanese government failed to join, the Syrian territories incorporated in Lebanon against the wishes of their inhabitants would be returned to Syria on the basis of a plebiscite. One could immediately discern that the British supported both versions designed, in

part, to pressure the pro-French nationalists in Lebanon to accede to the Arab orientation of al-Sulh.

The peripheral Arab states, however, feared that such a British undertaking would ultimately lead to Hashimi domination. The latter's credibility had already suffered through their long association with the British and their inability to translate Arab independence and unity into reality[50]. The picture was even more complicated than the Nuri-'Abdallah plans presupposed: Saudi Arabia had feuded with the Hashimis since the latter lost the Hijaz, Syria considered itself republican, and Lebanon displayed its aloof particularism; Egypt, a newcomer to the scene of Arab regional cooperation, found itself urged by the British to play a mediatory role[51].

Taking that lead, Nahhas met with a Syrian delegation on 26 October 1943. The Syrians maintained that they recognized Lebanese independence and renounced all their territorial claims conditional on the actual retention by Lebanon of her Arab orientation, and on the declared establishment of close economic ties with Syria. The Lebanese delegation led by al-Sulh, arrived late in January 1944, delayed by the November crisis with the French. It elucidated the new Arab policy of Lebanon as the interaction of three factors: the weakening of foreign influence, Arab recognition of Lebanese independence within its present natural frontiers, and the internal Lebanese desire to cooperate with the Arab states[52].

The news emanating from Cairo to Beirut conveyed the impression that behind the enthusiastic exchanges of Arab solidarity there lay a strong inclination to bypass the limitations on Arab cooperation set by the National Pact. Upon his return, the prime minister came under parliamentary attack. Certain deputies considered the agreement an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty while others took occasion to declare their support for cooperation but their rejection of Arab unity[53].

Parliamentary displeasure further revealed itself on the election of Yusuf Karam to the chamber for the seat of Mount Lebanon. He was escorted from Zgharta to Beirut on 28 April 1944, in a sort of military demonstration. All along the route armed men displayed support. When the procession reached the chamber, a group of demonstrators attempted to raise the old French-inspired flag, and an armed clash broke out with internal security forces. Six persons were killed and seventeen to twenty injured. The matter dropped when Karam pleaded his case in the chamber, explaining that the whole episode had been an unfortunate occurrence[54]. The fact that Eddé might have orchestrated the Karam incident[55], exacerbated in its wake by al-Sulh's harsh repression, seemed to have overtly alarmed the president. He began to privately criticize his erstwhile prime minister's newly-discovered exercise of power[56].

Compounding his loss of favor, al-Sulh returned to Egypt in September 1944, to attend the meetings of the preparatory committee for a

"League of Arab States", only to be subjected this time to the recriminations of the delegates that Lebanon represented an obstacle to Arab unity. The Syrians did not see fit at the time to corner the Lebanese on this issue because the British and the French impressed upon the two Levantine states the urgency of negotiating some sort of preferential treaty with the French. Churchill had changed his policies again now that German defeat in the world war was a bygone conclusion(57). In response to Lebanese sensitivities, the Syrians suggested the inclusion of a special provision that would affirm the independence of Lebanon. The Arab delegates approved the measure unanimously because they sought to strengthen al-Sulh's hand and to reduce Christian anxieties of a Muslim domination lurking behind the facade of regional cooperation(58).

In the final meeting on 7 October 1944, the keen desire of the Syrians and Lebanese for an Arab association to consolidate their independence against French designs culminated in the "Protocol of Alexandria."(59) The protocol formed a "Council of the League of Arab States," with binding decisions on those states that accepted them. It stated additionally that no member may adopt a foreign policy prejudicial to the policy of the League. The special resolution (Article 4) concerning Lebanon read,

> *The Arab states represented on the preliminary committee emphasize their respect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers, which the governments of the above states have already recognized in consequence of Lebanon's adoption of an independent policy, which the government of that country announced in its program of 7 October 1943.*

Two days after the end of the conference, King Faruq abruptly removed Nahhas from power, and the Syrian and Jordanian prime ministers were similarly dismissed. Al-Sulh was subjected to an intensive campaign critical of the agreement. The *Kata'ib* and the Maronite patriarch denounced it as an attack on Lebanese sovereignty(60). The Arab League was too novel an idea, too bold an endeavour to merit universal approval in its projected scheme of things. Paradoxically the special resolution on Lebanon had not strengthened al-Sulh's position after all. On 7 January 1945, al-Khuri asked him to submit his resignation and appointed in his place the Tripolitanian leader, 'Abd al-Hamid Karami.

The Alexandria Protocol setback proved shortlived. When new negotiations reopened on 15 February 1945, in Cairo to approve the final framework of the Arab League, the text of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals had become available, providing a definite and more acceptable framework for a regional organization tied to the United Nations. Despite the strong support for regionalism displayed by the Arab delegates, the Lebanese foreign minister, Henri Phar'un, a Greek Catholic banker, refused throughout the negotiations to include any reference to the Arab League as a

corporate regional body[61]. He did not want any restriction whatsoever on state sovereignty, especially since he had assured the Maronite patriarch that Lebanon's Arab zeal would be brought under tighter rein[62].

The "Pact of the League of Arab States" was signed on 26 March 1945 by six states: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Trans-Jordan. Yemen joined on 10 May[63]. The strengthening of relations was one of the declared purposes of the League (Article 2), but there was no mention, as stipulated previously in the protocol, of coordination in the field of foreign policy. Because the pact contained no infringement on the sovereignty and independence of the member states, the special article concerning Lebanon lost its *raison d'être*, and was simply dropped from the wordings of the pact.

Lebanese and Syrian apprehensions of French designs previously expressed in Cairo were soon to be corroborated. As soon as de Gaulle established himself in liberated France in early 1945, he launched one last attempt to extract preferential treaties in the Levant. Not only did the French provisional government delay the transfer of the *troupes spéciales* to the local governments, but they reinforced their occupation forces with fresh troops in May 1945. In response to nationalist protests and demonstrations, the French bombarded the capital Damascus on 30 May. The following day, the British handed the French commander in Syria a stiff ultimatum calling for the withdrawal of all French forces from the cities to specified barracks, threatening the employment of force in case of resistance. French compliance in 1945, to British military threats, insured, as it did in Lebanon in 1943, a further diminution of their authority and prospects for sustaining a privileged French position in the Levant.

Although the British had been most instrumental in removing the French from Syria and Lebanon, they were no longer able to fill the vacuum which they had intentionally engineered to create[64]. The Soviet Union and the United States had recognized Syrian and Lebanese independence and had explicitly declared that they would favour no special position for any other foreign country[65]. This greatly empowered the governments in Beirut and Damascus to press their cases before the United Nations Organization in February 1946, when the French raised cumbersome technical difficulties impeding their troop withdrawal. Although the Security Council failed to reach a resolution, the British and French decided simultaneously to abide by majority decision and to withdraw their forces before the end of the year. Following the departure of the British troops from Lebanon on 30 June, the last remnants of the French military mission along with its technicians finally evacuated their posts on 31 December 1946.

That the presence of European powers was diminishing while the nascent global powers of the U.S. and the Soviet Union had begun to play a more active role in the region, indicated further the changes in the international situation; changes that would ultimately extend sovereignty and

independence to the emerging nations of the Third World. At the regional level, Arab states tempered their zeal toward some form of federal union, and would ultimately accept Lebanon's "version" of the Arab League, where each member state would maintain its sovereignty and borders intact, thereby reducing Lebanon's vulnerability to Syrian-Arab intervention in its internal affairs.

The 1943 National Pact in many ways symbolized a new political order in Lebanon. Ostensibly overseen by the British and the French, power among the different sectarian groups was rearranged and Lebanon's foreign and Arab policies for the next three decades were to become well entrenched. As head of state, the president of the new republic gradually came to regard himself above partisanship and confessional politics. The 1943 constitutional amendments had transformed the powers of the high commissioner to the president, and al-Khuri hence could dismiss the ministry at will and dissolve the chamber without any limiting constitutional mechanisms(66). And he had simply exercised the prerogative powers of his office when he dismissed the popular Sunni Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulh in 1944. Given the sectarian nature of the regime, this could only bode a dangerous harbinger for the future, promising to transform each political crisis into a conflict with confessional and intrasectarian overtones amongst holders of entrenched governmental posts.

Despite its positive contributions to a healthier and more representative Lebanese polity, this new order, based on the interplay of domestic, regional, and international politics, could not withstand the severe tests to which it would be subjected, because international and regional political contests would largely be channeled unswervingly into sectarian antagonisms, and that would subscribe Lebanon once more to the mercy of external powers.



Map 7: Operation " EXPORTER," 9 June-15 July 1941

1. Issac Lipsichts, La politique de la France au Levant, 1939-1949 (Paris, 1963), pp. 30-52.
2. Longrigg, op. cit., p. 308.
3. The possibility that disturbances in Lebanon and Syria might spread to the neighboring British dependencies was very real. The British had just suppressed the serious Palestine Revolt (1936-1939) directed against the mandate and the growing Zionist presence. Moreover, prewar Italian and German propaganda virulently sought to undermine British-French prestige in the Middle East by courting various Arab nationalist groups in Palestine, Iraq, Egypt and the Levant. Although the local pro-German nationalist groups fell short of their strategy, they did maintain mutual lines of communication and at least exhibited reciprocal identification with the common struggle for Arab independence.
4. Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs, trans, J. Griffin (N.Y., 1964), p. 157.
5. Woodward, op. cit., 1: 568.
6. Hurewitz, II, op. cit., p. 582.
7. George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: The Middle East in the War (London, 1952), p. 121.
8. Jisr, op. cit., pp. 86f.
9. Khuri, op. cit., 1: 244f.
10. Catroux, op. cit., p. 259; the French published several written agreements signed by al-Khuri to the effect that he acquiesced in Cairo to full Arab unity (Mizhir, op. cit., pp. 1076-81).
11. Woodward, op. cit., 4: 223f.
12. In attesting to Spear's contribution to the erosion of the Free French position in Lebanon, J.C. Hurewitz poignantly states that,

    > *He went about his task (self-assumed, the friendly critics believed; calculated by a perfidious Albion, de Gaulle and his colleagues and other unfriendly critics came to suspect) with an assiduity that would have aroused the envy of single-minded fanatics and an abrasiveness that antagonized not only those Free French with whom he dealt or whom he chose to bypass and, until the elections of 1943, many top Maronite leaders in Lebanon who seemed to resent his patronizing style, but also neutral observers such as the American consul general and his man. Spears embarrassed the Foreign Office, but he was not its man.*

    (J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 598).
13. Woodward, op. cit., 4: 228-46.
14. Mohamed Majzoub, "L'independence libanaise dans l'ordre interne et international public, 1943-1956" (Thèse pour le doctorat, Université d'Aix-Marseille, 1956), pp. 151-68.
15. FRUS, 1943, op. cit., 4: 963-83.
16. Meir Zamir, "Emile Eddé and the Territorial Integrity of Lebanon" Middle Eastern studies 14 (May 1978): 232-35.
17. FRUS, 1943, op. cit., 4: 960.

18. Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, op. cit., p. 188; Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, Qawafil al-'Urubah wa-Mawakibiha Khilal al-'Usur [The Caravans and Processions of Arabism through the Ages], 2 vols., (Beirut, 1948-50), 2 (1950): 111-14.
19. FRUS, 1943, op. cit., 4: 977; Jisr, op. cit., p. 94.
20. Mizhir, op. cit., 2: 1073ff.
21. Al-Hallaq, op. cit., p. 70.
22. FRUS, 1943, op. cit., p. 4: 981ff; Khuri, op. cit. p. 1:76.
23. FRUS, 1943, op. cit. p. 4: 988.
24. Khuri, op. cit. p. 1: 260ff.
25. Ibid., p. 258.
26. Al-Dayri, op. cit., p. 46.
27. Spears, op. cit.,p.. 209.
28. Yusuf Salem, 50 Sanah ma' al-Nas [50 Years with the People] (Beirut, 1975), p. 151.
29. Khuri, op. cit., 1: 264.
30. Idem.
31. Muhammad Khalil, ed., The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record, 2 vols. (Beirut, 1962), 1: 105-9; See also George Dib, "Selections from Riad Sulh's Speech in the Lebanese Assembly (October 7, 1943) Embodying the Main Principles of the 'National Pact,'" Middle East Forum 34 (January 1959).
32. M. Sulh, Maruniyyah, op. cit., p. 29.
33. Al-Hallaq, op. cit., p.174.
34. George Hanna, Al-'Uqdah al-Lubnaniyyah [The Lebanese Puzzle] (Beirut, 1957), p. 22.
35. Dahir, op. cit., p. 242.
36. Al-Sulh had suggested to many of his Muslim compatriots that sectarian distribution of the top executive positions would be a temporary arrangement in order to allay Christian fears and enlist their support in the schemes for Arab unity (Al-Hallaq, op. cit., p.184f.).
37. Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy," in ibid., p. 129; Cf. Entelis, op. cit., p. 26; Smock, op. cit., p. 45; and Meo, op. cit., p. 83. Only Hourani states that the National Pact was an agreement to preserve the communal systems (Albert Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society" in Politics in Lebanon, ibid., pp. 27-28). On the other hand, Mas'ud Dahir maintains that the National Pact was geared solely to independence and Lebanon's Arabism but not to confessionalism (Mas'ud Dahir, Lubnan: Al-Istiqlal, al-Mithaq, wal-Sighah [Lebanon: Independence, the Pact, and the Arrangement] (Beirut, 1977) pp. 252f). For other didactic interpretations of the National Pact, see Baaklini, op. cit., pp. 109-17; Jisr, op. cit., pp. 120-29, 142-59.
38. Albert Hourani, "Lebanon from Feudalism to Modern State," Middle East Studies 2 (1966): 260; FRUS, 1943, op. cit., 4: 992. Even the speakership of parliament did not become an established Shi'i reserve until 1947 (Muhammad Yakan, Lubnan wa-Tahidiyyat al-Hadir [Lebanon and the Challenges of the Present] (Beirut, 1978) p. 54).

39. Malcolm Kerr, "Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy," in Politics in Lebanon, ed. Leonard Binder (New York, 1966), p. 189.
40. Woodward, op. cit., 4:270.
41. Catroux later confessed on 4 December 1946, that only de Gaulle and Helleu supervised the measures to be taken against Lebanon's constitutional government (Khuri, Haqa'iq, op. cit., 2: 281ff).
42. Woodward, op. cit., 4: 271.
43. FRUS, 1943, op. cit., 4:1005.
44. Spears, op. cit., pp. 225, 236.
45. Eddé's son, realizing the seriousness of the unfolding drama of events, rushed after his father to Helleu's headquarters. Finding Eddé already in closed conference with Helleu, the son passed a note with only two words that said: "refuse papa." A few minutes later, Eddé sent back his brief answer: "c'est trop tard" (Walid 'Awad, Ashab al-Fakhamah Ru'asa Lubnan [Their Excellencies the Presidents of Lebanon] (Beirut, 1977), p. 248).
46. Catroux, op. cit., p. 410.
47. Woodward, op. cit., 4: 281-83; Spears, op. cit., pp. 238, 241-51, 262.
48. Khuri, Haqa'iq, op. cit., 2: 42-46.
49. Woodward, op. cit., 4: 284-92; Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East, op. cit., pp. 306-9.
50. R. Simon, "The Hashemite 'Conspiracy': Hashemite Unity Attempts, 1921-1958," International Journal of Middle East Studies (July 1974): 314-27.
51. Kirk, op. cit., p. 338; Robert Macdonald, The League of Arab States (Princeton, 1965), p. 36.
52. Ibid., pp. 185-86; Kamil, op. cit., p. 257.
53. Lebanon, Majlis al-Nuwwab [Chamber of Deputies), Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab al-Lubnani [Record of Lebanese Chamber of Deputies], 3rd Emergency Legislature, 6th session, 23 September 1944. Goma'a, op.cit, p. 181.
54. Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab, ibid., 3rd Emergency Legislature, 2nd session, 25 July 1944. Kirk, op. cit., p. 286.
55. Al-Hallaq, op. cit., p.202.
56. Khuri, Haqa'iq, op. cit., 2: 103.
57. Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East, op. cit., p. 312.
58. Goma'a, op. cit., p. 220.
59. The Lebanese Druze Amir Shakib Arslan, father in law to Kamal Junblatt and grandfather to his son Walid, exerted a lasting influence on the development of the idea of the Arab League (Hurewitz, II, op. cit., p. xvii) and Yehoshua Porath, In Search of Arab Unity. 1930-1945 (London, 1986), pp. 14f). His impact on internal Lebanese politics, however, was less profound, because of his declared pro-Ottoman leanings and because he chose to reside in Geneva in self-imposed exile after the end of World War I.
60. Goma'a, op. cit., pp. 227f.
61. Taqy al-Din, op. cit., pp. 73-77; Porath, op. cit., p. 285.
62. Goma'a, op. cit., p. 246.
63. In the years following the signing of the Pact, the Arab nations joined it as and when they gained their independence, testifying to a growing

regional identity: Libya on 28 March 1953; Sudan on 19 January 1956; Morocco and Tunisia on 1 September 1958; Kuwayt on 30 June 1961; Algeria on 16 August 1962; the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen on 12 December 1967; Bahrayn on 11 September 1971; Qatar on 11 September 1971; Oman on 29 September 1971; Mauritania in 1972; Somalia in 1974; the PLO admitted as full member of the Council of the League in 1976; and, finally, Djibouti in 1977. It should come as no surprise to state, that with the widening membership of the Arab League, the scope of Arab intervention in Lebanon also widened.

64. See the confidential report by the British minister in the Levant, Terence Shone, submitted to the Foreign Office on February 1945, which addressed at length the viability of national independence in Syria and Lebanon as cited in Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford, 1984), pp. 155ff.
65. Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East, op. cit., p. 313.
66. M. Sulh, Maruniyyah, op. cit., p. 38; for a different opinion on Lebanese presidential powers, see J.C. Hurewitz, "Lebanese Democracy," op. cit., p. 215.

II

THE CRISIS OF ARAB UNITY, 1948-1958

(4)
Confessional Balance and the 1948 Debacle in Palestine

The previous chapters had dealt with the crises that brought abut Lebanon's independence in 1943, ushering in the meanwhile new sectarian arrangements based on interconfessional compromise and rapprochement in congruence with a new international order emerging from the ashes of the Second World War. The next serious crisis to confront Lebanon in the period 1948-1958, would be the attempts by Arab nationalists to overturn the regional status quo established in the 1916 Sykes-Picot accord and to revive the dormant schemes to unite the member states of the Arab League, conspicuously in response to the bungling Arab performance in Palestine in 1948. As expected, these regional developments would put intense internal pressure on the working arrangements of the National Pact, especially on the symbiotic interaction between the Maronite president and the Sunni premier. How each one of them exercised his power, or how he perceived the manner by which this power should be exercised, had ripple effects on the entire confessional system itself and on the system of political alliances and intersectarian "checks and balances" that had emerged after indpendence.

Lebanon in particular had driven a hard bargain when it joined the regional Arab organization, entailing that the founding members retain their full sovereignty and their independence in the conduct of foreign affairs. The debacle in Palestine, however, triggered a chain reaction of social and political upheavals led by the military in the populous regimes of Syria and Egypt. Iraq would follow suit with a latent but bloody revolution in 1958.

In the same vein, Lebanon would also suffer during the disorder of the interregnum that witnessed British retirement from the Middle East and American assumption of primary responsibility for regional defense. The French had infamously withdrawn from Lebanon and Syria in 1946, whereas the British lingered in the surrounding states with their military bases intact and their preferential political status guaranteed. Great Britain attempted to lay almost exclusive claim to the defense of the Arab states in the entire Middle East theater against the anticipated encroachment of the Soviet communist menace. The task proved too herculean for British resources and too unpopular in the wake of their liability for what had occurred to the Arab population in Palestine under the mandate.

The division of Lebanese public opinion over whether to subscribe to British schemes or not, included disagreements over Egypt's version of regional Arab politics in the post-war period. The 1956 Suez fiasco ultimately wrecked the foundation of support for those Lebanese leaders who had pinned their hopes on Great Britain. Consequently, unilateral

American efforts were launched in 1957, to salvage Western strategy in the guise of the Eisenhower Doctrine. This too, caused serious internal Lebanese rifts that ultimately contributed to the outbreak of the 1958 crisis.

Hence the dynamism inherent in the interpay of domestic, regional, and international politics would once more subject Lebanon to intense pressure. Internally, the National Pact had embodied a spirit of national compromise, yet none of the sectarian pundits however seemed satisfied with the arrangement by which each confessional group held a determinate post in the state(1). Muslim Shi'i deputies, despite their partial compensation in heading the legislative branch, voiced complaints of *ghubn* (injustice) (2). The spirited 'Abd al-Hamid Karami protested the diminution of the stature of the prime minister. The Greek Orthodox community, after some lobbying efforts by President al-Khuri, briefly recaptured the chief legislature post in 1947, only to lose it once again to its original Shi'i contender(3). The young Druze leader, Kamal Fu'ad Joumblat returned from the Sorbonne to establish the Progressive Socialist Party in 1949, which crusaded under an avowedly cross confessional platform, favoring the establishment of some sort of Fabian socialism. And to recap it all, the Maronite patriarchate was alarmed over the political status of Lebanon amidst the regional trends toward achieving Arab unity(4).

Significantly, the president's answer to the rise of a multifaceted sectarian opposition was to consolidate his own power by rigging the 1947 parliamentary elections. He later admittedly blamed zealous officials, educated under the mandate, who had unduly employed tactics such as erasing ballots or multiplying them(5). He nevertheless invoked parliament to pass a bill in May 1948, amending the constitution such that it permitted the renewal of his presidential term. *Ipso facto* it granted the president powers beyond the realm of accountability. Al-Khuri apologized for reinvestiture in terms of a near precedent, when the Syrian parliament arranged a similar amendment for Shukri al-Quwwatli in Syria so that he might meet the exigencies of the 1948 Palestine war(6).

The escalating Arab-Zionist clash had steadily widened its scope to involve regional neighbours, Lebanon notwithstanding. In general, Lebanese sympathized with the 1936 Palestine Revolt(7), and the French mandatory authorities did not fail to grant sanctuary in 1940, to the Mufti of Palestine, Haj Amin al-Husayni, who sought to escape British capture. Although some Maronite intellectuals warned of Zionist ambitions in south Lebanon, others felt that the creation of a Jewish state would not be so detrimental(8). Back in 1946, The archbishop of Beirut, Mgr. Ignatius Mubarak, did not conceal his support of Zionism, because he believed the Muslim Arabs wanted to dominate Lebanon and cast the Christians out in the process(9). Former President Eddé, conversely, had been forced to deny that he had ever contacted Zionist leaders to faciliate the establishment of a

constricted Christian Lebanon within the larger scheme of the British-Hashimite Fertile Crescent union[10].

On the official level, Lebanon immersed itself in the spirited meetings of the Arab League called specifically to discuss the Palestine situation in Anshas, Egypt (28 May 1946), Bludan, Syria (8-12 June 1946), Sawfar, Lebanon (16 September 1946), 'Aley-Beirut (7-15 November 1947), and finally Cairo in December 1947. The Bludan Conference, in particular, reached two "secret" resolutions urging military assistance to the Palestine Arabs and political opposition to Great Britain and the United States in case they favored Zionist claims[11]. Arab volunteers (6,550 men) joined *Jaysh al-Inqadh* (Salvation Army) under the nominal command of Fawzi al-Qawuqji, an Arab nationalist adventurer from Tripoli who saw active service in Palestine and in Iraq during the world war[12]. In January 1948, the volunteers crossed the borders from Syria, Trans-Jordan, and Lebanon joined by a small contingent from Egypt infiltrating from the Sinai, to help stiffen the forces of the Palestine Arab Higher Committee (5,000 men). The Zionist guerrillas (30,000 men) however, proved themselves better armed and numerically superior, such that they worsted the irregular Arab forces before the expiration of the exhausted British mandate in May 1948.

On the eve of the the creation of the state of Israel on 15 May 1948, the Lebanese army conducted joint military operations with Syrian army units in the upper Hula valley. Battles in and around the village of al-Malkiyyah aimed at allowing *Jaysh al-Inqadh* to redeploy in the Galilee and to prepare for the expected thrust to establish a junction with Iraqi and Trans-Jordanian forces. The combined Arab League armies, if one is to include Egypt and Saudi Arabia, numbered only 24,000 men and they ultimately failed to dislodge the well trained Israeli forces out of East Jerusalem and the Palestine coast (15 May-11 June, 8-18 July 1948). Trans-Jordan's amir, 'Abd Allah ibn Husayn, because of British-Iraqi pressures and in secret response to Zionist overtures[13], halted his troops along the 1947 partition lines drawn by the United Nations, while, conversely, the Syrians, the Egyptians, and the Lebanese prime minister, Riyad al-Sulh urged pressing forward [14]. After minimal setbacks, and taking advantage of a ceasefire, the Israelis shifted troops from the quiet joint Iraqi-Transjordanian Hashimi front, and conducted three isolated but successful offensives against the Egyptians in the Negev Desert and in the Galilee against the Syrians and the remnants of Qawuqji's forces (15-31 October 1948). The Israeli operation "HIRAM" carried them forward into south Lebanon where they occupied fifteen villages, piercing in the process the Litani River.

Al-Sulh, who returned to lead four consecutive cabinets (December 1946-February 1951), spent a disproportionate amount of his time shuttling among the various Arab capitals to reconcile the differences of opinion and

jealous apprehensions between the Arab monarchs and presidents. He also represented Lebanon in the United Nations during much of the crisis[15]. But after suffering new reverses in the Sinai, the Egyptians were forced to open armistice talks in Rhodes with Israel. Lebanon followed suit, reaching an agreement on 23 March 1949, which defined the Palestine-Lebanon frontier as the demarcation line wherein the number of troops on both sides of the frontier were limited[16]. Trans-Jordan and Syria similarly conceded defeat and left the Israelis to consolidate most of their gains.

The Arab debacle prompted al-Sulh to proclaim bitterly that the Palestinian issue had "broken his back," and that it would later weaken every single prime minister in the face of the incumbent president[17]. But the results of the Palestine war went far beyond the grievances of the competing officers of the Lebanese executive. Rather, it shocked and discredited all Arab regimes. Their humiliated armies lacked adequate numbers, and sufficient weapons and *matérial*. In the aftermath of mutual recriminations that followed the defeat, the military would turn against their regimes with a vengeance. To compound matters, destitute Palestinian refugees flocked to Lebanon, numbering according to some estimates, 100,000[18]. They refused all vestiges of permanent resettlement and their frustration grew as immediate restitution of their homes and property lapsed behind the exigencies of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The apprehensions of Lebanese ruling circles soon heightened when Colonel Husni al-Za'im, the Syrian chief of staff, mounted the first military coup in the post-independence period on 30 March 1949. Za'im protested against the corruption of the government that had lost Palestine and promised wide reforms. The precarious nature of his coup invited Hashimi, and by implication British, pressures to unite Syria with Jordan's 'Abd Allah or with Iraq's Nuri al-Sa'id. Beirut's consternation for these plans for a "Greater Syria" or a "Fertile Crescent Unity" was justified when in early July 1949, the Syrian Nationalist Socialist Party (PPS) launched a series of raids on Lebanese frontier posts with Za'im's apparent support.

The highly disciplined and secular Syrian Nationalists who strove for the unity of geographic Syria, to include both Lebanon and the island of Cyprus, exhibited an ambiguous attitude toward competing Arab nationalism. Backed by Za'im and the Hashimis, the PPS leader Antun Sa'adah, called openly for national rebellion in Lebanon. To further exacerbate the situation, elements from the Khuri opposition declared their support for the new Syrian regime.

On 7 July 1949, Syria abruptly reversed gears, partly due to American prodding, and partly in response to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who had been encouraging the Syrian and Lebanese republics in the past months to resist Hashimi encroachments on their sovereignty. The vacillating Za'im betrayed Sa'adah to the Lebanese authorities which summarily tried and

executed him promptly before a military tribunal. Riyad al-Sulh zealously defended his government's policy by insisting that Sa'adah had received legal due process, hence earning the PPS's undying enmity and turning it into his nemesis. He would later admit that it had been one of the most serious political mistakes of his life[19]. The government followed the repression of the PPS with further measures against other paramilitary organizations, such as the Najjadah and the *Kata'ib*[20]. This naturally forced them both to join the opposition to the government in power.

The PPS stepped up its activities against the regime by assassinating Riyad on his visit to 'Amman, Jordan, on 16 July 1951. That was a serious blow to an already isolated president, especially since the despondent Sulh family charged him with nudging Riyad against the PPS, claiming that he harbored a secret preference for the *Kata'ib*[21]. Al-Khuri gained a small respite in 1951, when elections brought forth a chamber stacked with loyalists. But the opposition gained too, and their deputies in the chamber formed the National and Socialist Front (NSF), so named because it constituted an alliance of three parties: the National Bloc, under Emile Eddé's sons, Pierre and Raymond, the Progressive Socialist Party under Kamal Joumblat, and 'Ali al-Bazzi's National Call Party, known for its close association to the al-Sulh family. Outside the chamber, the opposition included the *Kata'ib*, the *Najjadah*, and PPS sympathizers, who grouped themselves around what came to be known as the Popular Front.

President al-Khuri appointed Riyad al-Sulh's cousin Sami, prime minister with the hope that he could inherit his cousin's mantle of responsibility. Alas, he proved a disappointment to the president. Cornered by the mounting opposition against the government, the premier delivered a self-incriminatory diatribe against his own government in the chamber on 9 September 1952. He denounced al-Khuri himself and his family's nepotism, and even hinted that the president's clique had something to do with Riyad's assassination[22].

Al-Sulh's effective *coup de théâtre* came shortly after the opposition held a large rally on 17 August 1952, at Dayr al-Qamar, in the heart of the Druze district of Mount Lebanon. The opposition, feeling the surge of confidence in their midst called for a general strike to be held on 15 and 16 September. To forestall the consequences of a strike that would be damaging to Lebanon's fragile economy, al-Khuri invited the deputy from Beirut, Sa'ib Salam, to form a caretaker government. After some difficulty and much persuasion, Salam formed a cabinet of three members on 14 September, the day before the showdown with the opposition.

The strike successfully took place, after which fourteen deputies addressed a memorandum to the president on 17 September demanding his resignation. The Popular Front issued a supplementary demand for resignation and internal reform. Salam, as prime minister, had no choice but

to quit in the face of parliamentary discontent. By now it was clear to al-Khuri that the opposition mustered the popular will against him. His last chance lay in the Lebanese armed forces.

Was the army willing to impose law and order in case a new government was formed inspite of the threats uttered by the opposition? The commander in chief, Fu'ad Chehab, after deliberating with senior army offices, decided that the army would not resort to force against the prospective violence in the streets. He also declined the president's tempting and unconventional offer of the premiership, agreeing only to the formation of a caretaker government(23). This left al-Khuri no choice but to submit his resignation on 18 September 1952, two years before the end of his second constitutional term in office. On 23 September, the chamber unanimously elected Camille Chamoun president, a fitting gesture to his stand against presidential reelection in 1948.

For the participants, the events that preceded the ousting of President al-Khuri seemed to possess revolutionary significance, as they consistently referred to the 1952 or "White" revolution, or the more nostalgically "Rose Water" revolution(24). The idealistic Druze leader, Kamal Joumblat, who in any case regarded the Khuri administration as a foreign backed British regime(25), envisaged, with the removal of that government, far reaching secular and social reforms, and in particular, that the presidency would be open to all sects(26).

Chamoun had promised NSF leaders that he would abstain from the use of the influence and prestige of his office for personal monetary gain and self-aggrandizement, and would insure appointments in government departments exclusively on the basis of merit and competence, not confessionalism(27). No sooner did Chamoun take office than these promises to Joumblat became moot, and he brought himself in an early and direct conflict with Joumblat, the main instigator of reform.

Although the Lebanese military had refrained from conducting a coup(28), there was already a pattern of internal Arab disturbances heralded by the military in the wake of the Palestine war. The Za'im coup in neighbouring Syria, despite its fanfare, endured a meager four months. On 14 August 1949, Brigadier Sami al-Hinnawi, known for sympathizing with the PPS and favoring the union of Syria and Iraq under Hashimi rule, took power in Damascus, executing Husni al- Za'im in the process. Shortly thereafter, a third, but this time anti-Hashimi military coup, followed on its heels on 19 December 1949. Led by Colonel Adib al-Shishakli, a former Syrian volunteer in Qawuqji's army, he would rule as virtual dictator until removal by another army revolt in February 1954. Egypt emulated Syria on 23 July 1952, when a clandestine military junta overthrew the Egyptian monarchy, promising to destroy feudalism and the imperial domination of Egypt, and to rebuild and enlarge the army. This last event impressed the

Lebanese opposition which drew the analogy, at the time, unfairly perhaps, between the despotism of King Faruq and that of Shaykh Bisharah al-Khuri[29].

Miles Copeland, a former United States foreign officer stationed in the Middle East, argues that the above changes in Egypt and Syria, and therefore by implication Lebanon, were engineered by the State Department and the Central Intelligence Group (the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency). The objective at the time consisted simply of assisting the creation of representative popular governments, "strongmen" capable of developing their countries, resisting the encroachment of international communism, and settling amicably the Arab-Israeli conflict[30]. One cannot fail to note, however, that these were changes aimed at regimes close to Great Britain or which fell under British imperial responsibilities[31].

Perhaps related to Copeland's implicit assumption that the United States strove to replace the British in the region, is the contention of some observers that Western powers had removed Bisharah al-Khuri because he refused proposals to join Lebanon to the Middle East defense pact[32]. President Khuri in 1951, perceived a defensive alliance with Great Britain as a pretext for the return to a status of subjugation. Furthermore, he found it difficult to imagine the Soviet threat, when Israel had roundly defeated the Arab armies a few years before. British military specialists, in responding to these objections, went to great length in devising organizational loopholes to assure Lebanon and the Arab states that no Israeli armed forces would be granted free passage across their territories for military expediencies[33].

Related to the general Arab antipathy to regional cooperation with the Zionist regime, the incumbent president, Camille Chamoun (1952-58), could rely on his credentials in defending the Palestinian cause when stationed abroad as ambassador in London, as well as on his severe parliamentary criticism of al-Sulh's conduct in the 1948 Palestine War. Nicknamed *fata al-'Urubah al-agharr* [brave youth of Arabism], Chamoun's suspected affiliations with the British had not yet turned into a heavy political liability. In terms of the international and Arab role that could be played by Lebanon during the term of his presidency, Chamoun possessed great potential.

How much responsibility Lebanon could partake in the defense schemes of the Middle East was explored briefly in May 1953, by a visit to the region undertaken by John Foster Dulles, secretary of state in the new Republican administration led by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite optimistic public utterances, Dulles operated under no illusions: in an unpublished memorandum, he concluded that the Arab states would not openly join a collective security system that included a combination of Western powers. Nevertheless, he urged a rapid expansion of American

influence in the Middle East, fully aware that it might worsen relations with Great Britain[33].

Accordingly, President Eisenhower sent in October 1953, another envoy, Eric Johnston, with instructions to discuss regional hydroelectric water development between Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. The Israelis had threatened to divert unilaterally the Jordan River to water the arid Negev Desert. The Arab states refused to cooperate on the basis that they still questioned the 1948 *fait accompli* and the unrelenting problem of the Palestinian refugees. It abided that Israeli recognition of Arab riparian rights sequestered, in exchange, joint development of the Litani, a river running in its entirety in South Lebanon.[35].

In spite of Lebanese, Egyptian, and Syrian reservations, Iraq's wily premier Nuri al-Sa'id, embraced wholeheartedly, under British prodding, the Cold War schemes of Western containment. President Chamoun found himself caught in a serious dilemma. His temperament evoked in him a pro-British, and hence a Hashimi position. Taking sides alternatively against another coalition of Arab states which had good relations with the U.S., such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt, might damage his Arab nationalist credentials[36]. He first attempted to mediate among the conflicting groups of states by calling for a general Arab meeting in 1954, but the meeting failed to materialize[37].

It was at this juncture that the outgoing Israeli prime minister, David Ben Gurion, reverted to one of his cherished 1948 schemes--a strike against Lebanon, which he considered to be the weakest link in the Arab coalition. He proposed to his successor Moshe Sharett, the launching of a secret plan to carve up an exclusively Christian dominated state in a contracted territory north of the Litani river, with Israel annexing the south, leaving Tripoli and the Beqa' as bones of contention. Hashimi Iraq might also be encouraged to invade Syria in order to facilitate the fulfillment of the plan in the midst of regional instability. Sharett, however, responded to these contingency plans that the Lebanese seemed for all practical purposes content with the present system of Muslim-Christian coalition and that those minimamist factions amongst the Phalangists and other fringe Christian circles succoring aid from Israel did not reflect mainstream Christian public opinion. He warned, furthermore, that if ever such a secret plan became exposed, Israel's reputation would suffer irreparable damage[38]. On 16 May 1955, Ben Gurion attended a meeting in his recent capacity as defense minister, in which the chief of staff, Moshe Dayan, called for locating a Lebanese army colonel or even a major who would set himself up as the Maronites' defender, thereby triggering Israeli intervention[39]. Ben Gurion's propensity for secret plans ultimately culminated in the Anglo-French-Israeli collusion against Egypt the following year. Perchance France, ever fearful of losing her traditional influence in Lebanon, and anxious over the potential loss of

her North African possessions to the Arab nationalists, might have played a role in inducing the Israelis to steer their course from the north to attack southwards against Egypt.

The inter-Arab conflict took a sharp turn for the worse when Iraq signed a mutual defense pact with Turkey on 24 February 1955, heralding the formation of the Baghdad Pact--the much awaited Middle East defense organization. The Egyptian ruler, Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, not only rejected the Baghdad Pact, but in the face of British-French-U.S. apprehensions of selling weapons to Egypt and to other Arab countries for the sake of maintaining the status quo in the Middle East theater of operations *vis-à-vis* Israel, would conclude a major arms deal with the Soviet Union in September 1955. When Israel received in its turn arms from France, Nasir recognized the People's Republic of China in May 1956. This prompted Dulles to withdraw American financial aid for the Egyptian High Dam on 19 July. Nasir replied with his dramatic speech of 26 July in Alexandria, where he nationalized the Suez Canal Company. The succession of challenges and counterchallenges between Nasir's brand of pan-Arabism and the West left the Middle East area in a highly tense state.

While publicly declining to join the Baghdad Pact, Lebanon negotiated behind the scenes with Turkey, ostensibly to join the defense arrangement. (40) General Chehab, however, did not share Chamoun's enthusiasm for the British scheme of things, inclining rather to a retention of military cooperation with France(41). The new Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami (16 September 1955-19 March 1956), son of the veteran unionist, 'Abd al-Hamid of Tripoli, spoke of Lebanon's joining the series of mutual defense agreements held between Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen between October 1955 and April 1956(42). This brought about a conflict between Karami and his foreign minister, to the extent to which Chamoun was prompted to release Karami from the premiership(43).

President Chamoun, with his Hashimi leanings, had displayed his willingness to adhere to Western sponsorship of regional security, and this readiness might have neutralized Israeli proclivity to expand northwards at Lebanon's territorial expense throughout the fifties. But the strong currents of Arab nationalism, and ironically the aid of some pro-French Lebanese nationalists in the Lebanese military, had initially resisted the British, and would later inhibit unilateral American attempts at drawing Lebanon into a Western military alliance which aimed at erecting a regional defence tier around the Soviet Union without necessarily challenging Israeli parmouncy. But already this policy by Chamoun had generated interconfessional tensions, which would later escalate and culminate in the outbreak of the 1958 crisis.



Map 8: Lebanon-Israel Front, 1948

1. Perhaps the most scathing criticism against the National Pact was an article published by George Naccache in L'Orient on 10 March 1949, entitled "*Deux negations ne font pas une nation!*". It was deemed at the time so inflammatory, that the journalist merited prosecution and imprisonment (See Georges Naccache, Un rêve libanais, 1943-1972 (Beyrouth, 1983), pp. 52-58).
2. Al-Hallaq, al-Tayyarat, op. cit., pp. 206f.
3. Ibid., p. 182.
4. See the conflict generated over the Maronite patriarch's memorandum to the United Nations in 1946, and entitled "Lebanon: A National Homeland for the Christians in the East." (Al-Hallaq, op. cit., p. 217). It was also in this period that Patriarch 'Aridah allegedly signed a secret memorandum with Dr. Chaim Weizman, president of the Zionist Organization, which recognized Jewish demands for independence in exchange for recognition of the Christian Character of Lebanon (D. Joseph, The Faithful City (New York, 1960), p. 5.
5. Khuri, Haqa'iq, op. cit., 3: 30f. 41.
6. Ibid., op. cit., 3: 122.
7. Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, a Sunni writer from Beirut, headed in 1944, a coalition called "The Union of Lebanese Parties for Combatting Zionism," which strove to organize meetings and contact various diplomatic representatives in an effort to explain the Arab position (Hasan al-Hallaq, Al-Mu'arikh al-'Allamah Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, 1887-1978 [The Learned Historian Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, 1887-1978] (Beirut, 1980), pp. 82-95).
8. Back in 1941, Charles Corm and Albert Naqqash attempted to form a '*Societé Liban-Palestine*' in cooperation with Eliahu Elath, a representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Though assured of Eddé's blessings, the Maronite patriarch hesitated to render his support and the project was dismantled when al-Khuri assumed the presidency (Elath, op. cit., p.55).
9. Kirk, The Middle East, 1945-1950, op. cit., p. 114.
10. Al-Nahar, 15 October 1946, as cited in al-Hallaq, op. cit., p. 358.
11. Wizarah al-Difa' al-Watani [National Defense Ministry] *et. al.*, Al-Qadiyyah al-Filastiniyyah wal-Khatar al-Sahyuni [The Palestinian Problem and the Zionist Danger] (Beirut, 1973), pp. 246-50; Leila Kadi, Arab Summit Conferences and the Palestine Problem (1936-1950), (1964-1966) (Beirut, 1966), pp. 27-60.
12. See Fawzi al-Qawuqji, Mudhakkarat Fawzi al-Qawuqji [Memoirs of Fawzi al-Qawuqji], 2 vols. (Beirut, 1975).
13. Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford, 1988), p. 200.
14. Riyad's militancy may have prompted the Israelis to explore the possibility of engineering his government's downfall through a Christian revolt. In April-May 1948, the Jewish Agency sent Father Joseph Awad, a Lebanese-American Maronite priest from Waterville, Maine, to sound out the idea. Pierre Gemayel proved receptive to Awad provided he was supplied with arms and financial support. In a secret meeting in Paris on 3 July 1948, Eddé dismissed the idea to an Israeli foreign ministry official as being impractical. A Phalangist

journalist, Ilyas Rababi, finally did meet Elias Sasson, head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry's Middle East Affairs Department, in Paris in October, and received an undisclosed "small loan." By that time, however, the war approached its logical conclusion and Israeli urgency to undergo the Lebanese venture had by then receded (Benny Morris, "Israel and the Lebanese Phalange: The Birth of a Relationship, 1948-1951," in Studies in Zionism 5 (1984): 125-130).

15. Khuri, Haqa'iq, op. cit., 3: 100-4.
16. See minutes of second meeting held at Ras al-Naqurah between Lebanese and Israeli delegations on 7 March 1949, in Israel state Archives, Document on the Foreign Poicy of Israel, vol. 3: Armistice Negotiations with the Arab States, December 1948-July 1949 (Jerusalem, 1983), pp. 294-304.
17. M. Sulh, Maruniyyah, op. cit., p. 39.
18. United Nations, Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, Part I, 28 December 1949, pp. 22f.
19. Al-Hallaq, op. cit., p. 272. The other two mistakes had been what he considered to be his lenient policy toward al-Khuri and his compromise on economic unity with Syria. The betrayal of Sa'adah by Za'im holds more sinister motives after the intervention of King Farouq of Egypt. The Syrian chief of staff had conditioned his releasing Sa'adah to the Lebanese authorities eliminating him on the borders "after attempting to escape". The head of the sûreté générale, Mir Farid Chehab, and the Chief of Police, Nur al-Din al-Rifa'i, after escorting Sa'adah to the borders, prevaricated and preferred to submit him to due legal process. But even there, the trial was before a military court and Sa'adah was summarily executed within 48 hours (Niqula Nasif, Sir al-Dawlah: Fusul fi Tarikh al-Amn al-'Aam, 1945-1977 [Secret of State: Chapters in the History of the Sûreté Générale, 1945-1977] (Beirut, 2013), p. 134.
20. This might have induced the *Kata'ib* journalist, Rababi, to reopen secret negotiations in October 1949, with Sasson in order to obtain financial assistance from Israel (Avi Shlaim, "Israeli Interference in Internal Arab Politics: The Case of Lebanon," in The Politics of Arab Integration, vol. IV (London, 1988), p. 210). Rababi later met with Israeli foreign ministry officials in New York in December 1950, and requested $35-100,000 to aid the party in the 1951 parliamentary elections, hinting about the possibility of an armed insurrection. In a second meeting in Paris in March 1951, Rababi, while expressing his profound belief in the inevitable link binding the Jews of Israel and the Christians of Lebanon, stressed that Lebanon as a Christian country could not be the first Arab state to enter into a peace treaty with Israel (an almost identical scenario to be historically rehearsed in 1982 with Bashir Jummayyil). He also evaded an Israeli invitation to provide military training for party members. Much to his embarrassment, he received for his efforts only $2,000 (Morris, op. cit., pp. 135-144). In other words, the Israelis had rebuffed his overtures that they aid his party achieve power in exchange for Lebanon's covert yet good will policy toward Israel. If Lebanon had constituted a more viable military threat toward Israel, such cooperation might have been possible. Ironically, it was the rise of a non-Lebanese security

threat, the Palestinians, that finally brought about Israeli-Phalangist cooperation.

21. Al-Hallaq, op. cit., pp. 272-76.
22. Ibid., p. 119; Ahtakim, op. cit., pp. 80, 99f.
23. Khuri, Haqa'iq, op. cit., 3: 473-74.
24. Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 196.
25. One of the landmarks of the opposition movement was an article by Kamal Joumblatt in his Progressive Socialist Party's organ al-Nida'a in the summer of 1952. The government prosecuted the newspaper because of the inflammatory title "The foreigner brought them [i.e. the government to power]. Let the people oust them" (Taqy al-Din, al-Tatuwur al-Tarikhi, op. cit., p. 81).
26. Al-Dayri, op. cit., p. 54.
27. Full text of document is cited in Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 24.
28. For discussion of the possibility of a *coup d'état* by the Lebanese armed forces, see Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 124.
29. George Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolution" The Middle East Journal 1 (Winter 1953): 12.
30. Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics (New York, 1969), pp. 44, 50-75. See also National Security Council, Memorandum for the Senior NSC Staff: United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Area of the Arab States, Iran, and Israel during the Period of the Cold War, 4 March 1952, p. 27.
31. It is estimated that Chamoun came to power with the blessings of the British, the Hashimis, and Shishakli himself (Al-Dayri, op. cit., p. 51). See evaluation of the Lebanese head of *Sûreté Générale* in Nasif, Sir al-Dawlah, op. cit., p. 150.
32. Niqulay Hofhanisyan, al-Nidal al-Tahruri al-Watani fi Lubnan (1939-1958) [The National Liberation Struggle in Lebanon (1939- 1958)] trans. Bassam Arduyan (Beirut, 1974), p. 120.
33. Khuri, Haqa'iq, op. cit., 3: 351-54.
34. See the seven-point memorandum drawn by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lebanese Chamber, delivered to Dulles during his visit to Beirut (15-17 May 1953), as cited by Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 9 (1952-54): 12958.
35. Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, Washington Tu'abid al-Turuq li-Muscu fi Bilad al-'Arab wal-Muslimin [Washington Paves the Road for Moscow in the Lands of the Arabs and the Muslims] (Beirut, 1954), pp. 55ff.
36. Chamoun even believed that Iraq constituted an economic extension of Lebanon (Camille Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient (Paris, 1963), pp. 254ff).
37. Ziadeh, op. cit., p. 156; Qubain, op. cit., p. 26.
38. Avi Shlaim, "Israeli Interference in Internal Arab Politics: The Case of Lebanon," in The Politics of Arab Integration, vol. IV (London, 1985), pp. 238f.
39. Ibid., pp. 241f. There can be no doubt that Dayan would never have ventured such plans if there had already been no contacts with certain Lebanese officers or if he had not possessed, at the very least, reliable information about the state

of the Lebanese army (See for example Al-Hallaq, al-Tayyarat al-Siyasiyyah, op. cit., p. 516). One of Israel's most effective intelligence operators in Lebanon in the period 1947-61, had been Shula Kishak-Cohen, who was later arrested by Lebanese military intelligence. She would many years later insist in her subsequent memoirs that unnamed high Lebanese officials had rendered her knowledgeable assistance (See Aviezer Golan and Danny Pinkas, Shula: Code Name the Pearl (New York, 1980)).

40. Salah al-ʻAqqad argues that the real reason for Lebanon's disinclination to join the Baghdad Pact lay in the pan-Islamic nature of the four founding members: Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq (Salah al-ʻAqqad, Al-Mashriq al-ʻArabi, 1945-1958 [The Arab East, 1945-1958] (Al-Qahirah, 1967), p. 210).
41. See confidential report by British ambassador in Beirut, Sir Edwin Chapman Andrews, No. 116 (1014/2/38/55) dated 11August 1955, as cited by al-Sharq al-Awsat, London, 16 February 1986.
42. Colombe, op. cit., 2: 9.
43. The US embassy in Beirut did not hide its opposition to the Arab collective security agreement as evidenced in the 8 May 1956 report, cited in FRUS, 1955-1957: Vol. 13: Near East: Jordan-Yemen, (Washington, D.C., 1988), p. 190.

(5)
Nasirism and the Eisenhower Doctrine

The previous chapter has detailed at length the impact of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war on Lebanon and the sectarian tensions that it had engendered with the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state in a majority area of mandatory Palestine. In spite of the existence of fringe groups unsympathetic to interconfessional Christian-Muslim rapprochement, Lebanon had so far treaded the course of sectarian balance in allocation of power in the state, and had generated enough regional Arab support and as well as international approbation to strengthen this arrangement. If the "revolution" against the al-Khuri regime came in the wake of the ripples of change led by the surrounding Arab military juntas smarting from their defeat in 1948, pressure from Western quarters, primarily American and British, to organize a system of regional defense against the Soviet Union, would not abate and Lebanon hence would be left no respite.

President incumbent Chamoun had ridden to power on the crest of this wave for change, but he ultimately believed that the international umbrella so vital for Lebanon's permeability demanded that it subscribe fullest to the Western strategy of containment. His opponents would claim that he had overarched the National Pact by ignoring the postulate that Lebanon should not be conducive to an assault into the Syrian hinterland, whose governing regime at present was adamantly opposed to joining a Western-inspired regional defense. He therefore would find himself at odd ends with Egypt's Nasir as well as with the pan-Arabists of Lebanon and their sympathizers. That would not augur well for the delicate and complex sectarian balance of power, and it was with great difficulty that the 1958 crisis remained as narrowly limited in the scope of the damage it ultimately wrought about on the national conscience.

To tip the scales against those who opposed the strategy of containment in the Middle East, the United States decided to orchestrate a change of government in Damascus, wherein Lebanon would play a pivotal role. Chamoun had convinced Washington that success necessitated the defeat of pro-Egyptian Lebanese deputies in the 1957 parliamentary elections and the renewal of his presidential mandate one more term, since he alone of all Maronite candidates proved capable of steering the country into an active military alliance with the U.S.[(1)] The defeat of the pan-Arab nationalists in the elections, however, only served to galvanize the opposition against the Lebanese president, while the plot against Syria backfired when it joined Egypt in full union under Nasir's leadership. Now,

it would seem that the very survival of the Chamoun regime itself which was at stake.

Arab nationalism in the decade of the fifties had become inseparable from Egypt's leadership and 'Abd al-Nasir's vision, style, and approach to power. The first indication of the importance of this change came during the 1956 Suez Crisis--an event which proved a turning point for Nasir's standing inside Lebanon as in the rest of the Arab world. All Arab states, including Iraq, championed Egypt diplomatically and expressed profound indignity at the tripartite assault. President Chamoun sought to rectify his position by inviting a conference of Arab leaders in Beirut (13-14 November 1956) so as to adopt effective policy measures in accordance with the Arab Collective Defense Treaty[2]. The Egyptian ambassador in Beirut, however, requested Chamoun to express his government's position more vocally[3].

Chamoun reiterated his verbal support for Egypt, but lobbied in an effort to convince the conferees to endorse the decision of his government to retain its relations with Great Britain and France. Two members of the cabinet, 'Abdallah al-Yafi and Sa'ib Salam, felt that to be less than the minimum gesture expected at the time, since Syria and Saudi Arabia had both ruptured relations with France and Great Britain, while Iraq and Jordan meted out the same to France. The two ministers accordingly resigned, claiming that Chamoun explicitly promised in the Arab summit to sever diplomatic relations and that his failure to do so was a breach of good faith. The Lebanese president replied that Egypt had officially requested him to use his good offices to mediate with Britain and France, that he could not mediate with broken diplomatic relations, and that he did not promise the two ministers or the conference anything of the sort[4].

The Arab nationalist parties, such as the *Ba'th* and the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), began to agitate against the Chamoun regime. Lebanon, they declared, should pursue a noncommittal strategy against both sides of the American-Soviet rivalry, refusing military bases to either power, relying solely on the Arab collective security pact for regional defense. But if nationalist propoganda emanating from Radio Cairo could induce the Arab military to stage coups, they would find that the Lebanese military chaffed under no such illusions. The Lebanese army mirrored the sectarian divisions of their political milieu which in effect put a brake against any inclination toward a coup as happened in neighbouring countries[5].

Undeterred by Arab nationalist opposition[6], Chamoun strove to unequivocally assert Lebanon's foreign policy as distinct from that of Egypt with a definite policy tilt toward the United States. Shortly after the resignation of Salam and al-Yafi over the Suez issue, he invited the veteran Sami al-Sulh to form the government (18 November 1956-24 September 1958), with Charles Malik, former ambassador to Washington, as foreign

minister. Malik was a stellar choice as he had long established himself as a firm enthusiast of the West, an ardent anti-Communist, and a cowriter in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Suez ultimately persuaded the U.S. that its two Atlantic allies, France and Great Britain, had reached their nadir in the Arab world and that it had to assume unilateral responsibility for the defense of Western interests[7]. Eisenhower submitted on 5 January 1957, for enactment to Congress a new declaration of American policy, later known as the Middle East or Eisenhower Doctrine. He requested authorization to cooperate with the states of the area in maintaining their national independence in the face of communist aggression. More specifically, the American president promised to undertake programs of military assistance and aid, limited by a $200 million ceiling, to any country demanding such assistance even though it did not subscribe to the Western strategy of containment. The promise was stiffened by the stipulation for the employment of American armed forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by "International Communism"[8].

Upon final Congressional approval of the doctrine on 7 March 1957, the administration sent James P. Richards as a special emissary to the Middle East to help popularize and explain the new thrust of American foreign policy[9]. Except for Iraq, already a member of a Western military alliance, initial Arab response to the plan since its inception was lukewarm. The only other Arab state to unequivocally accept the doctrine was Lebanon. On 16 March 1957, the Lebanese government and the Richards' mission issued a joint communique stating that the discussions turned to the application of Eisenhower's proposals to Lebanon. Both parties considered international communism incompatible with national independence and a menace to world peace. Richards promised American assistance for Lebanese development projects, in addition to a grant of military equipment to help strengthen the Lebanese armed forces. Lebanon received around $20 million in aid in 1957, and a further authorized sum of $15 million in 1958[10].

The first implementation of the doctrine manifested itself with the Jordan crisis of April 1957. Faced by a possible coup from his army chief of staff and by his prime minister, both deemed pro-Nasir, King Husayn requested American aid to oust them especially after receiving a pointed invitation by Dulles. Chamoun interfered and sent President Eisenhower a letter urging swift and decisive action to save Jordan[11]. The White House obliged that it had accepted the judgement of the Jordanian monarch that "International Communism" threatened his independence. It then extended $10 million in financial aid and placed units of the Sixth Fleet in readiness to act on Jordanian appeals[12].

Chamoun succeeded in wringing a parliamentary vote of confidence in favor of the government's foreign policy and the Eisenhower Doctrine. Accordingly, six deputies submitted their resignation from the chamber on 6 April, and together with other opposition leaders, set up a common organization, the United National Front. They included two former prime ministers, Rashid Karami and 'Abdallah al-Yafi, and two Shi'i leaders from the Beqa' valley and Hasbayya, Sabri Hamadah and Ahmad al-As'ad respectively and a prospective Maronite contender for the presidency, Hamid Frangieh.

On 12 May 1957, the United National Front called for a general rally in Beirut meant to rival the antecedent 1952 rally of Dayr al-Qamar which began the movement to topple the regime of Bisharah al-Khuri. The deputies complained of Chamoun's abuse of power and demanded a return to the general policies of the National Pact which the government's forays in foreign policy had endangered(13). The meeting, held under a large picture of 'Abd al-Nasir, signified where the sympathies of the nascent opposition to the government rested. The ANM, the *Ba'th*, and the Najjadah Party agitated for more drastic precipitous action. But perhaps the morale of the opposition was bolstered most by the sympathy of the Maronite patriarch, Bulus al-Ma'ushi, who feuded with the Lebanese president over his unilateral definition of the community's interest and leadership(14). A major Druze clan led by Kamal Joumblat supported the United National Front but held back outright condemnation of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Arab nationalist opposition decided to force the issue by calling in a Muslim religious meeting celebrating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad on 26 May 1957, for a demonstration in Beirut four days later. At the appointed time, three separate demonstrations emerged led by 'Abdallah al-Yafi, Sa'ib Salam, al-Yafi's ministerial colleague in 1956, and Nasim Majdalani, a key leader of the Greek Orthodox community. Joumblat refused to participate, but allowed Majdalani, one of his partisans in the Progressive Socialist Party, to join. The government's security forces, accusing the opposition of staging an uprising with the support of subversive elements and Palestinian refugees, clashed violently with all the three demonstrations(15). The rioting left seven casualties and sixty wounded; Majdalani and Salam among the latter(16).

Chamoun, unlike former president Bisharah Khuri, neither felt intimidated by the opposition nor hesitated to employ force. And if the pan-Arab nationalists of Beirut had sought to display their paramouncy within the opposition, their demonstrative efforts proved naught. At the end of the last electoral phase of the parliamentary elections of 1957, all the major leaders of the opposition, Salam, al-Yafi, and al-As'ad had lost; even the vacillating Joumblat was punished with the loss of his seat in parliament(17).

Inevitably, the losers charged electoral corruption and accused the regime of deliberately orchestrating their demise[18].

Linked to these developments in Beirut would be the ouster of the PPS from Syria and the transfer of its base of operations to Lebanon with the full support of Chamoun. The assassination of a prominent *Ba'thi* officer, 'Adnan al-Malki, in April 1955, resulted in a succession of trials that weeded out PPS sympathizers from within the officer corps, and outlawed the party in Syria. Since the Lebanese branch of the PPS had assisted Chamoun against Khuri in 1952, and as the party's appeal for the unity of a geographical Syria that excluded Egypt proved satisfying to Hashimi Iraq, the PPS could operate in Lebanon at will under the protection of the Lebanese government[19].

The Syrian travails of the PPS, and its ensuing ideological warfare with Arab nationalism made it ideal for a role in a growing plan to overturn the pro-Egyptian Syrian government, ostensibly via the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey became involved with the United States in formulating military plans against Syria before it allegedly became a base of international communism[20]. President Eisenhower sent his special envoy, Loy Henderson, in order to coordinate between the states concerned.

As the Turks massed troops on the Syrian border in mid-September, the Arab partners to the plan cautiously evaded their commitments. Sa'ud conspicuously played a mediatory role, accusing the United States of partial responsibility for the crisis. Only Chamoun, ironically the party with the least resources, persisted in consecrating for collective intervention[21].

In a dramatic gesture, President Nasir despatched troops to Syria on 13 October 1957, to take positions alongside Syria's northern border with Turkey. Nasir's gesture unleashed a chain of events that would plunge Syria into full union with Egypt three months later. Seizing upon public anxiety over the impotence of Syria's neutrality and purporting to crown the achievements of Arab nationalism, the *Ba'th* submitted to parliament in December 1957, a project for an overdue federal union with Egypt. On 1 February 1958, Nasir and Syrian President Shukri al-Quwwatli announced the merger of Syria and Egypt under the title of the United Arab Republic (UAR)[22].

For the Arab nationalists of Lebanon the UAR constituted a moment of euphoric victory. On 9 February 1958, president-retired al-Quwwatli announced to a jubilant Lebanese delegation of the United National Front that "Lebanon is invited to join it (UAR) whenever she may so desire by merger or by federation, with the right to maintain her own integrity and special position" [23]. When Nasir, president-elect of the UAR, landed unannounced in Syria on 24 February, thousands of Lebanese, estimated at an incredible 60-350,000, crossed the border to Damascus to join the

festivities. Several delegations led by the Chamoun opposition, included one headed by a representative of the Maronite patriarch, addressed the president of the new republic with exhortations of admiration and support[24].

The panegyrics of Lebanese politicians for Nasir did not translate into an immediate demand on their part for joining the UAR[25]. But the Egyptian leader might have eschewed Lebanon's entry into the UAR emulating Syria's smooth accession[26]. "Radio Cairo" and "Voice of the Arabs," the two broadcasting stations that effectively played on their mass appeal for support of Egypt's policies, became replete with criticism of the government of Chamoun, Malik, and al-Sulh[27]. The Syrian *Deuxième Bureau*, responsible for military intelligence and headed by Colonel 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj, began to smuggle arms across the border and the Egyptian ambassador in Beirut, 'Abd al-Hamid Ghalib, prominently instructed members of the opposition on the means to confront Chamoun.

Sure enough, after the massive enthusiasm in Damascus in February 1958, there erupted in the Lebanese coastal cities demonstrations calling for union with the UAR. Begining in mid-March, the cities of Tripoli, Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut witnessed clashes between demonstrators and internal security forces directed to clamp down forcefully on such incidents. There were close to fifteen casualties and some 150 persons arrested[28].

Government newspapers charged that in a particular demonstration in Tyre, three men allegedly tore and trampled the Lebanese flag. The Arab nationalists and the Muslim leadership were taken aback, and began to counsel moderation, since they feared that Chamoun could quite easily harangue Maronite public opinion against them if they persisted in agitating for union with the UAR. As a quid pro quo, they gained the moral backing of the Maronite patriarch who tempered Maronite fears by stating he had received a reassuring letter from Nasir and al-Quwwatli attesting to the inviolability of Lebanese sovereignty and independence[29].

By the end of March, the opposition succeeded in deconfessionalizing crisis by shying away from the issue of joining the UAR and concentrating instead solely on the abuse of presidential powers by Chamoun. Partly due to Joumblat's initiative, some eighty-five leading personalities from all sects formed a Congress on 27 March 1958, which elected Henri Phar'un president, 'Abdallah al-Yafi vice-president, and Joumblat secretary. As foreign minister in 1945, Phar'un literally tore to shreds the Alexandria Protocol due to the limitations it imposed on the freedom of the Arab League members. His views now as then remained unaltered, but he deplored Chamoun's foreign policy, and the deterioration of relations with the Arab countries which endangered, in turn, internal equilibrium. The Congress affirmed its dedication to the continued existence of Lebanon as an independent state and to the National Pact which had sanctified national unity since 1943. They accused Chamoun of spreading

anxiety about Lebanon's independence *vis-à-vis* the UAR because he was in actuality preparing the grounds for his reelection to office[30].

The issue of succession to the presidency had been raised ever since the parliamentary elections of June 1957. There it remained dormant until the opening months of 1958, when loyalist deputies openly called for amending the constitution to allow an incumbent president to succeed himself. A group of neutrals, calling themselves the "Third Force", approached Chamoun on 17 December 1957, to ascertain whether he would seek reinvestiture, but the president procrastinated. On 10 and 24 April 1958, one of Chamoun's strongest advocates, deputy George 'Aql, announced that by the end of the month he would propose to the chamber a motion for amending the constitution[31].

The ensuing polarization and political mobilization in Lebanon continued throughout April amid explosions, demonstrations, and occasional armed clashes between government troops and members of the Chamoun opposition. Muslim pressure to force Sami al-Sulh's resignation from the premiership mounted, and when that failed, some 300 Muslim leaders meeting with Shaykh Muhammad 'Alaya, the Mufti of Lebanon, criticized al-Sulh as having violated the unanimity of the Muslim community. The deputy from Sidon, Ma'ruf Sa'd, warned in the chamber on 15 April 1958, that the government had created a chaotic situation analogous to the period that preceded the 1860 civil war. Such an explicit reference to a historically antecedence of bloody sectarian strife, stirred a sharp debate, because inferred to an impending outbreak of armed conflict and the to the prospective use of force by the opposition[32].

Nevertheless, future events validated Sa'd's portent warnings. Chamoun, in conjunction with the Hashimites, could neither retract his policy of joining a regional defense structure, nor would he be induced to back down from the final installment of his agreed plan with the U.S., namely to renew his presidential mandate. As he persisted in intriguing to remove the regime in Damascus, now Nasir and Sarraj, in their turn, supported the opposition mustered against Chamoun to remove him from power. That would ultimately call for a test of strength with the Arab nationalist opposition in Lebanon; a test that would ultimately lead to the 1958 crisis.

1. The question of the elections had been raised by Malik in a meeting with Dulles on 5 February 1957, whereby the Lebanese minister attempted to convince his counterpart that the elections were crucial since parliament, in its turn, selected the president. In the meeting, He did not conceal his opposition to Nasir and to his violent form of Arab nationalism, more so than Dulles. Malik also called for political change in Egypt and/or Syria in order to ease tensions in the region and relieve the pressure off Lebanon (U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, op. cit., pp. 201ff).
2. G. Barraclough, Survey of International Affairs, 1956-1958 (London, 1962), p. 145.
3. Sami al-Sulh, Ahtakim, op. cit., p. 139.
4. Meo, op. cit., pp. 99ff. In actuality, the Egyptians did request mediation. Nasir met the Lebanese ambassador in Cairo on 7 August 1956, well before the outbreak of war. He called upon Lebanon to mediate with the non-Arab members of the Baghdad Pact, and to convey a veiled threat to Britain and France that Egypt would block the canal in case of armed attack (Sami al-Sulh, Mudhakkarat Sami Bayk al-Sulh [The Memoirs of Sami Bey al-Sulh] (Beirut, 1960), p. 139).
5. In his work on the Lebanese army and the state, Adel Freiha claims that General Fu'ad Chihab subscribed to the "constitutionalist" school of Bisharah al-Khuri, and that was the reason why he did not resort to a *coup d'état*. Other reasons for the army's inactivity according to Freiha include the influence of Michel Shiha's ideas on Shihab, Lebanon's economic prosperity and nonagrarian society, the historical tradition of Phoenician and Punic democracy, and lastly the traditional composition of the officer coup from conservative ruling families (Adel Freiha, L'armée et l'état au Liban (1945-1980) (Paris, 1980), pp. 43-55).
6. By mid-1955, Sunni leaders Sa'ib Salam, Husayn al-ʻUwayni, and ʻAbdallah al-Yafi, had begun to meet "in secret" to form an opposition, raising the apprehensions of the British that a repeat performance of the campaign to oust al-Khuri was in the making (See the confidential report by Sir Andrews, No. 92 (1014/2/27/55) dated 8 July 1955, as cited by al-Sharq al-Awsat, 14 February 1986).
7. ʻAbdallah al-Mashnuq, a well know Sunni journalist who would later emerge as one of the leaders of the 1958 insurrection, described Chamoun as possessing modesty and political charm to the extent that it ensured him some degree of popularity among the Muslim rank-and-file. That he would soon be overwhelmed by the turbulence of Arab unitary nationalism, which he had supported since 1945, serves only to indicate the tragic limitations of the Maronite president (See interview with ʻAbdallah al-Mashnuq in Nawaf Salam, "L'insurection de 1958 au Liban" 5 vols. (Thése pour le doctorate III cycle, Université de Paris Sorbonnes, 1979), 4: 3).
8. If he intended to sell Congress the Doctrine by dwelling exclusively on the Soviet menace, Eisenhower later failed to elaborate on whether he intended to confront Arab nationalism specifically (Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years (London, 1966), pp. 177-83).

9. For the Richards' mission and the implementation of the Middle East Resolution, see ibid., pp. 531-71. See the envoy's assessment of his trip to Beirut in U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, op. cit., p. 210.
10. During the same two-year period, the United States launched a complete overhaul of the aging air force by paying for fourteen British manufactured Hawker Hunter aircraft under the offshore procurement program and delivered one US landing craft, and seventy-five M-47 Patton tanks, under the military assistance programs and a whole range of light arms, all guaranteed by adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm, 1971), pp. 551, 847). Until 1955, the Lebanese army had imported arms largely from Great Britain, most likely in anticipation of Lebanon's admission to the Middle East defense organization. After the formation of the Baghdad Pact, France, a nonmember of the Pact, extended military aid to provide a more balanced supply flow. But Baghdad Pact countries continued to furnish military and other kinds of aid to the Lebanese government as revealed by the trial of the Iraqi military tribunal in 1958 of Fadil al-Jammali, onetime foreign minister in Nuri al-Sa'id's cabinet,. Jammali confessed that Chamoun had sequestered the following financial assistance from Iraq: 50 thousand Lebanese pounds on 21 February, 14 June, and 30 October 1955; 200 thousand in June 1957; 13 1/2 million during the 1958 civil war (Yusuf Hanna 'Aql (Dayr al-Qamr). Fada'ih 'Ahd Sham'un [Scandals of the Chamoun Regime] (Beirut, n.d.), pp. 184-88).
11. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 194.
12. The opposition, in seeking to interpret Chamoun's obtrusive motives, adduced them to calculated tactics employed for the sake of over-dramatizing the effect of the upcoming parliamentary elections in June 1957, and setting the stage for the election of quiescent deputies loyal to the government.
13. Malcolm Kerr, "The Lebanese Civil War," in The International Regulations of Civil Wars (London, 1972), p. 73.
14. For a background analysis of the Chamoun-Ma'ushi conflict, see E. Frankel, "The Maronite Patriarch: An Historical View of a Religious Zai'm in the 1958 Lebanese Crisis", Pt. 2, Muslim World 60 (October 1976): 245-58. There is a distinct possibility that the patriarch's opposition had been in part motivated by France's reduction of influence under the Chamoun regime.
15. As early as 1 March 1956, Chamoun had intimated to the US ambassador the need for repatriation or resettlement elsewhere of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. When queried about whether Lebanon would enter into peace with Israel in case of such an eventuality, the Lebanese president refused to answer (FRUS, 1955-1957, op. cit., p. 187).
16. S. Sulh, Mudhakkarat, op. cit., pp. 442ff.
17. Joumblat embraced the cause of the opposition wholeheartedly. He later admitted that he thought seriously there and then of armed rebellion against what he termed the Lebanese "isolationists," alias the pro-Chamoun Maronites. The trickling of arms across the Ba'albak region from Syria began with occasional interdiction by Lebanese security forces. Aside from connections Joumblat had with the Druze of Syria and the Druze Shawkat Shuqayr, former Syrian chief of staff, it is not probable that this transfer of

arms turned into a complex or extensive operation as adduced later by Chamoun.

18. The CIA allegedly assisted the president in predetermining the electoral results (Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (New York, 1980), pp. 149-53).
19. See Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Politics, 1945-1958 (London, 1965), pp. 240ff.
20. Eisenhower, op. cit., pp. 196-204.
21. Ibid., p. 201.
22. Seale, op. cit., p. 323.
23. As cited by Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 61.
24. The inception of the UAR had so upset Chamoun that he initially thought Lebanon should send no official congratulatory note. He changed his mind only when Prime Minister al-Sulh, his lone Muslim supporter of weight, threatened to resign (Sami al-Sulh, Ahtakim, op. cit., p. 170).
25. Al-Yafi, Hamadah, Karami, and Salam expressed their desire that Lebanon join the UAR with some circumspection, since they feared a backlash from the government in Beirut. Surprisingly, the Shi'i leader 'Usayran, who formerly took Chamoun's side, declared in the most explicit statement to date that Lebanon's interest lay in joining the UAR (For Lebanese statements in favor of the UAR, see Agwani, Lebanese Crisis, op. cit., pp. 51ff).
26. In a confidential meeting with a Lebanese newspaperman, Riyad Tahah, Nasir asked, after spreading a map and studying the Syrian-Lebanese border, why Tahah neglected Syria's westernmost neighbor (i.e. Lebanon) when speaking so fervently of Arab unity. To this Tahah replied that Lebanon retained its special status which prevented it from joining an Arab unity framework at so short a notice (Riyad Tahah, Qisah al-Wihdah wal-Infisal [The Story of Union and Secession] (Beirut, 1974), p. 106).
27. Qubain, op. cit., pp. 58ff.
28. Ibid., p. 64.
29. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, op. cit., p. 49.
30. Ibid., p. 41.
31. The opposition hardly needed further proof of the president's ulterior motives. They pinpointed to the electoral law of 1957, which limited the number of deputies to 66 instead of the proposed 88, designed to curtail opposition representation and to remove all obstacles to the reelection of Chamoun (Qubain, op. cit., pp. 66f).
32. Lebanon, Mahadir Majlis al-Nuwwab, op. cit., 9th Legislature, 7th Session, 15 April 1958.

(6)
The 1958 Crisis:
The National Pact Reaffirmed

If the immediate cause for the outbreak of the crisis in Lebanon in May-July 1958, lay in President Chamoun's decision to renew his presidential term, the intrinsic cause was a clash over Lebanon's foreign policy and its regional alliances. Renewal for Chamoun meant that the government would remain a hidden partner to the Baghdad Pact and would continue to repress the popular Arab nationalists under the guise that they constituted a fifth column for Nasir. Chamoun saw no compromise possible, and he would consisently insist on Washington to fully uphold its commitments under the Eisenhower Doctrine to which he had subscribed, even if it risked outright US military intervention.

With the benefit of historical hindsight, it would have served the Lebanese president better to maintain a balance between traditional Western support and populist Arab nationalism, even though he professed a leaning toward Hashimi regional policy. This might have avoided the outbreak of the crisis, which many analysts would refer to as "civil war" or "akin to civil war". But in comparison to the wars that broke out in Lebanon seventeen years later, the present crisis might only be construed as an extremely low intensity conflict.

In the initial phases of the crisis, the Lebanese president failed to constitute a united Christian front, let alone induce the armed forces to forsake its neutrality and clamp down forcefully on the rebels. The United States refrained, too, from overt military intervention or from invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine despite repeated pleas by Chamoun. The seemingly pro-Nasirite military *coup d'état* in Iraq, however, threatened to drag Lebanon and Jordan into the sphere of Egyptian hegemony, thereby spurring the landing of American marines in Lebanon on 15 July 1958, to protect that country's sovereignty and independence. The venture proved conspicuously successful because it finally led to accommodation with the UAR, the peaceful termination of President Chamoun's tenure, the election of a neutral president, and reaffirmed the viability of the National Pact.

On 8 May 1958, a Maronite opposition newspaperman, Nasib al-Matni, was assassinated in Beirut. His last article manifestly called for Chamoun's resignation. On that same day, the United National Front issued a statement holding the government personally responsible for the murder and calling for a general strike. While the Front met on 9 May in Beirut to deliberate the outcome of the strike, Rashid Karami contacted them from

Tripoli. He reported 40 persons injured in truculent clashes between protesters of Matni's death and security forces[1]. The Front made the ominous decision then and there to launch an armed insurrection[2].

The rebellious Muslim opposition divided into three main groupings. The commanders in Beirut comprised al-Yafi, Salam, ‘Abdallah al-Mashnuq, a young influential journalist, and ‘Adnan al-Hakim, head of the *Najjadah* Party -- the so-called Beirut Four[3]. The deputy from Sidon, Ma‘ruf Sa‹d, controlled his city while Tripoli followed the guidance of Karami. These political bosses challenged the authority of government with the help of their armed supporters in the loyal sections of the cities[4]. In the rural areas of the east and the south, where Shi‘is predominate, Ahmad al-As‘ad mobilized his quasiclannish followers in Hasbayya and South Lebanon, while Sabri Hamadah and Tufiq Haydar controlled the Ba’albak region further to the north. Joumblat held sway in his turf in the Shuf mountain while a local Druze chieftain, Shibli al-‘Aryan, operated from the eastern Beqa‘ valley, a particularly strategic area since it bordered on the Syrian frontier, easing the transfer of military aid, supplies, and possible reinforcements from the UAR.[5].

The total amount of Muslim rebels was estimated to number around 10,000 men, dispersed in bands of 400 to 2,000[6]. Lightly armed, they achieved little organization above platoon level and radio communication between the sundry allied bands hardly existed[7]. But Nasir’s lieutenant in Syria, Colonel ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj, seemed to have convinced Nasir, if he needed convincing, that aiding the rebellion might shortly lead Lebanon to join the UAR. Sarraj had contacted Sa’ib Salam after the assasination of Matni, and offered him unconditional aid which the Beiruti leader accepted without hesitation. The UAR supplied arms and material to Salam and the various other armed groups of the opposition to enable them to sustain the pique of their offensives and, in addition, launched a virulent propaganda and radio campaign on their behalf[8].

But the insurrection also received Christian political support in the guise of former members of the Constitutional Bloc, who did not forgive Chamoun's ouster of President Khuri in 1952, in addition to members of the United National Front, who favored a neutralist foreign policy, as well as Maronite deputies disenchanted with Chamoun’s plans for reelection because it forfeited their own chances for the presidency[9]. The highest Christian endowment on the opposition remained, however, the support of the Maronite patriarch, Butrus Bulus al-Ma‘ushi (1955-75) who denied Chamoun the palpable religious *raison d’être* to mobilize the Maronite community against the rebellious Muslims[10].

At the other end of the loyalist spectrum, the government supporters banded around Na’im Maghabghab's “Mountain Army”, which operated from the village of ‘Ayn Zhalta in the Shuf region. Another Maronite

commander, George ‘Aql, the deputy who vowed to assure the reelection of the president, barricaded himself at Dayr al-Qamar, audaciously near Joumblat's base of operation. The interior ministry distributed arms to other civilians under the excuse that they would protect public installations[11]. Further to the north, the two well disciplined and paramilitary parties, the *Kata’ib* led by Pierre Gemayel and the PPS, traded control over various villages. The government irregulars stiffened the resistence of the internal security forces whenever attacked by the opposition, although they sometimes conducted independent runoff attacks of their own.

The military conflict escalated unabatedly throughout the country. In Tripoli, war resumed on 10 May 1958, with ten persons killed and sixty wounded. The army took an active part, probably owing to the initiative of the local commander, Colonel Antwan Karam, assualting the opposition with tanks and artillery. Government forces besieged the old “casbah” part of the city and heavy fighting continued throughout for three more months. In Beirut, a curfew was imposed on the capital after fighting broke out on 12 May, with security forces hemming in Salam’s partisans in the Basta quarter of the city.

In the Shuf district of Mount Lebanon, the bastion of the Joumblatis, the Druze belligerents planned a quick *coup de main*: attack the summer presidential palace in Dayr al-Qamar and capture Chamoun himself. In a two-days battle (13-14 May), a combined force of the garrison, the PPS, and Maghabghab’s men repulsed the attackers inflicting heavy losses. In retaliation for the striking vigilance of the internal security forces, several hundred men attacked the Lebanese customs post on the Syrian borders on 13 May, and killed all security personnel. While in the Beqa‘, Hamadah and Haydar attacked but failed to capture the Shaykh ‘Abdallah army camp[12].

If the opening moves of the opposition hoped to remove president Chamoun from office by force in three days, then it fell short of its purpose[13]. Nonetheless, there remained one force capable of putting a decisive end to the armed clashes, namely the 9,000 man army under the command of General Fu’ad Chehab[14]. Chehab, correspondingly, feared that his army might melt away among the warring factions once fully committed against the Arab nationalist opposition, and he therefore counseled a wait and see attitude. But even while steering its neutral course, the armed forces did not hesitate to deploy at selected sectors and at critical periods when the opposition verged on outright victory. In Tripoli, they exceeded their quasineutral role[15].

Chamoun could not therefore employ the Lebanese army *en masse* to put an end to the civil strife once and for all. The army’s nonintervention stripped the government loyalists from clinching a credible military solution, and it also inadvertently legitimized the opposition's political demands in the process. General Chehab enhanced this legitimacy further, when he entered

into several *modus vivendi* agreements with Muslim opposition areas to allow the passage of food and supplies to the population[16].

With his local military resources found lacking, Chamoun finally invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, and tentatively asked the American ambassador Robert McClintock on 11 May, and two days later on the 13th, for a Marine division[17]. Eisenhower favored such forceful action, but his secretary of state, Dulles, warned that it would have adverse effects on the Arab world[18]. Washington authorized its ambassador to advise Chamoun first to file a complaint with the United Nations Security Council. McClintock warned that future American combat assistance was not forthcoming unless Lebanon's armed forces were insufficient for the protection of the state and that assistance would not extend to the internal question of the Lebanese presidential elections[19]. Clothed in diplomatic parlance, the answer could be considered a mild rebuff to Chamoun, and a veiled reference to the neutralism of the Lebanese army as challenging the president's version of how internal developments had been unfolding so far. [20]

The Lebanese government, accordingly, submitted a note of complaint first to the Arab League, wherein it accused the UAR of intervening in Lebanon's internal affairs. In a press conference held to justify the official complaint, Chamoun claimed that around one thousand foreign UAR troops operated in the country and that the UAR was threatening to dominate the policies of Lebanon, and that he, in essence, would not allow it. When queried over the subject of his reinvestiture, the president provided evasive answers[21]. The next day, the Lebanese delegation at the UN submitted its official complaint to the Security Council.

The insurrectionists decided to escalate the military conflict in the hope of sabotaging the official Lebanese complaint at the UN. Joumblat took advantage of a Druze column that reached him from Syria via Dayr al-'Asha'ir, the Beqa', to mop up villages from Chamoun loyalists between 9 to 13 June. He achieved a striking success when he captured the village of Na'im Maghaghab, 'Ayn Zhalta. The army chose again an opportune moment to interfere, and drove the forces of Joumblat out of the village. On 15 June, Joumblat tempered down and entered into an agreement with General Chehab to allow the passage of supplies to the Shuf. Likewise in Beirut, Salam's Popular Resistance organization launched a general attack on 9 June against government positions. The army intervened with tanks, and shelled Salam's house. The Popular Resistance burned down Prime-Minister Sami al-Sulh's house in retaliation. After witnessing the heaviest scenes of fighting since the beginning of the war, combat in the capital, as in the Shuf, petered out.

The seriousness of the offensives had forced Chamoun to request for a third time in mid-June the intervention of American forces. Eisenhower

described the Lebanese president as bordering on panic and gave his request serious consideration[22]. But American hesitancy could be explained by the ongoing overtures between the US and the UAR. On 7 and 20 June, Nasir had already suggested to the American ambassador in Cairo a compromise solution that would insure Chamoun's departure through the election of General Chehab to the presidency and the appointment of Karami prime minister[23].

This would partly explain the unobtrusive nature of the UN mission to Lebanon. The international body had adopted a draft resolution on 10 June to form a United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) to ensure that no illegal infiltration of arms or men flowed from Syria[24]. The group reached the conclusion on 3 July that they detected no case of massive infiltration. They found to their surprise little signs of bloodshed. Near harmony characterized the relationship of the Christian and Muslim armed groups, while security forces stood idly by doing nothing. And barbed wires and barricades sealed the opposition areas; minor obstacles for Chehab's army if it chose to advance[25].

The attractive offer of reaching an accomodation with the US and the impossibility of the pan-Arabists in Lebanon to force a military solution of their own must have convinced Nasir to rein in his lieutenant Sarraj[26]. A friendly regime in Lebanon could certainly help Nasir consolidate his power in Syria, a much more credible solution than being dragged into the complexities of sectarian Lebanese politics. The relaxation of tensions in Lebanon could certaily be ascribed to these behind-the-scenes US-UAR negotiations[27].

With the standoff between the opposition and the loyalists as such, Chamoun decided to end one of the most irritant issues of the crisis. He declared on 9 July that he would not run for a second term. The president, however, still hoped that perhaps his erstwhile Iraqi ally, Nuri al-Sa‘id, would provide a military avenue under the guise of the Baghdad Pact. The Iraqi government ordered one brigade to the Jordanian borders on 13 July, presumably to intervene against Syria and relieve the pressure on Lebanon[28]. Instead, in the early hours of 14 July 1958, the brigade moved into Baghdad, killed Nuri and the entire Hashimi royal family, and set up a revolutionary Arab nationalist government.

The shocking loss of Iraq to a military coup jolted the west in fear of this regular pattern of destabilization performed by the UAR and the Arab nationalists. Now the main counterweight to Nasir’s influence in the Arab world had vanished overnight. The opposition in Lebanon felt their own victory near[29]. On 14 July, Chamoun requested urgent aid from the US ambassador for the fourth and final time, emphasizing that if the Americans did not intervene militarily within 48 hours, his pro-Western government would be toppled.

Eisenhower received Chamoun's request while holding a National Security Council meeting that included Secretary of State Dulles, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and the Head of the Joint Chiefs of staff, General Nathan Twining, to discuss the situation on 14 July. The conference realized that such a Lebanese request was in the making. If no vigorous American response followed, Eisenhower reasoned, Lebanon and Jordan would in all probability follow Iraq's paths with dire consequences held in store for what remained of Western influence in the Middle East. The President and the National Security Council concluded that the establishment of Nasir's hegemony in the Middle East in the name of Arab nationalism would ultimately lead to the neutralization of US military bases in the region. It would expose the hollowness of American commitments to protect its allies throughout the world. The decision was made to intervene.(30) The Joint Chiefs of Staff had for long prepared a contingency plan for Lebanon code named Operation BLUEBAT, which needed only 13 hours for launching(31).

General Twining instructed the commanders of BLUEBAT that their mission did not envisage fighting Lebanese rebels or intervening against the revolutionary regime in Iraq, but that it rather aimed at securing the Lebanese government and its key centers in and around Beirut. The military buildup in Lebanon, according to Twining, would continue until the expeditionary force felt strong enough to turn back infiltrations and border forays from Syria and to suppress, if the need arises, the Syrian First Army, located in the Golan Plateau, south of Damascus. On 15 July, at 3 p.m., one battalion of marines from the American Sixth Fleet, permanentely at readiness in the Mediterranean, hit the beaches outside Beirut and proceeded to occupy the airport, meeting no resistance(32). Two more battalions followed the next day. British troops in the same period landed in 'Amman to ensure the survival of the last Hashimi monarch, King Husayn. Even if Washington had not intended to interfere in Lebanon prior to 14 July, the American military build up since May permitted the United States to launch a rapid strategic stoke.

A few hours before the marines went in, the American ambassador notified Chehab and Chamoun of their impending arrival(33). The Lebanese president expressed delight but Chehab feared Lebanese army units in the vicinity of the landing would join the Muslim rebels and oppose the landing force. He asked the Americans to land in Beirut harbor and avoid appearance as an invading force. As the marines prepared to progress toward Beirut proper on 16 July, a Lebanese armored column deployed in echelon formation in front of the American troops. A confrontation was avoided only when the American commander, Admiral James Halloway, General Chehab and Ambassador McClintock made an *ad hoc* encounter with the menacing troops. Chehab succeeded in convincing his subordinate commanders to withdraw and enter the capital jointly with American

forces[34]. The army commander had proved his mettle in case the US held second opinions about his election to the presidency.

What were the exact prospects of Chamoun losing power within 48 hours? In 1961, Chamoun declared that the UAR could have sent volunteers across Syria and tipped the scales. The truth of the matter was that the danger to Chamoun emanated not from the opposition, but from the neutralist armed forces[35]. It is Ambassador McClintock who would later illuminate that at the very time when the marines hit the beaches on 15 July, a distraught Chamoun telephoned requesting armor in haste because the army planned a coup. McClintock immediately contacted Chehab and in no uncertain terms made it clear that if the Lebanese military arrested the chief of state, it would result in the most disagreable consequences. After a long pause, Chehab said he would recommend to his officers forestalling the coup[36]. The tensions of 14 July 1958 and its aftermath, had greatly contributed to the unfolding drama of events, and senior Lebanese officers must have felt that if they did not move now, some unbeknown junior officers would, thereby putting an end to the country's parliamentarian democracy and ushering in a military dictatorship in the same pattern that had been evolving across the core Arab states of Egypt, Syria and finally Iraq.

If the opportune landing of the marines had unwittingly forestalled a possible coup by the Lebanese armed forces, the goals of the American intervention remained temporized because of its immediacy. Eisenhower in an address to the nation on 15 July, surprisingly, did not invoke the Middle East Doctrine, but Article 51 of the United Nations Charter that dealt with indirect aggression. He claimed action in suport of the international organization and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Nevertheless, the spirit and the purpose of the Doctrine prevailed, clearing the ground for the United States to exercise unopposed its fullfledged military power in Lebanon[37].

The president appointed Robert Murphy, undersecretary of state, as his personal representative to launch a diplomatic offensive to solve the Lebanese crisis parallel to the introduction of military forces[38]. Eisenhower instructed Murphy that sentiment in the Middle East and in Egypt no longer believed the United States capable of exercising force for fear of Soviet reaction. He wanted to prove that this was hardly the case[39]. At first instance, the American envoy agreed with Chamoun that the American expeditionary force (14,000 men), in conjunction with the Lebanese army (9,000 men), should move against the Basta, the rebellious Sunni quarter of Beirut and the headquarters of Sa'ib Salam[40]. But later Murphy preached conciliation, and began meeting with members of the Muslim opposition in order to smooth out the functioning of the American troops, restore internal stability, and settle the issue of the presidential elections once and for all.

The chamber of deputies met hurriedly on 31 July and elected Chehab as president. Chamoun remained in office steadfastedly, as he had consistently vowed to do, to the end of his constitutional period on 23 September 1958.

The UAR president similarly thought that the preliminary American buildup in Lebanon threatened to escalate into an attack on Iraq to roll up the Qasim coup, and ostensibly via Syria. He had no previous inkling of the Iraqi military coup nor did he mastermind it, but he was surely fed prior information that rebel officers were considering mounting a coup in Baghdad. The landing of American troops, however, had diffused the confrontation in Lebanon and the consolidation of the military in Iraq constituted anyway a far more important asset for Nasir. After the initial blast of anti-American propaganda, the UAR acquiesced to the *fait accompli* in Lebanon when assurances were given that the details of the original American-Egyptian agreement would be ascribed to.

By its action in Lebanon, the United States had asserted to Nasir and to the Arab nationalists that they must contend with the regional interests of the United States and its allies in all seriousness. This did not mean that Washington had no singular interest in maintaining Lebanese stability and independence, but that this interest remained secondary to its wider regional and global responsibilities.

The election of General Fu'ad Chehab to the presidency rested, ironically, on the expanding revolutionary role that the military had played in Arab politics since 1949. Ostentatiously, he refrained from seizing power by extraconstitutional measures, although he came close to it on 15 July 1958. Even after the departure of the American troops on 15 October, he still made no move to subordinate democratic civilian rule, as his fellow officers in other Arab states had already done.

But surprises were still in store for the internal sectarian balance of power. When on 24 September 1958, a day after Chamoun left office, Chehab appointed Karami prime minister, the new premier announced that his cabinet would harvest the fruits of the "revolution". That statement in practical terms meant that all those loyalists associated with the Chamoun regime would be denied representation in government. The PPS because it displayed military bravado in assisting security forces and because it identified with the lost Hashimi cause, found itself victimized and isolated. But the mainstream *Kata'ib* party could not lend itself so easily to obscurity. They took the initiative when a former government loyalist newspaperman, Fu'ad Haddad, was kidnapped on 19 September. As the defunct opposition removed their barricades and called off their four month-old strike, the new opposition led by the *Kata'ib* and former president Chamoun raised their own barricades and announced a strike of their own against the Karami government. A wierd sense of *déjà vu* hovered over the country(41).

The perennial Maronite "counterrevolution" literally shocked the complaceny of members of the Muslim opposition and their allies who had basked in the false premise that they had conducted a multiconfessional national revolt against an oppressive regime hostile to Arab nationalism. The counterstrike ultimately forced Karami's hand, and on 10 October, he held a surprise parley with Pierre Gemayel, leader of the *Kata'ib* Party. A few days later, Karami formed a four-member national salvation cabinet which included none other than Gemayel himself, as well as Raymond Edde, the outspoken son of former Francophile president Emile Eddé[42]. The 1958 Lebanese crisis had formally and unremittingly come to an end.

To conclude, the "neither victor nor vanquished" stalemate in Lebanon, as aptly coined by Sa'ib Salam, augmented the scrupulous reconstruction of Christian-Muslim rapprochement under circumspect US military auspices and tacit UAR diplomatic acquiescence. The modern state of Lebanon could not maintain the internal sectarian balance of power, and by implication, the country's permeability and sovereignty, without due consideration to the regional and international powers at play. But interconfessional politics by and in itself, similarly required an intricate adherence to a power formula engineered to assure all concerned, that no misappropriation or abuse of power had occurred in the unfolding interplay of domestic, regional, and international politics. However the return to internal rapprochement and to the fundamentals of the 1943 National Pact exacted a heavy price: an estimated loss of 1500 lives in four months of armed clashes out of a total population of 1.5 million[43].

As for the inexorable march of Arab nationalism, the Iraqi revolutionaries led by General 'Abd al-Karim Qasim purged the military from Arab nationalist officers loyal to 'Abd al-Nasir in December 1958. The Baghdad leadership truly shattered the illusion of a unified and monolithic Arab revolutionary movement spearheaded by Egypt. On 28 September 1961, more dramatic events took place in Damascus, where a military junta took power and announced the secession of Syria from the UAR, ultimately sealing the last and only successful attempt at fulfilling the fleeting ideal of Arab unity that would supposedly overturn the Sykes-Picot arrangements promulgated close to 40 years ago. In retrospect, the dangers of unitary Arab nationalism to the independence and integrity of Lebanon looms less larger today than it did in 1958.



Map 9: American Troop Deployment in Lebanon, 1958

1. Karami had called only for a peaceful strike in Tripoli and not for armed insurrection (Rizq Rizq, Rashid Karami (Beirut, 1987?), p. 64).
2. The participants, who included 'Abdallah al-Yafi, Sa'ib Salam, and Kamal Joumblat authorized Joumblat for reasons of military exigencies to trigger the revolt with his Druze followers in the inaccessible mountain redoubts. Other participants in the meeting included Husayn al-'Uwayni, a rich Sunni politician close to Saudi Arabia, and Fu'ad 'Ammun, a Maronite lawyer from Dayr al-Qamar who was one of the supporters of Joumblat. For a biographical sketch of the major politicians in the crisis, see Salam, op. cit., 1: 169-86.
3. Copeland, op. cit., p. 232.
4. For a disposition of Muslim positions in Beirut and Tripoli, see Salam, op. cit., 5: carte 3 and 4.
5. Jacques Nantet, Histoire du Liban (Paris, 1963), p. 319.
6. Geoffrey Kempf, "Lebanon, 1958," The Control of Local Conflict Case Studies, vol. 3 (Massachusetts, 1969), p. 293.
7. General Odd Bull, War and Peace in the Middle East (London, 1976), p. 7.
8. Salah Nasr, 'Abd al-Nasir wa-Tajribah al-Wihdah ['Abd al-Nasir and the Experience of Unity] (Al-Qahirah, 1976), p. 158.
9. Nantet, op. cit., pp. 320f. Fu'ad 'Ammun, implied, as member of the opposition, that the president sought to partition Lebanon and retain an exclusive Christian state.
10. Many Maronite clerical leaders, for example, deserted the patriarch and refused to follow his policy guidelines, urging their followers to support the government (Qubain, op. cit., p. 83).
11. Yusif, op. cit., p. 180.
12. Qubain, op. cit., p. 79.
13. S. Sulh, Mudhakkarat, op. cit., p. 490.
14. This figure was given by the Lebanese ambassador to the US, Dr. Victor Khuri, in 1956, see FRUS, 1955-1957, op. cit., p. 181.
15. Nantet, op. cit., p. 324. Chehab would later intimate in 1960, to his minister of justice, Fu'ad Butrus, that his army could sustain an offensive campaign against the rebels for seven days, after which he would no longer be able to vouch for its unity and cohesion on the 8th (See Fu'ad Butrus, al-Mudhakkarat, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 2007), p. 48)
16. Freiha, op. cit., pp. 118-21.
17. Robert McClintock, The Meaning of Limited War (Boston, 1967), p. 101.
18. Mcclintock and Nadim Dimishqiyyah, the Lebanese ambassador in Washington, convinced Dulles that Chamoun's insistence on reelection was a fatal error. Indeed disenchantment with Chamoun went back to the 1957 elections, when Dulles commented that it constituted such an adverse result to Lebanese moderates that it might ultimately lead to internal instability (Eisenhower, op. cit., 264).
19. See Chamoun's press statement as cited by Agwani, The Lebanon Crisis, op. cit., p. 74.
20. Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 268.
21. The Egyptians also submitted another proposal through the American embassy in Beirut on 11 June, calling for the termination of Chamoun's term, the

appointment of Chehab prime minister, and amnesty for the rebels. Eisenhower did not at the time think highly of Chehab and considered him an upstart (See Irene L. Gendzier, "The U.S. Perception of the Lebanese Civil War According to Declassified Documents: A Preliminary Account," in The Middle East and North Africa: Essays in Honor of J.C. Hurewitz, ed. Reeva Simon (New York, 1990), p. 340). For a more extensive *exposé* by Gendzier, see her later work Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon, 1945-1958 (New York, 2006). Earlier, on 30 May, Patriarch Bulus al-Ma'ushi nominated Chehab for the presidency but failed to persuade the army chief to declare his acceptance overtly.

22. The Americans originally supported the Lebanese concept that UNOGIL should not function merely as an observer team, but as an international force that would seal the border. The UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, persuaded Dulles otherwise, since no clear evidence of massive foreign infiltration had yet surfaced. For a study of the role played by Hammarskjöld in tempering down US eagerness for military intervention or in turning UNOGIL into a police force as Chamoun desired, see Michael Graham Fry, "The United Nations Confronts the United States in 1958," in A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958, ed. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (London, 2002), pp. 145-180
23. Major-General Carl Van Horn, Soldiering for Peace (New York, 1967), p. 101. Previously on 10 June, the Lebanese government had claimed that Syria recruited and trained 15,000 men for use in Lebanon. The UN commander later estimated that the number came close to 1,100, two-thirds of them Druze lacking in proper military training (Bull, p. 14).
24. Along the borders, the distribution of arms to the Shi'is and the Druze proceeded in utter confusion. This completely exasperated members of the Syrian *Deuxième Bureau*. They pleaded with the Shi'i leader Sabri Hamadah to attack government positions in Hirmil, the hilly country in North Lebanon, but he nonchalantly avoided to commit himself with the excuse that the loyalists embraced kinsfolk. When a delegation from Beirut arrived asking for more aid, Syrian intelligence officers answered with desperation that heretofore thirty-six Syrian commandoes carried the brunt of the heavy fighting in Beirut. The failure of the military solution and the shortage of funds had, in the meantime, created dissension between the head of the Syrian *Deuxième Bureau*, Sarraj, and the political leadership in Cairo (Tahah, op. cit., p. 127).
25. That period of relaxation witnessed tensions amongst members of the Muslim opposition. The strongest Sunni boss in Beirut, Sa'ib Salam, quarreled with the head of the *Najjadah* party, 'Adnan al-Hakim, over the latter's appeal on the radio to Lebanese Arab nationalists in the army to defect. The Najjadah still hoped, along with Sarraj, for a military victory in Lebanon (Interview with Sa'ib Salam, 20 July 1991). In a candid 1979 interview, Salam admitted to having received from the UAR during the war 1,300,000 Lebanese pounds. He then estimated that taking other participants into consideration, the UAR must have spent at the least between 10 and 40 million pounds (Mona Nsouli, "The U.S.-U.A.R. Involvement in the 1958 Crisis," M.A. Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1979, p. 96).

26. Joumblat also feared a crude return to the National Pact in the guise of a renewed Maronite-Sunni agreement. On 30 June, he opened a new offensive from the Shuf toward Beirut Airport. The army intervened one more time on 2 July in conjunction with other civilian irregulars, and in a four-day battle repulsed the attackers decisively. The Druze leader blamed the Sunni leadership of Beirut for having tacitly allowed the loyalists to concentate against him.
27. President Chamoun had raised the issue of requesting Iraqi military intervention in a cabinet meeting on 12 July. See evaluation of the Lebanese head of *Sûreté Générale* in Nasif, Sir al-Dawlah, op.cit., p. 266.
28. Nantet, op. cit., p. 327.
29. William B. Quandt, "Lebanon, 1958, and Jordan, 1970," in Force Without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, ed. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington, D.C., 1978), pp. 222-28.
30. See 23 June memorandum for the Joint Chief of Staff "Study of the Long Range Military implications of US/UK Intervention in Lebanon," as cited in Gendzier, op. cit., p. 346. See also United States Army Headquarters Europe, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon (USAREU, 1959).
31. Margaret Bodron, "US Intervention in Lebanon, 1958," Military Review 56 (February 1976): 71. See also the minutes of the presidential meetings at the White House as published in Ulrich H. Brunnhuber, Die Libanonkrise 1958: U.S. Intervention im Zeichen der Eisenhower Doktrin? (Hamburg, 1997).
32. President Chamoun failed to admonish the commander of the Lebanese armed forces that he had requested US intervention on the government's behalf, thereby widening the gulf of confidence that separated the two. The US Joint Chief of Staff, however, considered the Lebanese army unreliabele in its support for American military intervention (Gendzier, op. cit., p. 346).
33. McClintock, op. cit., pp. 108-114.
34. The US military did take into its consideration around mid-June the option that the Lebanese army could conduct a coup for or against the Lebanese president (Gendzier, op. cit., p. 348).
35. McClintock, op. cit., pp. 108-114.
36. J.C. Hurewitz, "Lebanese Democracy," op. cit., p. 233.
37. The president seemed to have chosen Murphy precisely because of tensions in the relations between McClintock and Chamoun (Gendzier, op. cit., p. 337)
38. Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (London, 1964), p. 485.
39. Ibid., pp. 491ff.
40. Mideast Mirror (Beirut), 21, 28 September 1958.
41. Eddé had been set against Chamoun's reelection, as evidenced by the five points for the resolution of the crisis which he submitted to McClintock on 20 June (Gendzier, op. cit., p. 343). The fourth minister had been Husayn al-'Uwayni, a notable Sunni politician who conducted at the time unimpeachable relations with both republican Egypt and monarchial Saudi Arabia.
42. Nantet, op. cit., p. 339.

III

THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY, 1964-1976

(7)
Chehabism and the Modernization of the Confessional Polity

The following section address the challenge posed to Lebanon's sovereignty and confessional polity by the gradual rise of the Palestinian resistance movement, and the utter failure to absorb the consequences that would follow the creation of a widely armed presence amongst the Palestinan refugee camps in Lebanon. It became obvious to some observers that it would be futile to search for a standoff balance between Western sponsorship of Lebanese sovereignty and an actively benign Arab involvement in Lebanese affairs as had happened in 1943 and 1958. The esnsuing yet serious lapse in upholding the country's sovereignty would ultimately lead to the breakdown of the interconfessional polity and the wrecking of the National Pact which had served the country so well in the interplay of domestic, regional and international politics since 1920.

The outbreak of the third Arab-Israeli war on 5 June 1967, would bring an abrupt cessation to Lebanon's apparent insularity from the vicissitudes of Arab regional politics(1). Militant Palestinian nationalism under guidance of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would rise to challenge the crushing defeat of the Arab regimes and agitate for unrestricted guerrilla warfare against Israel. The ruling Lebanese political establishment would later harbor the desire to curb, by force if necessary, the political-military mobilization of the Palestinian refugees in a manner analogous to what had been meted out in Jordan in Black September 1970. They were in part driven by the fear that the PLO would terminate the country's quasineutral stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other Lebanese leaders, conversely, lobbied for the establishment of a Palestinian sanctuary in southern Lebanon but they would subsequently exact a heavy price: Israeli retribution in the south dislocated its largely Shi'i population and channeled their indignation against the Lebanese state itself.

In similar fashion, the PLO would cement its alliance with radical and antisectarian leftist parties commandeered by Joumblat who challenged to completely upturn the traditional mode of distributing power amongst the religious sects. Selective targeting of Israeli strikes in the south also led to the embittering of relations between the few Christian villages on the border and the Palestinians who were accused of actively plotting to upset the internal balance of power inside the country at large, especially since Palestinian militancy constituted a vehicle for the intervention of Arab states in Lebanese politics with arms and men at an hitherto unprecedented scale in Lebanon's history(2).

Thus for all practical purposes, the first shots of the war of 1975-76, were actually fired as the hostilities of the June 1967 war had petered out. The first repercussion was for Israel to feel free to intervene in Lebanon after its souring of relations with de Gaulle's France over its preemptive strike in the June war. Although French arms had played a major role in *Zahal*'s victory, any inhibitions Israel might have had not to intervene against France's traditional *protégé*, i.e. Lebanon, became moot. Likewise public opinion in western states, primarily the United States and Great Britain, had greatly sympathized with Israel's conduct of the June war and in its aftermath, and thus Lebanon henceforth lost another crucial bastion of support, for under the guise of defending itself against Palestinian revanchisme, Israel had won free rein to operate against its northern Lebanese neighbour(3). It is telling that Israeli Mossad operatives had predictably gauged that Palestinian guerrillas would soon descend on the south in early 1968, and they hoped that they could use their presence there as a pretext to begin intervening in internal Lebanese politics(4).

But before being swept into the Arab-Israeli vortex of war, Lebanon possessed a window of opportunity to reform and reinforce the interconfessional system during the crucial years of the Chehab administration in 1960-1964. In his early inaugural address in 1958, President Chehab asked for renewed faith in the spirit of the National Pact as the bulwark of Lebanese independence, and consequently no major redistribution of sectarian positions of power was put forth. Joumblat in particular strenuously criticized this crude return to the National Pact. He assessed the postwar 1958 settlement as strikingly reminiscent to that of 1840, when the European concert of powers forced the Ottoman Empire to divide Lebanon into a Maronite and Druze province, which prepared the ground for the bloody 1860 confrontation. Joumblat's message was clear; Lebanon had once more succumbed to such a clannish and sectarian division of spoils, only this time between the Sunni and Maronite communities, instead of opting for drastic secular reforms to which he espoused.

President Chehab appeased the complaints of the radical antisectarian groups by instituting social-economic reforms and conceding to distribute important ministerial portfolios to members of the Druze chieftain's party, the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). As a counterweight to the PSP in the cabinet, Pierre Gemayel of the *Kata'ib* more than often held crucial ministerial posts. In the same manner, the Chehab regime established with arithmetic precision proportional representation in government according to sect and regional province(5). Perhaps the single political group barred throughout the period from cabinet representation belonged to the entourage of former president Camille Chamoun and to members of his newly formed National Liberal Party(6).

Under the army's watchful scrutiny to guarantee fair elections, Joumblat, Salam, Karami, and al-As'ad regained their seats in the 1960 parliament in contrast to Chamoun's partisans who dwindled into a small minority of the chamber. Without warning, Chehab submitted his resignation on 20 July 1960, declaring his mission of national reconciliation fulfilled. Parliament hailed him as the nation's saviour and implored him to withdraw his resignation a few hours later. By this gesture of *désenchantement* toward political life, General Chehab emphasized his own indispensability and the prestige of the presidency(7).

Although the he seized this public mandate as an opportune juncture with the assistance of the military to exercise his powers to the full, the president did not encroach on the power prerogatives of the prime minister. Indeed Chehab portrayed a semblance of Maronite-Sunni balance and continuity by inviting Tripoli's leader, Rashid Karami, to head three cabinets for marathon periods (24 September 1958-14 May 1960, 31 October 1961-20 February 1964), which in Lebanon represented near records. Karami's ostentatious Beirut rival, Sa'ib Salam, had fallen from grace after sharp disagreements with Joumblat. Two other prime ministers, Ahmad al-Da'uq (14 May-1 August 1960) and Husayn al-'Uwayni (20 February-25 September 1964), formed temporary provisional governments which never attained Karami's stature(8).

As self-styled bureaucratic disciplinarians, both Chehab and Karami focused on modernizing the state to help prevent the recurrence of a political collapse similar to that of 1958(9). They meticulously called for administrative reforms and launched programs of economic planning and development. By alleviating social-economic differences between communities in their respective geographic regions, the president in particular hoped to maintain a cross-sectional national unity. But the crux of these reforms fell on the power base of the traditional leaders, and by association, sectarian bosses, whom Chehab would dismiss as "frômagistes" bent on maintaining a loyal clientèle by distributing patronage and services. They in turn, accused the president, by his meticulous attention to sectarian quotas, of reviving the confessional consciousness of the individual citizen and destroying the flexibility of intersectarian alliance formation; in short, he was accentuating the sectarian problem which he sought to mollify.

Partly to circumvent the power of these traditional bosses, Chehab imposed the needed degree of conformity on the national level by relying on his loyal base of support, the armed forces. He surrounded himself with a group of handpicked loyal officers and other technocrats who acted as his ombudsmen agents within the bureaucracy, ready to receive grievances and apply pressure when necessary(10). The expanded role of the military, while taking its cue from the military juntas in power in the surrounding Arab states, tended to antagonize the traditional *zu'ama'* bosses who, for the first

time perhaps, confronted such an institutional interference by the army in government. The *Deuxième Bureau*, for example, subsequently immersed itself in the minute details of confessional politics, such as the distribution of parliamentary seats and the composition of the cabinet, which essentially lay beyond its jurisdiction of maintaining internal security(11).

In the field of foreign affairs, Chehab was fortunate enough to induce support from both Cairo and Washington. US commitments to Lebanon gave expression in the prompt extension of $12.6 million in financial aid to help rebuild the economy shattered by the 1958 war, and by the annual portcalls of the sixth Fleet to Beirut harbor(12). In the case of Egypt, Chehab made no diehard commitments toward Arab nationalism. When the Lebanese government requested a parley to settle the outstanding economic differences with the Syrian region of the UAR for the facilitation of transit traffic, Chehab met Nasir under a tent in a remote unassuming sight at the Lebanese-Syrian frontier on 25 March 1959. Nasir stressed his support for Lebanon's internal balance and unity, and urged that Lebanon remain neutral in the inter-Arab sphere especially in view of its traditionally historical relations with the West. Having denied Nasir entry into Lebanon proper, Chehab had merited approval from those Maronite quarters who were extremely sensitve to further Egyptian intrusions and who envisaged that Lebanon should maintain a strictly "neutral" Mediterranean stance completely independent of its Arab milieu(13).

But Chamoun's partisans in general resented Chehab's Arab policy and they resented too, the influence of the Egyptian ambassador stationed in Beirut. Within this context, Chamoun and his National Liberal Party witnessed a resurgence of popularity, as his stand in 1958, retroactively assumed heroic proportions. In the same vein, when on 28 September 1961, a group of Damascene military officers staged an anti-Nasirite coup and announced Syria's secession from the UAR, Chehab refused to grant the new government immediate recognition which the Chamounists saw as an unwanted and uncalled for gesture of magnanimity toward Nasir's setback.

But the challenge to the regime in Lebanon also arose from fringe extraconfessional parties. Angered by the government's presumed capitulation to Egyptian directives, a handful of Lebanese military officers in coordination with the PPS, attempted to seize power for a second time in the party's history on 31 December 1961. The plot blundered despite the initial arrest of scores of highranking Chehabist officers, and the army retaliated with a repressive campaign against the leadership and supporters of the Syrian nationalists(14). Although chances to impose a party dictatorship and a pan-Syrian nationalist regime in Lebanon remained rather slim, even before the first shots of the attempted coup were fired, the putsch shocked the military and actuated further their intervention in internal politics(15).

The election of a new parliament in 1964 loyal to the regime, and the approaching end of Chehab's term in office posed, once more the extraconstitutional but seasonal Lebanese question of whether the president would seek reinvestiture[17]. Parliament declared in May 1964 its readiness to amend the constitution so that Chehab might supervise in a second term the full implementation of his modernizing reforms. But the opposition to the Chehabist régime was already being set in motion. Raymond Edde, head of the National Bloc and a critic of military intervention in politics, joined the ranks of ostracized leaders such as Chamoun and Salam, after he lost the April-May 1964 parliamentary elections. Eddé would later recover another seat in runoff elections in 1965, and that after considerable efforts against *Deuxième Bureau* machinations[16].

Nevertheless, Chehab demurred over a second term, since none of the influential Maronite leaders, neither Eddé, Chamoun, Gemayel, nor Suleiman Frangieh, prepared to sacrifice their early prospects to assume the presidency. Paradoxically, the Muslim deputies supported reinvestiture, reflecting their confidence in the policies adopted for the last six years. Thus Karami, Joumblat, and Hamadah campaigned feverishly to line up a parliamentary majority in favor of constitutional amendment, only to fail in swaying Chehab from his decision to ultimately refuse reinvestiture, especially since he felt that the country was again treading the path of heightened interconfessional tensions[18].

The chamber of deputies elected in September 1964, a neutral compromise candidate, Charles Hilu. Although he did not belong to the former president's immediate entourage, he pledged nevertheless to follow "*al-Nahj al-Shihabi*", a synonym for Chehabist policies. In retrospect, perhaps Chehab's enduring legacy was that he did not retire in the wake of a major national crisis and that he had attempted and actively pursued widespread economic and administrative reforms. The eminent Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi had summarized Nahjist Chehabist policies and it would be worth quoting herein as[19],

> *The maximum possible neutrality at the international level; the maximum possible accommodation to Nasserist policy; the maximum degree of fairness in the distribution of political and administrative responsibility among the Lebanese religious communities; the introduction of at least the minimum social measures to prevent the spread of popular discontent; the development of a reformed state with a modern machinery worthy of independence, even at the cost of curbing the power of parliament and alienating the politicians of the traditional school.*

But now that Chehab had withdrawn from the scene, those very same institutions, created to modernize the state and limit sectarian politics,

betrayed vestiges of unbridled power. The secretive *Deuxième Bureau* interfered in dictating government policy, punishing politicians who did not adhere to it. This raised fears that the retired president imperiously reigned behind the Bureau with Hilu reduced to a mere figurehead. Hilu however was not lacking in political finesse. He used Chehabists against their opponents and vice versa. He committed himself to neither side, maintaining his authority above al1[20].

The first foray of the newly elected Hilu's exercise of power as president, was to attend a summit conference in Cairo in January 1964. Projects to divert the waters of the River Jordan, near the triangle of the Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese frontiers, and buttressed by unconfirmed reports that the Hebrew state would shortly possess a nuclear capability, provided the *cause célèbre* for the Arabs to close ranks. Egypt, no doubt hopelessly immersed in the Yemeni quagmire since 1962, and frustrated in its efforts to restore its regional primacy, had extended conciliatory invitations to all thirteen independent Arab states. The Arab presidents and monarchs of the Arab world met amiably to settle their outstanding differences under the auspices of the Arab League in the hope that the venerable institution might once more suppress the destabilizing forces arising from efforts by pan-Arabists to precipitate a fully integrated union and, in addition, to temporize the ongoing ideological war between the Arab revolutionaries led by Egypt and the conservatives led by Saudi Arabia.

The conferees agreed to establish a joint military force commanded by an Egyptian general and considered plans for reducing the northern tributaries of the Jordan River - the Hasbani in Lebanon, Banias in Syria, and the Yarmuk in Jordan.[21]. In the second summit conference held at Alexandria in September 1964, President Hilu requested at least one year delay before initiating water construction projects on the Hasbani because he feared Israeli reprisals. The president similarly resisted proposals to reinforce Lebanon's meager armed forces with Arab troops according to the projected plans of the unified military command. Hilu demanded, instead, substantial funds to strengthen the country's standing army. Lebanon feared that stationing Arab troops, presumably Egyptian or Iraqi, on its territory invited their indelible intervention in domestic affairs and their disruption of the sectarian equilibrium of power[22].

Although the Alexandria summit witnessed the first floundering of coordinating strategy against Israel, this did not obviate Arab leaders from establishing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the official representative of the Palestinian refugees. For nearly two decades, the Arab League had ruefully failed to provide a viable solution to the destitute camp dwellers in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. The acute urge to liberate Palestine from Zionism and to challenge Israel's existence must have heightened now that a new generation of refugees had grown in their

diaspora without contingent solution to their plight. As a supplementary military arm to the PLO, the summit promised to train and equip a conventional Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). But again, President Hilu rejected Palestinian militarization on Lebanese territory and the *Deuxième Bureau* continued to keep close watch over the refugee camps. [(23)].

If the president skillfully maintained the investment of his country's comparatively meager resources against Israel to a bare minimum, the Syrians managed to involve both Lebanon and Jordan forcefully in their anti-Israeli bellicosity. The radical *Ba'th* regime in Damascus found reconciliation with traditional Arab regimes most distasteful, not to mention their ingrained fear that the summit meetings constituted part of a grandiose Egyptian plan to isolate them and ultimately release their shaky hold over Syria. In late 1964, small groups of Palestinian nationalists, with Syrian encouragement, began reconnaissance probes into northern Israel. Some raiders crossed through Lebanon and when detected, fell into *Deuxième Bureau* captivity, revealing that they were members of an hitherto unknown underground movement called al-*Fatah* (the reverse Arab sobriquet for the Palestine National Liberation Movement)[(24)].

In the meanwhile that Lebanon was resisting Egyptian pressures for Arab military standardization and Syrian schemes for precipitating a war, the Lebanese government could still count on a protective US umbrella. President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-68) had despatched W. Averell Harriman as his special emissary to Israel on 25 February 1965, to forestall consequences of massive retaliatory strikes against the moderate pro-American governments of Lebanon and Jordan[(25)]. In addition, the Chehabist-Hilu regime had cultivated a special relationship with de Gaulle's France by the utilization of its experts and technicians in different modernizing projects[(26)]. The French supplied Lebanon with some military hardware, and announced in February 1966, that a dozen of the fairly advanced fighterbomber, the Mirage IIIC, would be added to the Lebanese arsenal. It were precisely these Mirage planes that would deliver the Israeli *coup de grâce* over the Arab airfields in June 1967, and would herald the end of Lebanon's insularity from the Arab-Israeli conflict.

1. Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence, op. cit., p. 93.
2. Marius Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War (N.Y., 1980), p. 24.
3. Walid Khalidi argues that another result of the June war and the loss of the Golan had been the growing strategic importance of Lebanon both to Syria and Israel (Walid Khalidi, "Lebanon: Yesterday and Tomorrow," The Middle East Journal 43 (1989): 381).
4. Israeli agents had contacted certain unbeknownst Maronite and Druze leaders, for example, and urged them to seriously consider the creation of independent sectarian states. See Muhammad Khalil Qutmah, Qisah al-Dawlatayn al-Maruniyyah wal-Durziyyah ma' al-Wath'iq wal-Mustanadat [Story of the Maronite and Druze State with Documents and Exhibits] (Beirut, 1985), p. 123.
5. Moreover, Maronites and Sunnis practically always shared an equal number of cabinet posts, with the ministry of interior usually passing as a Sunni preserve and that of foreign affairs as a Maronite. The Druze held the ministry of defense while Shi'is the ministry of education. A Greek Orthodox became intermittently deputy premier (Elie Salem, "Cabinet Politics in Lebanon," The Middle East Journal 21 (1967): 501).
6. Waddah Shararah, Al-Silm al-Ahli al-Barid: Lubnan al-Mujtama' wal-Dawlah, 1964-1967 [The Civil Cold Peace: Lebanon, Society and State, 1964-1967] 2 vols., (Beirut, 1980), 1: 31.
7. Freiha, op. cit., p. 143.
8. Salem, "Cabinet Politics in Lebanon," op. cit., p. 491.
9. Kamal Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958-1976 (Delmar, N.Y., 1976), p. 14. See also Marwan Harb, "Le chehabisme ou les limites d'une experience de modernization politique au Liban", Master 2 en science politique, l'Université Saint-Joseph.
10. W. Khalidi, op. cit., p. 40.
11. Salibi, Crossroads, op. cit., p. 21. For an excellent exposé of the history and workings of the *Deuxième Bureau*, see Niqula Nasif, "Al-Maktab al-Thani": Hakim fi al-Dhil ["The Deuxième Bureau": Ruler in the Shadows], 3rd Ed. (Beirut, 2006).
12. Seeking a wider role in Lebanon, American officials would declare their abhorrence of past French policies that had encouraged minority separatism and stimulated confessional differences, implying therefore that they would act otherwise. See U.S. Department of State, National Security Council, Current Trends in Arab Unity, 23 June 1959.
13. Al-Hawadith, 17 June 1986.
14. For details of the 1961 coup, see Fu'ad 'Awad, Al-Tariq ila al-Sultah [The Road to Power] (Beirut, 1973), and Nasif, "Al-Maktab al-Thani", op. cit. pp. 83-112. Chamoun's former association with the PPS may have precluded him from political participation during the Chehab regime.
15. Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic, op. cit., p. 307.
16. Shararah, Al-Silm, op. cit., 1: 51.
17. Raymond Sayegh, Le president de la Republique Libanaise (Beyrouth, 1975), p. 16.
18. Shararah, Al-Silm, op. cit., 1: 86. Chehab would again refuse to run for reelection in 1970, despite entreaties by his political sympathizers. His

erstwhile ally, Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus, would draft a declaration on 4 August 1970, in which the former president bewails the negative impact of the traditional (i.e. sectarian) system of politics in Lebanon which would make it nonconducive to implementing further reforms or to exercise meaningful power (Buturs, op.cit., p. 160).

19. Salibi, Crossroads, op. cit., pp. 44f.
20. He would even use the *Sûreté Générale* headed by his longtime friend Joseph Salamé, against the *Deuxième Bureau* headed by the pro-Chehabist Gaby Lahhoud! (Nasif, Sir al-Dawlah, op.cit., 351). These tactics begged the accusations that the new regime performed a dualist role, or "izdiwajiyyah". Thrust upon the izdiwajiyyah between quasimilitary Chehabism and sectarian civilian rule was every conceivable contradiction in Lebanese politics: unitary Arab nationalism versus particularist Lebanese nationalism; Christianity versus Islam; secular versus sectarian; zu'ama versus parties; etc. The influential newspaper al-Nahar, in particular, effectively played this theme to the hilt, while crusading against the *Deuxième Bureau*'s intimidating tactics and press censorship (Rabbat, op. cit., p. 904).
21. Africa Diary (l-7 February 1964), p. 1585.
22. Ibid., (3-9 October 1964), p. 1974.
23. Nevertheless, anti-Chehabists accused the Deuxième Bureau of discreetly allowing PLA units to train near Beirut as a tool against Hilu and the Christians to keep them in line with Chehabist policies (Salibi, Crossroads, op. cit., p. 27). Because they participated in the 1958 incidents, staunchly supported Egypt, and formed the bulk of the leadership of the pan-Arab ANM, the Palestinians reserved the potential to play a disruptive role in Lebanese politics
24. Clashes between Lebanese security forces and *Fatah* groups occurred on three different occasions: 22 June 1966, 2 May 1967, and 14 May 1967. The *Deuxième Bureau* arrested one Palestinian sympathizer, Jalal Ka'wash, in January 1966, who later died allegedly under torture.
25. Shararah, Al-Silm, op. cit., 1: 166.
26. The abortive 1961 coup by the PPS has often been catered as a sign of American disinterest in the maintenance of General Chehab in power, necessitating the development of an alternative connection with the French. Although anxious not to compromise Lebanese security, the French, notwithstandingly entered at the same time into a tacit alliance with Israel, building the research nuclear reactor at Dimona and supplying large numbers of aircraft to form the mainstay of Israeli air power.

(8)
Sovereignty Compromised:
The Rise of the PLO and the 1970 Cairo Agreement

It was Mirage planes and French deep penetration bombs that wreaked havoc in the Arab air bases during the third Arab-Israeli war. On 5 June 1967, Israel in six hours struck against the entire Egyptian air force, annihilating it on the ground and achieving a decisive air superiority over the battlefield[1]. In six days, the Israeli army defeated the bewildered Arab forces piecemeal, and Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Plateau passed under Israeli suzerainty[2]. The ignominious display had sent traumatic shockwaves reverberating into every corner of the Arab world, as the broken armies bore testimony to a grave miscalculation of Israeli preeminence, and an inflated estimate of the Arab coalition's prowess and capabilities.

Although the PLO reeled from the loss of its regular PLA battalions in the war, the small Palestinian guerrilla bands escaped the *debâcle* and, once more with the aid of Syrian provisions infiltrated and set base in Jordan while continuing their pin prick harassment of Israeli troops in the West Bank. In December 1967, the Palestinian branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) in Lebanon joined the ranks of the practitioners of insurgency warfare by forming the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) preliminarily based in Jordan[3]. But it was *al-Fatah* which possessed a skeleton organization capable of absorbing the major ingredients of guerrilla tactics at such an early phase, and this assured them an unchallenged ascendancy among the various Palestinian militants. Arab governments, finally discovering a respite to their humiliation, extolled the revival of Palestinian militancy and officially sanctified their growth and preservation.

The disastrous Six Day War prompted three Maronite political leaders, namely Gemayel, Chamoun, and Eddé, to form a Triple Alliance. The three leaders mounted a virulent campaign against the intervention of the *Deuxième Bureau* in domestic politics, animated no doubt by the general Arab disenchantment with repressive military regimes that had proved ultimately unworthy in battle. They called to question not only the merits of Chehabist reform, but the regime's Arab nationalist and international policies as well[4].

The alliance drew implicit support from other moderate quarters that had found themselves snubbed by the government. Established by Suleiman Frangieh, the "Central Bloc", included Salam and Kamil al-As'ad, the foremost Shi'i deputy from the south[5]. But the Triple Alliance, by its mere

existence as an exclusively Maronite organization, struck at the heart of the presidency, hinting that the alliance stood for the defense of Christian Lebanon. They substantiated their claims by winning a strong electoral victory in the May 1968 parliamentary elections. Chehabist politicians, both Christian and Muslim, retained a numerical majority in the chamber of deputies, but the depletion of their ranks and the pressures emanating from the Maronite alliance sapped their political strength as a crossconfessional power bloc[6].

Conversely, the tremendous pressure for change in all aspects of Arab politics and society that characterized the post-1967 period led to the rise in Lebanon of a strong antiestablishment, Marxist, and "leftist" trend agitating for the Palestinians to be given free rein[7]. That Marxism dominated the radical intellectual trend should neither obscure the fact that the "left" remained a loose political term, nor should it minimize the role of other non-Marxist parties such as the PSP and the *Ba'th*. Partly inspired by Joumblat, the establishment of the Front of Progressive Parties by the ANM, PSP, and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) in 1965, furnished a valuable testing ground for the formation of a broad radical coalition. As minister of interior in August 1970, Joumblat granted licensed authorization to the *Ba'th*, PPS (hereafter the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), and ANM, earning their fealty since they no longer had to operate clandestinely or under duress. The SSNP, whose leaders had previously received amnesty in February 1969 that absolved them from the 1961 coup attempt, shifted the formerly pro-Chamounist party toward the left by stressing a secular socialist ideology, in alliance with Joumblat and the left.

Concomitantly, the *Deuxième Bureau*, with its primary responsibility for gathering military intelligence and protecting national security, found it exceedingly difficult to prevent the ongoing politicization, and by consequence, the militarization of the Palestinian refugee camps, a process already accomplished successfully in Jordan in March 1968. Exploited in the past as a source of cheap labor and kept docile by heavyhanded security measures, the Palestinians in Lebanon proceeded throughout 1968, to set up underground cells, undergo small-scale training on weapons, and organize fundraising campaigns[8].

The preeminent guerrilla organization, *Al-Fatah*, pledged noninterference in the internal affairs of its host Arab states, with the reciprocal assumption that Arab states would respect Palestinian freedom of political and military action. Because of their ANM background, however, the PFLP and its offshoots, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) and the PFLP-General Command, coordinated with the radical Lebanese parties to render assistance against what they roundly considered a feudal and reactionary Lebanese regime. The tendency of Arab

governments to subsidize and manipulate the emerging PLO factions in Lebanon complicated this Palestinian-leftist symbiosis. Hence Syria formed *al-Sa'iqah* (Thunderbolt) in April 1968, replenishing it with Syrian arms and advisors. In 1968, the *Ba'th* returned to power in Iraq, and since it opposed the Syrian branch of the party in Damascus, formed the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) in April 1969, and which soon followed with a presence in the refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan.(9).

The extension of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon in 1968, nevertheless, remained lowkeyed despite growing signs of public infatuation with the resistance movement. The Lebanese press covered the exploits of the *fida'is* (self-sacrificing fighters), and funerals for Lebanese volunteers or resident Palestinians in Lebanon who died on the Jordanian front turned into spectacular demonstrations. On 2 November 1968, Prime Minister 'Abdallah al-Yafi (8 February 1968-7 January 1969) addressed one such demonstration, wherein he attested unabashedly to the legitimacy of guerrilla activity against Israel.

Flushed by their 1967 victory and in the absence of Arab peace overtures, the Israelis could not contemplate any armed resistance, no matter how minimal, to their forces of military occupation. Palestinian mobilization in Lebanon and Jordan in their eyes required massive retaliation. For a time, Tel Aviv's strategy helped strengthen rather than weaken the ongoing Palestinian regimentation. On 26 December 1968, two Palestinian members of the PFLP attacked a civilian El-'Al carrier plane in Athens in an operation which soon became the trademark of the radical groups' checkered career. As one of the Palestinians resided in Lebanon, Israel declared that it could not relieve the Lebanese government from responsibility for acts of sabotage organized on its soil. Two days later, Israeli commando units transported by helicopters swooped on Beirut International Airport and after blasting thirteen aircraft belonging to Lebanon's national airlines, returned home unscathed.

The attack on the airport constituted a latent declaration of war by Israel, an intentionally humiliating strike at the heart of Lebanon's quasineutral stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict and its role as a liberal economic haven for the Arab world. For the next few weeks, angry student from practically all universities and high schools, engaged in strikes and massive demonstrations, demanding fortification of the southern border against the possibility of invasion and lifting all restrictions against operations of Palestinian guerrillas from Lebanon(10). President Hilu hurriedly invited the veteran Rashid Karami to form a new cabinet (15 January 1969-13 October 1970) to forestall the repercussions of the "student revolution." The Triple Alliance seized the opportunity to call for the formation of a broad national unity cabinet, only to be thwarted by Joumblat,

who adamantly refused the repatriation of his old enemy Chamoun so smoothly into public life.

Perhaps more tellingly, President de Gaulle imposed a total embargo in January 1969, on arms destined for Israel because of the use of French helicopters in the assault against Beirut international airport and in due respect to the special relationship that bound Lebanon to France(11). Conversely, the United States president, Lyndon Johnson, abjectly refused to countenance immediate Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Sinai, West Bank, and Golan unless the belligerent Arab states recognized the state of Israel and redrew the boundaries to assure secure borders. He correspondingly replenished the Israeli arsenal with American weaponry lending credence to the fact that he would continue to support military retaliation against the surrounding Arab neighbours.

The Lebanese public mandate in January 1969, encouraged the Palestinian guerrilla organizations to begin setting up unauthorized makeshift bases in the south of Lebanon and to open military offices and recruitment centers in the major refugee camps of Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli. The Lebanese armed forces, still comparatively speaking a sizable force, and hemmed in by criticisms of radicals and Maronite leaders alike, moved in to obstruct the Palestinian buildup. The armed clashes between the two sides brought the students back to the streets, except that this time a curious phenomenon had occurred: Muslim politicians and radical parties led the protest against the government's repression; the purely national student upheaval a few months ago had proved shortlived because the Triple Alliance had persuaded their constituency to rein in their support of the PLO. On 23 April 1969, security forces fired on student demonstrators in Beirut and on Palestinian protestors in the 'Ayn al-Hulwah refugee camp in Sidon. Karami, convinced that President Hilu supported the military suppression, tendered his resignation(12).

With the benefit of historical hindsight, the only hope to prevent Palestinian militarization would have been in early 1969, when the guerrilla forces were as yet few in numbers while alternatively the army was comparatively stronger. Hilu, backed by the Triple Alliance and the Maronite patriarch, proceeded unilaterally without a government to curb the Palestinians. In two addresses to the troubled nation on 6 May and 23 June 1969, the president unequivocally rejected the Palestinian *fait accompli*, warning that if he allowed bases or training ground for the PLO it would provoke an Israeli invasion(13). The infiltration of guerrillas from Syria, however, continued unabated, and intermittent clashes around most of the refugee camps stretched for several months(14).

As an indication of the reduced American posture *vis-à-vis* Lebanon and its full support for Israel, the assistant secretary of state, Joseph Sisco, announced on 10 October 1969, that the United States attached great

importance to Lebanon's independence and territorial integrity, but that any open support for the Lebanese government would only exacerbate the situation further[15]. Even when Palestinian-Lebanese clashes resumed at a higher pitch, the secretary of state, William Rogers, conferred with the USSR and Israeli ambassadors only for the purpose of reducing the prospects of superpower intervention and deflect a possible preemptive strike by Israel in case the guerrillas gained the upperhand[16].

President Hilu, hence, felt obliged to take up Nasir's mediatory offer and invested the commander in chief, Major-General Emile Bustani, with full powers to negotiate in Cairo with the chairman of the PLO and the leader of *al-Fatah*, Yasir 'Arafat. The minutes of the meetings in Cairo reveal Palestinian anxiety over the harsh treatment of the refugees in the camps. In later sessions, 'Arafat demanded the expansion of fixed observations points to the central sector of south Lebanon, especially in the area near Nabatiyyah, because heavy Israeli military concentrations in the Hula valley had rendered operations from the 'Arqub region in south-eastern Lebanon prohibitive. Bustani, however, feared an Israeli invasion of the central sector, explaining that Hilu already possessed great qualms over allowing the Palestinians into the 'Arqub in the first place[17].

On 3 November 1969, 'Arafat and Bustani signed the "top secret" Cairo Agreement that attempted to regulate the guerrilla presence in Lebanon, thereby extending it de facto recognition while establishing at the same time provisions for Palestinian liability toward the governing Lebanese authorities[18]. The two delegations agreed to allow for the formation of local PLO committees and military posts in the refugee camps. Three annexes to the Cairo agreement, negotiated later on 27 January, 1 February, and 8 April 1970, recounted in further detail the crossing points for patrols as six rectangles with boundaries surrounding the narrow "finger" of Israel's northernmost Hula valley and along the rising crest western of Mount Hermon. The two sides understood that armed patrols may conduct military operations at a depth of at least 10 kilometers inside Israel but that they may not launch missiles from Lebanese territory, fire on Israeli frontier patrols, or place mines along the border. Instead, the guerrillas would be granted a oneway safe passage for the purpose of manning and supplying PLO bases inside occupied territories[19].

Despite their munificence in granting the PLO offensive facilities into Israel, the Lebanese military had actually deceived themselves in the belief that they could still uphold at the same time the 1949 armistice agreement with Israel by forbidding Palestinians to bear arms or appear in uniform all along the border, or in the military zones of the south and inside the country proper. The guerrillas could circulate freely only on the roads leading from Syria to the 'Arqub region, the area in the extreme southeast corner of Lebanon where the PLO gained permission to establish secret

bases[20]. Lying astride the strategic Lebanese-Syrian-Israeli crossroads, the ‘Arqub or its later sobriquet “Fatahland”, provided an ideal staging area for insurgency operations and a close enough base to the supply route from Syria. But these half measures would not suffice, and the PLO arc of operations would soon widen beyond the strict confines of the ‘Arqub to include the whole infrastructure of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

Once the general framework of the 1969 Cairo Agreement leaked to the press, there followed an immediate uproar by the Triple Alliance[21]. Eddé denounced the decision to tread the paths of belligerency and demanded the maintenance of Lebanon’s military neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict by positioning UN peacekeeping forces on the southern border. But the support of Karami, Joumblat, and the tacit acquiescence of Gemayel, made it almost impossible to abrogate the *fait accompli* of Cairo.

Although Eddé’s vociferous campaigning induced President Hilu to relieve Bustani of his command in January 1970, the executive never submitted the agreement to the legislature for ratification, and the accords remained secret even to members of the Karami cabinet[22]. The anti-Chehabist camp claimed that Nasir and ‘Arafat had promised to support Bustani’s candidacy in the upcoming presidential elections or that the *Deuxième Bureau* machinated to recall General Chehab from retirement in the name of national salvation[23]. The sobriety of events, however, overtook the idealized version of guerrilla warfare, which the various Lebanese and Palestinian military delegations fell prey to throughout the 1969-70 negotiations. Spasmodic Israeli air raids in 1969-70 forced the lateral expansion of the guerrillas from their main bases in Jordan, to Syria and Lebanon. Monthly reprisals against south Lebanon pushed guerrilla concentrations further inland toward the more hospitable refugee camps, in strict violation of the Cairo agreement. Some of the camps, situated on Beirut’s fringes in 1948, have become, on account of rapid urbanization during the sixties, in the heart of the capital and in strategic control of major inroads. Palestinians publicly appeared in arms and combat fatigue, erected unauthorized roadblocks outside the camps, and participated in antigovernment rallies[24].

If the PLO had blown its “secret” cover in Lebanon by bidding for direct wardship of the refugee camps, nonetheless it helped presage the construction of a vast social-economic infrastructure, independent of governmental authority[25]. But stringent Israeli counterinsurgency tactics forced guerrilla operations in the south to resort to crossborder firing of missiles, artillery shells, and small arms fire from within Lebanese territory. The Israeli army retaliated with repeated assaults against the largely Shi‘i and Christian villages in the south suspected of harboring the fida’is. Many

of the Shi'i villagers fled to Beirut, and by June 1970, their number had swelled to 50,000 refugees without proper housing[26].

It was at that particular juncture that irregular Maronite militias had begun to surface. Frangieh, the strongest Maronite leader of North Lebanon, collected a private army composed of 700-800 men in October 1969, vowing to complete the army's unfinished business of barring the Palestinian commandoes.[27] On 24 March 1970, Phalangist gunmen ambushed a Palestinian funeral cortege passing through the mountainous village of Kahhalah, triggering clashes between the two parties in Beirut[28]. The following June, Camille Chamoun presided over the first public display of his party's militia.

The Chehabist bungled performance in facing the Palestinian incursion and their suspected credentials of past cooperation with Egypt and Syria weakened their chances in the upcoming presidential election. By the margin of only one vote (50-49), the chamber of deputies elected on 17 August 1970, Suleiman Frangieh (1970-76) over his opponent Ilyas Sarkis, Chehab's former aide and the Governor of the Central Bank. The president incumbent came to power with the declared prospect of dismantling the Chehabist military apparatus itself as well as curtailing the Palestinians. He invited his close ally, Sa'ib Salam (13 October 1970-25 April 1973), to assist him in these policies through the installation of a government formed virtually of young businessmen and professionals --The Youth Cabinet. Although the government allocated 200 million Lebanese pounds to strengthen the army, it followed a contradictory policy of dismissing highranking Chehabist officers and dissolving the *Deuxième Bureau*, since the new administration harbored a deep distrust of the military's alleged conspiratorial machinations against them[29].

In sharp contrast to the hesitant overtures of the military in Lebanon in 1969, King Husayn launched a bloody reprisal against the Palestinian guerilla organizations in September 1970[30]. The bloodletting and the ensuing ostracism of the Jordanian regime in the Arab world, precluded the pursuit of a similar solution to the Palestinians in Lebanon, if such a solution was deemed possible at all. The PLO conversely domesticated their intrusion, albeit temporarily, in internal Lebanese politics and professed their readiness to cooperate with local authorities in curbing intermittent violations of Lebanese laws. Likewise, Israeli retaliatory raids toned down as Palestinian operations virtually ceased[31]. Thus despite the Nixon administration's declared readiness in November 1970, to supply Lebanon with arms along with Jordan and Israe1, the Lebanese defense minister hesitated to accept the offer. He preferred instead to purchase in June 1971, French antiaircraft missiles, British tanks, and Russian artillery[32].

The Palestinian defeat in Jordan, however, transformed Lebanon into the PLO's singular base of unrestricted operations against Israeli targets,

attracting the gradual and unrestricted influx of Palestinian guerrillas into the Lebanese haven. In early 1972, missile strikes from within the Lebanese border would resume, followed closely by the crescendo of Israeli counterstrikes. The prime minister managed to force ‘Arafat to suspend the raids temporarily in January 1972, after two threats from David Elazar, the Israeli chief of staff, followed by a particularly heavy raid on the ‘Arqub on 25-28 February. Salam accordingly had to order the Lebanese army to block the return of retreating guerrillas to their old bases in that region after the Israelis had withdrawn(33).

The PLO, bedridden by extremist factions, found an outlet to its quandary by conducting external operations such as that of Lydda airport by Japanese members of the PFLP (31 May 1972), and the abduction of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics (5 September 1972) by the Black September Organization, an *al-Fatah* schismatic group. As to be expected, the superior Israeli airforce reacted fiercely against Palestinian targets in Lebanon as well as in Syria, which had witnessed throughout the year several armed clashes with Israeli troops in the Golan. On 16-17 September 1972, Israeli soldiers entered the ‘Arqub in force, demolishing scores of houses and seizing large caches of arms and ammunition. Salam declared a state of emergency and the Lebanese army, which had proferred some resistance to the advancing Israeli army, stepped in the breach once more to forbid Palestinian reentry into the ‘Arqub.

The Israelis again chose an opportune time to engage in provocative attacks against the Palestinians in Lebanon that would only lead to further aggravation of the situation. On 19 April 1973, a group of Israeli commandos assassinated three prominent al-Fatah leaders in their Beirut apartments. Salam demanded the resignation of the army commander, Major-General Iskandar Ghanim. The president steadfastly refused to affix responsibility on the armed forces and the prime minister was forced to tender his resignation.

Conversely, Kamal Joumblat’s leftist parties staged a huge funeral demonstration for the three al-Fatah leaders which signified the growing alliance between the PLO and the National Movement -- the group of radical parties mustered by Joumblat.(34) The antiestablishment maneuvers of the National Movement stirred fears that the new combination of forces would overturn the confessional system and presumably replace it with a secular and radical regime. Believing that the army had fully absorbed its new hardware, President Frangieh appears to have decided that the time had come to take a serious stand against the PLO. On 2 May 1973, the Lebanese armed force retaliated against the kidnapping of several soldiers by the PFLP and the PDFLP by surrounding the refugee camps and subjecting them to intense bombardment. Clashes continued inconclusively for sixteen days,

with Muslim and leftist-dominated areas in a state of siege by security forces.

The Syrian government under Hafiz al-Asad sent *al-Sa'iqah* to harass Lebanese units and close the borders with Lebanon, thus depriving Lebanon of the lucrative transit trade with the oil-producing Arab Gulf states. Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia offered to mediate the conflict and pressured Frangieh to suspend the crackdown. Under Arab auspices, the Lebanese government and the PLO entered into a new agreement on 18 May 1973, called the Melkart [Hotel] Protocol, which basically reconfirmed the 1969 Cairo agreement except that it explicitly forbade the presence of guerrillas or of heavy weapons in the refugee camps and in the villages of the 'Arqub; two provisions which would remain singularly unobserved(35).

The resignation of the prime minister and the failure of the 1973 army crackdown spelled at long last the end of all attempts by the Lebanese state to unilaterally deny the PLO possessed unrestricted freedom to operate from Lebanon. And, alternatively, Israel would possess, henceforth, unrestricted ability to strike anywhere at the time of her choosing. Hints abounded that the United States had been urging the Lebanese president to move against the PLO in Jordanian style and that Frangieh had claimed that Muslim officers would not heed such orders if issued(36). In a later meeting with 'Arafat on 1 June, Frangieh exasperatingly advised the Palestinians to unilaterally undertake the defenses of their refugee camps, warning that he could no longer prevent the arming of the Maronite militias(37). In effect, he had opted out for the seemingly less controversial policy, i.e. arming the local militias as a surrogate to the Lebanese army and a deterrent to the PLO instead of the draconian measure of ruthlessly suppressing the Palestinians and endangering the entire confessional system of government. By September 1973, the Phalangists and the NLP had begun to parade arms and recruits in the various training camps that they had established under their control.

At the outset, the militias unleashed could serve as a surrogate to the army, especially when trained by Lebanese military officers with the obtrusive blessings of the president. However once absorbing the limited hardware available at the time, the next logical step would be for the diehard militias themselves to clamor for finishing the job against the PLO even though, in essence, they expounded less meager resources than those already in possession by the Lebanese army(38). It was an extremely volatile and dangerous mixture that could only lead to further deterioration of the security situation as the army felt itself increasingly marginalized and the militias increased in confidence that they held the political upperhand.

Thus on the eve of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Lebanon had maneuvered itself into an unenviable static position. Its military forces remained comparatively undermanned and underarmed while its belligerent

neighbors (Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and of course Israel) strove to augment their military capabilities with modern weaponry and greater numbers of conscripts. The Lebanese government officially maintained its neutrality in the Arab war of attrition against Israel, at a time when Israel and the PLO had transformed unhindered the south into a major battlezone of their own making(39). Although the surprise attack by Syria and Egypt in October 1973, failed to restore the 1967 *status quo ante bellum*, the improved performance of the Arab armies and the international crisis created by the oil embargo restored some lost pride to Arab military honor. Thus *vis-à-vis* the Palestinian guerilla organizations, the Arab governments would restore some semblance of their credibility in the eyes of their peoples. But Lebanon was a nonparticipant in the war, and it therefore could not claim its full rehabilitation in the face of the PLO. The Lebanese state's compromised sovereignty as articulated in the 1970 Cairo Agreement could not be rolled back so easily, and the threats to the intersectarian balance of power would remain unabated.



Map 10: The Cairo Agreement: The Central and Western Sectors



Map 11: The Cairo Agreement: The Eastern Sector

1. Although Israel subsequently denied emphatically any threatening concentrations against Syria in May 1967, Lebanese military intelligence, which Nasir trusted for its accuracy, confirmed Syrian and Soviet reports that the Israelis prepared to march against Damascus ('Aziz al-Ahdab, Harb al-Ayyam al-Sittah [The Six Day War] (Beirut, 1971), p. 29). Captain Abbas Hamdan gathered information in mid-May 1967 of Israeli preparations to invade the Golan and southern Lebanon up to the Litani in case of Lebanese belligerency. This information was relayed to Nasir via the Egyptian embassy and to the Syrians on 23 May (Nasif, "al-Maktab al-Thani", op. cit., p. 277).
2. Prime Minister Rashid Karami had ordered the hesitant Maronite commander of the Lebanese military, Major-General Emile Bustani, to commence hostilities and prepare for the final showdown with the Zionist enemy, only to moot the whole incident as the catastrophic defeat loomed ahead.
3. The ANM formed three *Fatah*-styled organizations before the June war: The Heroes of Return in October 1966, by PLO dissidents based in Lebanon; the Youth for Revenge in early 1967, formed by a Jordanian Christian, Nayif Hawatamah; and the Palestine Liberation Front also in 1967, led by Ahmad Jibril, a former officer in the Syrian armed forces. These groups, however, would be construed at the time as a less than serious effort on the part of the ANM.
4. For the text of the Alliance's declaration, see al-Dayri, op. cit., pp. 270ff.
5. For a background of the Salam-Chehabist conflict, see Michael Johnson, "Factional Politics in Lebanon: The Case of the 'Islamic Society of Benevolent Intentions' (Al-Maqasid) in Beirut," Middle Eastern Studies 14 (January 1978): 56-75.
6. See Jalal Zuwiyya, The Parliamentary Election of Lebanon 1968 (Leiden, 1972), p. 10.
7. Long before the term gained popular currency, Clovis Maqsud, a Maronite intellectual and ardent Arab nationalist, had defined the left in 1960, in quasi-Marxist parlance as those groups working for enlarged and continued mass participation in the social, political, and cultural life of the country through the elimination of class contradictions (Clovis Maqsud, Azmah al-Yasar al-'Arabi [The Crisis of the Arab Left] (Beirut, 1960), p. 9).
8. Peter Hellyer, "The Palestinian Resistance: 1964-1975," in Israel and the Palestinians, ed. Uri Davis *et. al.*, (London, 1975), p. 124.
9. Egypt sponsored two smaller *fida'i* organizations, the Palestine Arab Organization and the Arab Committee for the Liberation of Palestine. Even monarchial Jordan patronized the Hashimi Organization.
10. Salibi, Crossroads, op. cit., p. 41. The PLO shift from pro-Nasirite Arab nationalism to a more Palestinian bent paradoxically imparted the fragmentation of the Arab world within the ranks of the guerrilla movements itself.
11. See Michel Chehdan-Kalife, Les relations entre la France et le Liban (1958-1978) (Paris, 1983), pp. 34-49.
12. John Entelis, "Palestinian Revolutionism in Lebanese Politics," Muslim World 62 (October, 1972): 339.

13. The possibility that Palestinian and to a lesser extent, non-Arab Kurds, both national groups constituting a Sunni majority, might lend their weight to the Muslims and produce a crushing majority had always stirred Christian anxieties. Paradoxically, the Muslims harbored identical fears against the immigration of Armenians and other non-Lebanese Christian minorities into Lebanon.
14. H. Conway Zwigler, "The Emperor's New Clothes: Being an Interpretive Essay on the Changing Role of Crisis in Lebanese Politics from October 1969, to April 1970," Middle East Research Association (1969-70): 39-51.
15. Koury, The Operational Capability, op. cit., pp. 365-77. In a widely circulated pamphlet on 26 October 1969, entitled "Message to the Lebanese People on the Current Events," *al-Fatah* claimed that guerrilla strategy could not be launched from fixed bases close to the Israeli frontier, but required sanctuaries and safe transit through Lebanese territory for fastmoving strike forces. On this issue, the president stonewalled, except that the long drawnout struggle against the PLO, set against the display of every form of public displeasure by the radical parties and the Muslim masses in the cities, had failed to achieve concrete results. In addition, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, bore pressure in support of the beleaguered Palestinians, whereas the timing of Israeli ground and air strikes against PLO bases in south Lebanon suggested an embarrassing coordination with Lebanese countermeasures
16. New York Times, 24 October 1969.
17. Those attending included the Lebanese ambassador, Halim Abu 'Izz al-Din, Sami al-Khatib, member of the *Deuxieme Bureau*, Major General 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya of the PLA, and Arafat's lieutenant, Salah Khalaf, *aka* Abu Iyad. The Egyptian side included War Minister General Mahmud Fawzi and Foreign Minister Mahmud Riad. See Halim Abu 'Izz al-Din, Tilka al-Ayyam: Mudhakkarat wa-Dhikrayat [Those Days: Memoirs and Reminiscences), vol.1 (Beirut, 1982), pp.1170-1176.
18. For text of the Cairo agreement, see Republique Libanaise, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres et des Libanais d'Outre-Mer, Le livre blanc libanais: Document diplomatiques 1975-1976 (Beyrouth, 1976), pp. 196ff.
19. For the "top secret" annexes to the Cairo agreement, see Fiches du Monde Arabe (Beirut), Nos. 589, 590, 591, 592, 597, 598 (9-23 March 1977).
20. The 'Arqub, a densely forested hilly terrain, stood overlooking the Hula valley to the south while to the east, the topography rose steadily to touch the crest of Mount Hermon and then fall to the Israeli occupied Golan plateau. See Colonel Khattar Haydar, "Al-'Arqub: Taqyim Jughraphi wa-'Askari [Al-'Arqub: Geographic and Military Evaluation]" Al-Anwar, 8 February 1977.
21. The influential paper al-Nahar published the then unauthenticated 'secret' text on 20 April 1970. See also Nasif, "al-Maktab al-Thani", op. cit., pp. 288-307.
22. Livre blanc libanais, op. cit., p. 185.
23. See Munah al-Sulh's interview in al-Sharq al-Awsat, 6 January 1990.
24. For the Lebanese military's interpretation of the Cairo agreement and their meticulous recording of Palestinian violations, see the official memo published in 'Imad Yunis, Silsilat al-Watha'iq al-Asasiyyah lil-Azmah al-Lubnaniyyah, 1973-... [Series of Basic Documents of the Lebanese Crisis, 1973-...], vol. 1: Malamih al-'Azmah wa-Infijariha wal-Dawr al-Filastini

wal-Dawr al-Mahali [The Begining and Explosion of the Crisis, and the Palestinian and Internal Roles] (Beirut, 1985), pp. 174ff. See also ibid., vol. 3: Al-Adwar al-'Alamiyyah [International Roles] (Beirut, 1985) , p. 135.

25. Much faith had been placed in "secret" agreements between Lebanese authorities and the guerrilla groups, probably because it was assumed that Israel would not detect a viable military threat in Lebanon if the PLO remained underground.
26. See the demographic shifts in Beirut in Murray, op. cit., p. 33.
27. New York Times, 20 October 1969.
28. Young Bashir Gemayel, son of Sheikh Pierre, is rumored to have laid down the ambush (Wade R. Goria, Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943-1976 (London, 1985), p.101).
29. Fu'ad Lahhud, Ma'sah Jaysh Lubnan [The Tragedy of Lebanon's Army) (Beirut, 1977), p. 49; Goria, op. cit., p. 101.
30. Henry Alfred Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), pp. 606-31. An example of total slighting of Lebanon's pro-Western relations was the March 1970 PFLP attack on the American embassy in Beirut, in retaliation against alleged US plans to foment a religious war in Lebanon to paralyze the guerrilla movement.
31. Israeli strikes occurred sporadically only on 3, 14, and 15 January, 18-29 June, and 9 August 1971.
32. The supplementary military aid bill submitted to Congress and passed in January 1971, requested $15 million for Lebanon, $30 million for Jordan, and $500 million for Israel (New York Times, 7 January 1971).
33. René Chamussy, Chronique d'une querre: Liban 1975-77 (Desclée, 1978), p. 69.
34. Sami Dhubyan, Al-Harakah al-Wataniyyah al-Lubnaniyyah [The Lebanese National Movement] (Beirut, 1977), p. 125.
35. For text of Melkart Protocol, see Camille Chamoun, Crise au Liban (Beyrouth, 1977), pp. 175-84.
36. Jonathan C. Randal, Going All the Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and the War in Lebanon (New York, 1983), p. 166.
37. See interview with Abu Iyad in al-Nahar, 6 September 1976.
38. It has been suggested that the militias in their contacts with the American government did not request a repeat of the 1958 Marines landing, but that they should be rendered diplomatic as well as political support in their anti-Palestinian campaign (Randal, op. cit., p. 169).
39. See the secret army report of 26 September 1973, which warned that the Palestinian guerrillas had reached an incredible 22,525 figure, and that the camps witnessed the concentration of heavy weaponry in violation of previous agreements, as cited by 'Aziz al-Ahdab, Al-Balagh Raqam Wahid [Communiqué Number One] (Al-Qahirah, 1977), p. 70.

(9)
The 1975-76 War:
The Collapse of the National Pact

The Lebanese war of 1975-76 had brought about the dismantling and the unraveling of the security and military apparatus of the Lebanese state. One can no longer speak about the interplay of politics, for constructive dialogue has been replaced by the thunder of artillery and the exchange of murderous cross-fires in the alleys and the residential quarters of the major cities. One can immediately witness an escalation of intersectarian tension, and the proliferation of armed citizen militias that increasingly seized the initiative and circumvented all attempts by the traditional political bosses to halt the war. The aims of the local militias were clearly warlike: the Maronite militias aimed at completely dismantling the PLO structure in Lebanon, and their leftist radical opponents aimed at the complete dismantling of the sectarian political system. No compromise between them was deemed possible. There existed those who felt that a modification of the sectarian distribution of power might advance the goal of diffusing inter-sectarian tensions. To complicate the issue further, the Palestinians maintained an independent military autonomy, and they invited Arab states to interfere on their behalf both with military hardware, financial aid, and volunteers. Syria entered Lebanon in force and Israel would launch her first massive ground incursions into southern Lebanon. Western intervention was lacking except along the lines of offering of mediation among the warring parties or perhaps to help calibrate Syrian and Israeli interventions. The war would ultimately come to an end, but it would not bring about a restoration of the *status quo ante*, with the Lebanese state remaining a vital player in the field, but it would largely become subordinated to the interests of the various international and the regional players.

If the 1967 Arab Israeli war had brought in its wake the entrenchment of the PLO military presence in Lebanon, thereby compromising state sovereignty while exacerbating at the same time intersectarian tensions, the 1973 October war ushered a series of regional diplomatic maneuveurs which would push Lebanon unwillingly to the fore of a state of belligerency versus Israel as never before.

The PLO had split violently over its position versus US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's step by step diplomacy, and the Geneva conference framework, which joined the United States and the Soviet Union, together with Israel, Syria, and Egypt in search for a peaceful settlement after the October war. Kissinger had mediated two disengagement agreements on the

Egyptian front in January 1974, and September 1975, and another disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel in May 1974. *Al-Fatah*, supported by *al-Sa'iqah* and the PDFLP, were prepared to go to Geneva. However, the PFLP, PFLP-GC, and ALF joined Iraq and Libya to form a "Rejection Front" to any peaceful settlement with Israel. When Kissinger visited Lebanon previously in December 1973, as part of his visit to push forward the Middle East peace process, Beirut throbbed with anti-American demonstrations led by the left and the radical supporters of the PLO, in marked contrast to his being feasted royally in Cairo Damascus, and Riyadh. Tthis conveyed a very negative impression on Lebanon's ability to conduct an actively independent foreign policy in the Middle East peace process.

To compound matters further, all Palestinian guerrilla formations jointly conducted provocative suicide attacks from their bases in Lebanon against Israeli quasi-civilian targets: the PFLP attacked Maalot on 11 April 1974, the PDFLP Qiryat Shmona on 15 May, and *al-Fatah* Nahariya on 24 June. They were in all probability aimed at dramatizing Palestinian military credibility, and at the same time ruthlessly sabotaging the expected political settlement in Geneva. Palestinian militancy induced the Arab summit meeting at the end of October 1974, in Rabat, Morocco, to declare that the PLO was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Rabat summit also mandated Yasir 'Arafat and President Frangieh to both address the UN General Assembly in November 1974. For the Palestinian leader, this represented a high moment for the guerrilla movement and an opportunity to expound on the plight of his people; for the Lebanese delegation, it was an opportunity to make one last yet desperate appeal for a comprehensive "multiconfessional" Middle East peaceful settlement along the Lebanese consociational model that would at least give the Palestinians an independent state on the West Bank.

But Washington did not hide its displeasure of Frangieh's position. New York port authorities refused to honor the diplomatic immunity of the president's entourage, and his luggage was subjected to a humiliating search. Frangieh could not misconstrue the slight, though he chose to vent his anger at the obstructive machinations of the newly appointed American ambassador, George McMurtrie Godley, whose reports to his home office allegedly criticized the president[(1)].

The US government had signalled that it opposed the Lebanese government's version of how best to conduct Lebanese-Palestinian relations. Into the breach stepped the Maronite militias, who began to increasingly and unilaterally pursue a confrontation with the PLO and their allies, whom they accused of endangering Lebanese sovereignty. Their ultimate rationale would be that the maintenance of the confessional status quo necessitated the eradication of the military and civil autonomy which the Palestinian organizations enjoyed and which they spectacularly misappropriated in

Lebanon. Taking the cue, the Shi‘i community, which had suffered the most from Israeli attacks in the south, began to witness an independent resurgence away from the Palestinian-left alliance. Their spiritual leader, Imam Musa al-Sadr, addressed an unsurpassed 75,000 of his supporters in Ba‘albak on 17 March 1974, some of whom openly displayed their weapons, declaring that “arms are the ornament of men,” and that they should wrest their rights from the state by force if necessary[2].

Lebanon’s lame international status would stir dark forebodings in the press about the country’s future in the geopolitical configuration of the Middle East[3]. Official reports, supposedly leaked from Washington, revealed an unfavorable assessment by Kissinger and his assistant, Joseph Sisco, of Lebanon’s role and its context in the overall Middle East peace effort[4]. The civil disturbances between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish invasion that partitioned the island in July 1974, seemed part of a plot to foment sectarian strife in the eastern Mediterrenean, pointing that Lebanon approached a similar “Cyprusization” between its Christian and Muslim communities[5].

The Lebanese and PLO protagonists thereby entered the 1975-76 war transfixed with the notion that the unfolding crisis followed in its minutest details the patterns dictated by an external conspiracy--preferably expostulated by the American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger himself. His appointment of Godley, who had helped direct secret military operations in Laos, in January 1974, signalled to the Palestinians a US intent to destroy the PLO[6]. Conversely, to President Frangieh in the least, the ambassador schemed to undermine the regime both for the countrevailing purpose of appeasing or conversely to embroil the Palestinians in the Lebanese quagmire[7]. Nevertheless, the objectives, the agents provocateurs, and the tactics of the “conspiracy” or al-mu’amarah المؤامرة, differed wildly according to who was expounding it: the partition of Lebanon into petty sectarian states to justify Israel’s Jewishness[8]; the uniting of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the PLO to facilitate the step-by-step peaceful settlement with Israel; the destruction of the PLO as a viable military and political force[9]; the total evacuation of the Maronites from Lebanon and the permanent resettlement of the Palestinian people in their stead as part of a comprehensive solution to the Middle East problem[10].

The fateful incident that ignited the 1975-76 civil war occurred on 13 April, when a Palestinian bus fell in ambush in ‘Ayn al-Rummanah, a Christian suburb in East Beirut. Twenty-seven Palestinians died at pointblank range. Prior to the shootout, armed clashes between the *Kata’ib* and PLO guerrillas lent credence to the jittery nerves that gripped all parties concerned[11]. ‘Arafat sent letters to the Arab heads of state calling for their intervention against the “conspiracy” designed to disrupt Palestinian-Lebanese relation while PLO guerrillas retaliated by dynamiting Phalangist

business enterprises in Beirut. For the next four days, *Kata'ib* gunmen clashed with the guerrillas, particularly around the refugee camp of Tal al-Za'tar situated in the heart of east Beirut.

Accentuated to periodic armed clashes since 1969, no one classified the April 1975 clashes as the opening round of civil war; or to put it more plainly, few realized to the the full the gravity and seriousness of what had occurred. At first, the militias were made up mostly of a few dozen localized volunteers, lightly armed with submachine guns and rocket launchers. Their weaponary fitted them for limited and sporadic street fighting, and not at all for a protracted war that would gradually increase in tempo and see the militiamen roaming far and wide across the land. Chamoun hurriedly trained what the NLP called the Liberals' Tigers and Liberals' Forces militias to back Gemayel's group[12], and President Frangieh's son organized his father's partisans in north Lebanon into the Zgharta Liberation Army-the Maradaites Brigade[13]. Although relegated to a secondary role due to the introduction of irregular forces, the army allowed the militias somewhat liberal access to selected depots. But no matter how fully mobilized, these militias simply could not, numerically speaking, overrun the Palestinian positions in Lebanon without the help of the Lebanese army.[14]

By late 1975, a galaxy of miniscule Maronite organizations had emerged, as the redundant availability of arms and funds proliferated the formation of militias throughout every single Lebanese district.[15] What gave the militias a sense of purpose, however, would be the solid alliance of Frangieh, Gemayel, and Chamoun in what was later to be coined as the Lebanese Front. Though the Maronite patriarach, Antonious Khuraysh, would remain aloof, the Order of Maronite Monks provided outright moral encouragement to the Lebanese Front for what they considered to be defensive efforts undertaken by the militias to protect the Christians of Lebanon. Nonetheless, not all shades of Christian public opinion joined the crusade against the PLO and their Muslim-leftist allies. Eddé, one of the original founders of the Triple Alliance and ironically a vehement opponent of the 1970 Cairo Agreement, defected because he believed that the *Kata'ib* and Chamounist engineering of the crisis invited civil war and eventual partition.

Following the Lebanese cabinet's resignation over the 'Ayn al-Rummanah incident, the leader of the national movement, Kamal Joumblat, demanded that the new government contain no *Kata'ib* members. Armed clashes as a result broke out on 20 May, and the fighting spread to several Beirut districts, especially the Shiyah-'Ayn al-Rummanah area. These two suburbs, south of the capital, encompassed expansive spaces, densely populated by economically marginalized Maronites and Shi'is, which

provided paradoxically an ideal haven and tested battleground for the militias.

Embittered by their underprivileged status and by dislocation from their agricultural pursuits in the wartorn south, the Shi'is vented their fury in violence. Some followed their spiritual guide, Imam al-Sadr, and perceived the conflict as part of an Islamic struggle to wrest Shi'i rights. Others formed extremist organizations such as Ali's Youth. Still large numbers joined the radical leftist parties, such as the communist LCP, the Communist Action Organization, and the *Ba'th* party, who portrayed the conflict as a nonsectarian class struggle against reactionary feudalists(16).

The belligerent Shi'is in Shiyah found themselves reinforced by the Palestinian guerrilla groups who formed the core of the Rejection Front opposed to any peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute; the PFLP, PFLP-GC, and ALF, bolstered by arms and funds from Libya and Iraq. The rejectionists believed the situation begged their intervention on the side of whom they considered the "oppressed masses", and they hoped furthermore to sabotage the peace process in the Middle East by destabilizing the Lebanese regime(17). The Iraqi and Libyan governments, and to a lesser extent the Syrian, stepped up their pressure against what they considered a conservative Lebanese regime coterminous with those of Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

Confronted with the deterioration of internal security, President Frangieh announced on 23 May 1975, the formation of a military government. The traditional Muslim leadership seized the presidential act to reshape their position and contain the radical-leftist thrust(18). In a meeting held at the office of the Sunni Mufti Hasan Khalid, practically all the major Muslim temporal and religious leaders, including a reluctant Joumblat who was forced to leave his leftist-radical turf, denounced the formation of the military cabinet. They demanded, in a sort of ultimatun, that Frangieh appoint Karami prime minister.

Syria, which indirectly participated in the crisis via *al-Sa'iqah* and the local Lebanese *Ba'th* party, sent its foreign minister, 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, to mediate between the warring factions and convince Frangieh that a military solution was inopportune. The stability of the regime in Damascus under President Hafiz al-Asad, the prestige associated with Syria's participation in the October War, and the normalization of relations with Lebanon in 1974, all combined to give Syria more than a nominal say in Lebanese affairs: after a mere sixty-five hours of their appointment, Frangieh announced that he would dismiss the military and select Karami prime minister (1 July 1975-9 December 1976).

Frangieh's appeasement could hardly prevent the *Kata'ib* and their allied militias from resuming sporadic sniper fire in the heart of the capital and by the random abduction of civilian bystanders. In the Shiyah area,

similar abduction tactics were used against contiguous Christian sectors of Beirut. After strenuous government efforts, an uneasy calm settled in the summer of 1975, although the protagonists took respite of the truce to rearm, train, and expand their recruitment drive. The Maronite militias could now formulate definite battle plans that would enclose their areas and separate the combatants along the so-called "green line" running through the Beirut-Damascus road, leaving the downtown area and the Central Bank in their hands while eliminating several Palestinian and Muslim pockets of resistance in the eastern suburbs of Beirut(19).

The deceptive truce of the summer 1975, witnessed a general Syrian and Palestinian disengagement from the fighting. Two days after an emotionally charged meeting with the Lebanese president on 23 June, 'Arafat "finally" pledged noninterference in the country's internal affairs(20). Both the Syrians and Palestinians believed, at that critical juncture, that they would equally bring forth an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and precipitate an early Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, if they picked up the gauntlet of facilitating Kissinger's Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Nevertheless sectarian tension inside Lebanon remained unleashed and the conflagaration spread out from the Shiyah front to Tripoli, 'Akkar, and the Beqa' valley. Kidnapping and ugly torture so inflamed the situation, that Imam al-Sadr retired to a mosque on 27 June and vowed a hunger strike until the violence ceased. The Imam's dramatic gesture and Khaddam's mediation set the stage for Karami to form a new cabinet on 30 June. But on 5 July a mine explosion in an *al-Fatah* training camp in the Beqa' killed fourty Shi'is and wounded one hundred. Imam al-Sadr, who a few days before had fasted for peace, hastened to announce the formation of a new militia called "*AMAL*" (the Arabic acronym for the Brigades of Lebanese Resistance)(21).

The *al-Fatah* mine explosion revealed that the PLO was extending training facilities and arming their other Lebanese allies. Two Sunni-led neo-Nasirite organizations appeared in Beirut, the Independent Nasirites' "al-Murabitun (Sentinels)" and the Arab Socialist Union(22). These newly emergent militias swallowed up rapid recruits among those who by tradition still clung to the goals of Arab unity and nationalism. Since Libya's leader Mu'amar al-Qadhdhafi aspired to inherit Nasir's charisma, Libya's coffers helped finance and equip them. Another Nasirite faction, the Union of the Working People's Forces (UWPF), lined itself with Sadat's Egypt, and later shifted its allegiance to Syria. Thus the UWPF militia underwent its training primarily by *al-Sa'iqah* while a splinter group from the UWPF joined the rejectionist front and in particular the PFLP-GC.

But it was Joumblat who would instill in the National Movement a vitalizing esprit de corps in the face of the Lebanese Front(23). He had announced on 19 August 1975, an interim program for reform which called

for the abolition of confessionalism in the areas of popular representation, the administration, the army, and the judiciary pending full secularization of the Lebanese political system[24]. Even if many Sunni and Shi'i traditional bosses would reject comprehensive secularization because of its anti-Islamic overtones, the better disciplined radical parties, the LCP, the SSNP, the Iraqi and Syrian branches of the *Ba'th*, and the PSP, steadily assumed the political-military offensive against the Maronite militias of the Lebanese Front.

Now that a plethora of local militias had been formed, trained, and armed on both sides of the interconfessional divide, it came as no surprise that in late August a new round of fighting spread from Zahleh to the Beqa' and from there to North Lebanon, with the exhibition of unabated sectarian atrocities between Christians and Muslims. For a fourth time Khaddam arrived to mediate and succeeded in convincing Lebanese leaders to participate in a National Dialogue Committee that presumably institutionalized the search for a political solution to the ongoing crisis.

The Syrians regarded their efforts in Lebanon crucial after Sadat had signed the second Sinai disengagement agreement on 6 September 1975, thereby wantonly isolating Syria and the PLO. As a result, 'Arafat reversed his position and declared on 5 October that he did not surmise the war as a strictly internal Lebanese affair but a conflict wrought by the political maneuvering leading to the Sinai II agreement, implying therefore that his military intervention in the Lebanese crisis was perfectly rationalized and thereby efficiently surmised[25].

The battlelines between East and West Beirut had now become solidified, and a rough if wary division between Christians and Muslim areas pervaded the rest of the country, making a drastic political solution -such as partition- very likely[26]. Indeed, with Palestinian and Syrian belligerency against them increasing on the ground, the Maronite formations began issuing cryptic statements that called for partition or threatening to court the "worst of all evils" i.e. Israel, if their enemy militias and their allies pushed them to the wal1[27].

Saudi Arabia, concerned over the disruption of the Arab coalition meticulously built since 1973, purported to mediate between Syria, Egypt and the PLO. By virtue of its oil wealth, the Saudi monarchy feared the expanded role played by the constellation of leftists, communists, and rejectionist parties. King Khalid, visited Syria on 27 December 1975, and pledged full support for a five point Syrian plan that envisaged the abolition of confessionalism, more equitable distribution of parliamentary seats between Muslims and Christians, and the election of the prime minister by the chamber to strengthen his executive powers[28].

The *Kata'ib* and the NLP found these plans completely anathema, especially since the demands for the abolition of the confessional system or

the redistribution of sectarian posts came under duress, as displayed in the ostentatious parade of Palestinian, Syrian, and a plethora of Arab arms. They therefore launched a general offensive in January 1976, to remove all the armed Palestinian and radical physical presence within their midst. Laying seige to Tal al-Za'tar camp, they overran the small refugee camp of Dbayah, and destroyed the Karantina-Maslakh enclave in east Beirut enabling them to control the lucrative proceedings of the port[29]. The surprising ferocity and success of the militia onslaught forced the Syrians on account of desperate Muslim appeals to send units of the Yarmuk Brigade of the PLA across the borders. This permitted the Palestinian guerrillas and their Muslim and leftist allies to concentrate elsewhere and overrun the Chamounist towns of Damur and al-Sa'diyyat on 20 January[30].

The threat of partition induced Khaddam to declare on 7 January 1976, in a very revealing statement of Syrian ambitions, that Lebanon was part of Syria and will return to it at the first actual attempt at partition[31]. The Syrian threat was partly temporized with the invocation of a new reform program between President Frangieh and Premier Karami on 14 February 1976, called the Constitutional Declaration. The declaration formalized the confessional distribution of the presidency to the Maronites, the prime ministry to the Sunnis, and the speakership of the chamber to the Shi'is. It proclaimed the Arabism of Lebanon, which the National Pact had left ambivalent for the sake of a neutral foreign policy, and lastly, it would call for the division of the number of seats in the chamber equally between Christian and Muslim deputies.

But the new agreement tended to bypass completely the reform program of Joumblat, in addition to the interests of Iraq, Libya, and the PLO, who had invested heavily both politically and militarily in the Lebanese crisis, and they collectively ignored it[32]. The PLO offset Syria's diplomatic incursion by supporting the splintering of a Lebanese army lieutenant, Ahmad al-Khatib, who had declared his insubordination in January 1976, because of attempts by the army to intervene on the side of the NLP in the battle of Sa'diyyat. Al-Khatib announced the establishment of the Lebanese Arab Army, and with PLO assistance proceeded on 9 March to occupy with startling success the major part of the army garrisons in the south[33].

To avert further splits within the army, officers of the general staff attempted to convince Frangieh to bring about a ceasefire, institute reforms, and declare a general amnesty to the dissident troops[34]. His refusal led them to organize a coup on 11 March 1976, led by Brigadier General 'Aziz al-Ahdab. The general demanded the immediate resignation of President Frangieh holding him responsible for Lebanon's general deterioration. On the eve of the coup, however, al-Ahdab fell out with his military associates, probably because he had contacted the PLO to coordinate the putsch[35]. Accordingly, another split occurred when Colonel Antwan Barakat

continued the war on the president's side from the well garrisoned army camp of Fayyadiyyah[36].

The splintering of the army into independent fighting units on the side of the various militias wasted the last military reserve available to the Lebanese state to put a halt to the deterioration of the security situation, and, at the same time, ushered in a most critical and violent phase of the war[37]. Artillery duels became more frequent, as dissident officers put their expertise at service, and the presidential palace at Ba'bda and the ministry of defense became prime targets for those fighting on the leftist-radical alliance.

With the collapse of all vestiges of security beccoming commonplace, and with the armed militias in effect widening their control into fringe areas away from the capital Beirut, the intervention of external forces heightened: Israel conducted secret negotiations with Lebanese contacts to supply limited caches of arms, while Syrian-American negotiations reached an advanced stage to buttress Asad's approaching military intervention.[38] To arrest the hovering Syrian encroachment, Palestinian guerrillas and the militias of Joumblat's National Movement together with al-Khatib's army, launched on 18 March 1976 a threepronged offensive that would meet success on all fronts: one against the presidential residence in Ba'bda, the other against the rear of the Maronite highlands in the Upper Matn, and the third against the *Kata'ib* positions in the hotel district of Beirut. [39] In the face of frantic appeals by Frangieh, Gemayel, and other Christian leaders to forestall a general collapse[40], Khaddam turned to Washington for its tacit acquiescense to direct Syrian military intervention on the side of the Maronite militias[41].

As the Syrian intervention clearly signalled a move to block the offensives of the PLO and Joumblat, Kissinger made sure that a joint American-Israeli strategy would apply. He communicated Israel's conditions to Damascus on 24 March, namely that the intervention forces should not exceed one brigade without employing tanks, surface to air missiles, aircraft, or naval units, and that Syrian units should not move south of a line running 10 km south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. In case Syria refused, Israel prepared itself to capture strategic positions vital for the security of its northern borders. Asad did not strictly adhere to the initial "Red Line" agreement: he would succeed in raising the cieling of his forces to more than two fully equipped divisions and pushing the geographical line of his deployment further south to a line joining Sidon, Jazzin, and Rashayya, or more precisely from the estuary of the Zahrani river to the village of Kfar Mashki in the eastern Beqa'[42].

In pursuing their role as mediator and powerbroker, the Syrians invited Joumblat to Damascus on 27 March. Asad attempted to dissuade the Druze leader from seeking a military victory in Lebanon and to accept the reform program introduced two months ago. According to the famous and

oft quoted speech by the Syrian president on 20 July[43], Joumblat remained unpertrubed by threats of an Israeli invasion and sought alternatively revenge for the humiliation of 1860, which had restructured the internal balance of power in favor of the Maronites. Joumblat stated that Asad strove to maintain the democratic and confessional balance of power in Lebanon whereas his minority 'Alawi sect held a disproportionate share of power in Syria. This, the Syrian president considered to be a veiled threat to the security of his regime and added to the ensuing bitterness between the two former allies[44].

Having outlined the contours of Syrian intervention, Kissinger despatched Ambassador Dean Brown, who served in Jordan during the heydays of the September 1970 crisis, as a special emissary to Lebanon on 31 March 1976. Confronted with the total collapse of the state machinary, Brown suggested to the Maronite leaders that they continue to test confessional consensus before opting for drastic solutions, such as partition[45]. More importantly, the American mediator advised supporting the Syrian peacekeeping role and promised to widen American support in lieu of the embarassment engendered by Israeli intervention[45]. Chamoun, Gemayel, and Frangieh certainly were hoping for a repeat performance of 1958, to which the ambassador had answered that the Sixth Fleet would only be used in case of massive evacuation. This reference to a mass evacuation, greatly angered the Lebanese president who considered it further proof of Kissinger's overall hostile intentions toward the Maronites and his regime, and fueled his fears of a "conspiracy" against his community.[46]

American mediation paved the road for parliament to amend the Lebanese constitution and insure the early election of Ilyas Sarkis as president on 8 May in exchange for a new general ceasefire[47]. Sarkis, however, was Syria's preferred candidate, and Joumblat felt unhindered to pursue an increasingly fleeting military solution which would instill a new political order in Lebanon with solely Palestinian help[48]. In the dramatic volte-face of the war, Syria turned its guns on its former allies on 1 June. This time regular units of the Syrian armed forces crossed the borders and clashed with Palestinian guerrillas and their allies deep inside Sidon and Beirut.

While the Syrians had been temporarily bogged down in localized clashes, the NLP and allied militias seized their opportunity to begin on 21 June a protracted siege of the Tal al-Za'tar camp. The formerly hardpressed Maronite militias now consolidated their ring of steel and overran a nearby smaller Palestinian enclave at Jisr al-Basha on 30 June. The *Kata'ib* later joined in, but the northern Maronite militia stuck to their heady alliance with the Syrians and stayed put[49]. Partly reinforced with tanks and heavy

artillery pieces, the besiegers brought about the fall of the Shi'i suburb of al-Nab'ah on 6 August and Tal al-Za'tar followed suit on 12 August[50].

Palestinian bitterness against Syria increased considerably for this unexpected reversal in fortunes. Neither they nor Joumblat agreed to withdraw their forces from the rear mountain highlands. The National Movement leader hoped till the last moment to infuse Egytian or even French troops to counterbalance the crushing weight of Syrian numbers[51]. Fearing the erosion of their initiative, the Syrian army finally thrust on 28 September against the leftist and Palestinian forces in the mountain and rolled forward to the capital Beirut.

The ensuing Palestinian-Syrian clash and the general detrioration of the security situation induced Saudi Arabia to organize a mini-Arab summit conference on 16 October in Riyadh[52]. It reconciled Syria, Egypt, and the PLO and recognized the former's preeminence in Lebanon by permitting Syrian troops to constitute the main bulk of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) that would supposedely proceed to disarm the militias. 'Arafat attempted in Riyadh to place the ADF under the overall stewardship of the Arab League, but Sarkis and Asad foiled his plans and placed a Lebanese officer in overall command[53]. A week later, a larger Arab summit met in Cairo to formally terminate inter-Arab rivalry in the Lebanese civil war and to temporize massive Arab intervention in internal Lebanese affairs. Again the Palestinian leader fought hard to increase the contingents of the United Arab Emirates, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Southern Yemen which constituted the ADF in order to limit Syrian numbers. He even proposed the inclusion of Palestinian units. Asad, however, with Sarkis's support, made sure that his 30,000 troops would dwarf all newcomers[54].

Despite the tacit "Red Line" agreement and the formal plans of the Arab summitry to end the crisis in Lebanon, Israel would persist in its pressure point tactics against the PLO and their allies in the south[55]. Moshe Dayan's old proposal in the 1950's to find a Lebanese major willing to collaborate finally culminated in a Greek Catholic officer from Marja'yun, Sa'd Haddad. The Lebanese army commander, General Hanna Sa'id, who himself hailed from the border village of Qlay'ah, issued to Haddad specific written orders, with the full knowledge of the caretaker minister of defense, Camille Chamoun, to cooperate with local militias and other unnamed "status quo forces," sic. Israel. As thousands of Palestinian fighters scurried southward away from the advancing Syrian army pouring into the Lebanese heartland towards Beirut, inevitable clashes broke out with the small forces mustered by Haddad in three separate enclaves of the southern border village[56].

But the parade of Syrian military prowess did not lead to the disarming of the mililtias, who just simply vacated their posts and kept their caches of arms in hiding. The ADF failed to collect the heavy weaponary of

the Maronite militias because the latter claimed that the Palestinians had not yet surrendered their own. 'Arafat pleaded that he needed arms to defend the Palestinian camps from the Israelis and deny their residents a fate similar to that meted to Tal al-Za'tar. Muslim and leftist militias lamely and naturally held similar excuses. Thus the Syrian forces had to content themselves with taking up military checkpoints and maintaining a general ceasefire as a police force ready to employ massive firepower against any armed group accused of security infringements.

If the PLO refused to disarm, the Lebanese Front made sure that Sarkis would not forget what they considered to be the core of the problem and their proposed political agenda for its solution. They took a stridently anti-Palestinian tone, calling for the distribution of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon among the various Arab countries. They declared that they refused the resurrection of the now defunct 1943 National Pact and demanded the establishment of a politically decentralized system of government(57).

Maintaining the present status quo in Lebanon did not meet Israeli approval. When the ADF widened its deployment and moved near the town of Nabatiyyah in January 1977, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon quickly fired an ultimatum claiming that the Syrians were crossing the "Red Line," thereby threatening vital Israeli interests. Although the Israeli general staff favored a Syrian deployment up to the southern border, thus spelling an end to the Palestinian guerilla threat, the foreign ministry saw great opportunities in supporting Haddad and expanding the covert links established with the Maronite militias to the north(58).

While the Maronite militias expended their energies against the PLO and their allies in the far south, the National Movement was dealt a shattering blow with the assassination of Joumblat near a Syrian checkpoint by unknown assassins on 16 March. His followers misdirected their fury against the Christians in the Shuf, killing 66 before his son and heir apparent Walid put a stop to the rampage(59). Bereft of their charismatic leader, the leftist militias steadily but surely lost their political edge and grew increasingly reliant on the PLO or Syria for protection and guidance.

The nihilism unleashed by the 1975-76 civil war and the sectarian militias' unrelenting pursuit of military victory left 40-60,000 dead in their wake(60). A certain pattern, however, could be discerned. The state security appartus had collapsed and the militias, through the support of multifaceted external sponsors, rose to the forefront as embodiments of the citizen army in lieu of the state. Shifting localized alliances became commonplace and their only true justification would be the continuing of the Lebanese war by all means(61). Once sectarian tensions had become unleashed, in part as a

result of foreign manipulation, Lebanon would turn for the next fifteen years into a deadly quagmire; a vortex which would sweep in and destroy all those who ventured near[62].

1. Randal, op. cit., pp. 156-159.
2. Salibi, Crossroads, op. cit., p. 78
3. See the warning reports by the *Deuxième Bureau* as cited by Jul Fu'ad al-Bustani, 'Aqdar wa-Tawaqu'at, 1972-76 [Destinies and Expectations, 1972-76] (Beirut, 1980).
4. This is the unpublished report which the al-Nahar journalists insisted signaled the "conspiratorial" decision to unleash the civil war (Al-Dayri, op. cit., p. 17). For further discussion, see Ghassan Tuéni, Une guerre pour les autres (Paris, 1985), pp. 185-189.
5. Gordon, op. cit., p. 268; al-Dayri, op. cit., pp. 14ff.
6. Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor in the Lebanese Civil War," The Middle East Journal 32 (Summer 1978): 267. The idea of the "conspiracy" still has an indelible and fascinating hold on the popular imagination, sometimes completely misplaced. On 12 November 2010, Sayyid Hasan Nasr Allah would spend the better part of two hours expounding a letter from Henry Kissinger to Raymond Eddé in answer to an open letter by the latter on 12/6/1976, in al-Nahar accusing the US Secretary of State to the point of instigating the civil war for the sake of partitioning Lebanon. Nasr Allah brandished the words of Kissinger's reply as proof of Eddé's accusation and scathingly scolded his opponents for failing to guage and read history in its accuracy. A few days later it became divulged that Kissinger's reply was actually a composite and imagined response written at the time by the journalist Selim Nassar of al-Hawadith on 18/6/1976. Nassar would rise to Nasr Allah's defense that it had been true that his letter in self-declaratory terms had been "imaginary", but that he had actually utilized information in it which he had gathered from President Franjieh himself, his prime minister, Taqi' al-Din al-Sulh, the foreign minister, Rashid Nafa' and a long-time friend, White House interpreter Camille Nawfal (See Selim Nassar's article in al-Hayah, 20 November 2010).
7. Larteguy, Dieu, l'or et le sang (Paris, 1980), pp.158f.
8. See for example Hilmi Muhammad al-Qa'ud, al-Harb al-Salibiyyah al-'Ashirah [The Tenth Crusade] (Al-Qahirah, 1981), p. 13. For an extensive argument for a wider scheme for partitioning the Arab Middle Eastern states, see Yosef Gotleib, Self-Determination in the Middle East (New York, 1982), pp. 10f., 134ff., 147f. In retrospect, the "conspiracy" entailed a euphemism for two distinct yet related themes of the war. The first constituted the Israeli dimension: the hitherto secret contacts with various militia leaders that would later become exposed in the post-1982 period, the clandestine supplies of arms and advisors via illegal seaports, the consistent policy to exacerbate tensions among the various sectarian communities in the south, and the military and intelligence operations conducted during the crisis against both Lebanese and Palestinian protagonists. The second unnamed theme of the "conspiracy" had been the United States' ambivalent policy toward the whole affair: it would address Israel's and Syria's security interests in Lebanon, open contacts with the status quo militias on the ground, and even coordinate with the PLO over security matters in west Beirut. In *realpolitik* terms, Lebanon would pay dearly for the shifts in the regional balance of power.
9. Blakemore, op. cit., 137.

10. Randal, op. cit., p. 174. See Antwan Khuwayri, Al-Harb fi Lubnan [The War in Lebanon] 5 vols. (Beirut, 1976-78), 1 (1976): passim of Introduction. As limited amounts of weapons from the black markets in western and Eastern Europe became available to the militias, certain Arab countries, such as Jordan, still immersed in its anti-Palestinian policies, trained and armed members of the NLP and the *Kata'ib*. See Camille Menassah (Benassar), Anatomie d'une guerre et d'une occupation: Evènements du Liban de 1975 à 1978 (Paris, 1978), pp. 88ff. The CIA, through the Lebanese army, funneled limited amounts of financial aid. See Nassar, Harb Lubnan wa-Madaha, op. cit., p. 185.
11. Salah Khalaf, one of *Fatah*'s leaders, later claimed that the responsibility for the 'Ayn al-Rummanah massacre lay with Colonel Jules Bustani of the *Deuxième Bureau* and members of Camille Chamoun's NLP militia, who disguised themselves as *Kata'ib* gunmen (Salah Khalaf, Abou Iyad, responsable des services speciaux palestinien: Palestinien sans patrie (Paris, 1978), p. 250; See also Wathiqah, op. cit., pp. 14-16).
12. Salibi, "'Right'," op. cit., p. 100.
13. Deeb, op. cit., p. 29.
14. In addition to replenishment from the Lebanese army and *Deuxième Bureau* depots in early 1974, with Frangieh's knowledge and acquiescence (Nasif, al-Maktab al-Thani, op. cit., p. 485), European, American, and Israeli sources also helped procure weapon systems for the Christian belligerents, allegedly via the CIA (Sampson, op. cit., pp. 9-13). It is the Israeli bureau of the CIA which had allegedly coordinated with Israeli intelligence services to provide military aid (Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (London, 1977), p. 261). Others have intimated that the Israeli embassy in Paris had opened early contacts with one of the Maronite militias (*Al-Tanzim*) in the summer of 1975 (See Simon Shiffer, Operation Boule de neige: Les secrets de l'intervention israelienne au Liban (Paris, 1985), p. 28). Still others claim that the Israeli embassy in Cyprus had contacted three *Kata'ib* emissaries also in early 1975, with the proposal to grant arms in exchange for direct political contacts with Tel Aviv (Antoine Basbous et Annie Laurent, Une proie pour deux fauves?: Le Liban entre le lion de Syrie et le lion de Judea (Beyrouth, 1983), p. 154).
15. Some of these pristine militia groups had included: Tannurin, Qadisha, Mountain, and *Muqqadamin* Brigades, Youth of Dikwanah, Zahleh Coalition, Lebanese Youth Movement, Lebanese Liberation Army, Gaurdians of the Cedars, and the Lebanese Organization Israeli sources claim that the Tanzim led by George Adwan had been the first Maronite organization to open serious political contacts with the Israelis in 1974 (See Beate Hamizrachi, The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Belt: Major Saad Hadad and the Ties with Israel. 1975-1978 (New York, 1988), p. 63). The Tanzim constituted a secret organization of Christian army officers founded in April 1969 after the first serious clashes between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians. They began secret military training of several groups, including the *Kata'ib*, and they participated in the May 1973 clashes (Lewis W. Snider, "The Lebanese Forces: Wartime Origins and Political Significance," in The Emergence of a New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality, Edward E. Azar *et. al.*, ed., (New York,

1984), p. 159). The officers seemed to have split from the army in the beginning of the 1975 civil war (Thomas Collelo *et. al.*, Lebanon: A Country Study (Washington, D.C., 1987), p. 240).

16. Despite their militant antiestablishment rhetoric, all radicals failed to mobilize in strength throughout the spring and summer of 1975, and therefore the military initiative rested with the Phalangists, or alternatively with the Palestinians. Leftists apologized for their lack of preparation in the spring and summer of 1975, by claiming that they refused with doctrinaire astuteness to be drawn into a sectarian war (K. Khalil, op. cit., p. 64; Salih, op. cit., p. 66; Dhubyan, op. cit., pp. 22-35).
17. Oil rich Libya, governed by its enigmatic colonel, Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, took a stridently anti-Maronite tone since 1973, in lieu of the Libyan's ideological blend of Islamic fundamentalism and revolutionary Arab nationalism. It, too, extended vast amounts of financial and military aid to Palestinian guerrilla organizations, radical parties, and various other Muslim groups. The New York Times, 13 September 1975, estimated that Libya had spent from the beginning of the civil war $30-40 million (As cited by Hudson, "The Palestinian Factor," op. cit., p. 269). Iraq, likewise considering itself a rejectionist state, extended substantive amounts of aid and arms to distract Syria away from Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy.
18. For example, all was not well between Premier Salam and 'Arafat as a taped conversation revealed by Frangieh to Arab ambassadors meeting him in the spring of 1975 indicated. Although the date was not determined, the gest of the 'Arafat-Salam conversation pointed to an extremely irritated Palestinian leader bent on exacting revenge for Palestinian losses, probably in reaction to the incident of 'Ayn al-Rummanah (See Laurent, op. cit., pp. 42f).
19. See interviews with European and American "mercenary" advisors who had formulated such plans with Bashir al-Gemayel in the summer of 1975, in al-Majallah, 18-24 May 1988.
20. See account of the meeting in Salah Khalaf, op. cit., pp. 252-58.
21. Al-Sadr suffered from the anti-Christian and disobedient excesses of his followers in the Beqa' valley and training a militia would consolidate his control considerably (S.J. Thom Sicking and Dr. Shereen Khairallah, "The Shi'i Awakening in Lebanon: A Search for Radical Change in a Traditional Way," Vision and Revision in Arab Society: CEMAM Reports 2(1974): 111-27).
22. Dhubyan, op. cit., p. 249. For a partisan anti-Christian tract of the war, see Union Socialiste Arabe, La Croix noire ou le dossier du complot contre le Liban (n.p., 1976).
23. For a listing of the National Movement's militias, see Sami Dhubyan, Al-Harakah al-Wataniyyah al-Lubnaniyyah: Al-Madi wal-Hadir wal-Mustaqbal min Mandhur Istratiji [The Lebanese National Movement: Past Present and Future from a Strategic Perspective] (Beirut, 1977), pp. 249-333.
24. For text of the program, see Religion. State and Ideology: CEMAM Reports 3 (1975): 40-50. Conversely, see article by Husayn al-Quwwatli about the nature of Islamic government written in essence to rebuff Joumblat's proposals in al-Safir, 18 August 1975.
25. President Anwar al-Sadat warned Syria to stay out of Lebanon, disclaiming in the process any previous connections Egypt possessed with Muslim or neo-

Nasirite parties. Ironically, reports abounded that Egypt exported arms to the Maronite militias instead (Khuwayri, 2: 194).

26. Salibi, Crossroads, op. cit., pp. 117-37. Cf. Joseph Abu Khatir, Al-Mas'alah al-Lubnaniyyah [The Lebanese Question] (Beirut, 1978), p. 84; Sarkis Za'tar, Lubnan al-Su'al [Lebanon the Question] (Al-Kaslik, 1976), p. 36. For other analyses and projects for the geopolitical reorganization of Lebanon, see Hanna (Jean) Ghanem, Liban: Guerre ou gènocide (Quebec, 1979), pp. 188-95; and Muhammad Majdhub, Masir Lubnan fi Mashari' [The Fate of Lebanon in Projects] (Beirut, 1978).
27. See memorandum submitted to the French emissary Couve de Murville by the Maronite League, in al-Muharir (Beirut), 22 December 1975. In all probability, these contacts had already begun, and Israeli arms and advisors definitely played a major role in fomenting the breakdown of security over the past year.
28. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 11 June 1976.
29. For an eye witness account to the fall of al-Karantina, see Don McCullin, Beirut: A City in Crisis (London, 1983), pp. 24-61. For the Maronite militias, the operations designed to prevent the complete encirclement of east Beirut by the belt of fortified Palestinian positions surrounding the city. Snider believed that these operations which required coordination among the various Maronite militias heralded the formation of the Lebanese Forces as a viable umbrella organization (Snider, "The Lebanese Forces," op. cit., p.129).
30. Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (London, 1990), pp. 99-102. Mishal al-Ghurayyib, a Maronite native of Damur and a leftist intellectual at the time, had greatly criticized the attack on his village as an expression of sectarian hatred by the Palestinians and their allies. See his two works Damur man Ant? [Damur who are You?] (Beirut, 1978), pp. 155ff., and Mudhakkarat Maruni [A Maronite's Memoirs] (Beirut, 1984), p. 101.
31. Interview with Kuwaiti paper al-Ra'y al-'Aam (Kuwait) as cited by Khuwayri, 2: 20.
32. See minutes of the meetings held in 'Aramun between Khaddam and Muslim leaders on 30 January and 26 February 1976, where the Syrian foreign minister attempted to sell the agreement inspite of Joumblat's strenuous objections and Libya's financial meddling (Hasan Khalid, al-Muslimun fi Lubnan wal-Harb al-Ahliyyah: Mahadir Ijtima'at Qimah 'Aramun athna' al-Harb al-Ahliyyah: Dar al-Fatwa fi al-Ahdath [The Muslims in Lebanon and the Civil War: Minutes of the 'Aramun Summit Meetings during the Civil War: Dar al-Fatwa in the Crisis] (Beirut, 1978), pp. 221-227, 240-244).
33. Clandestine contact between al-Khatib and *al-Fatah* had begun before 1976. See interview with al-Khatib in Al-Hawadith, 30 March 1979.
34. For the officers' memorandum, see Ghada al-Kharsa, Lubnan ... Ya 'Arab [Lebanon … Oh Arabs] (Al-Qahirah, 1977], p. 68.
35. John K. Cooley, "The Palestinians" in Lebanon in Crisis, op. cit., p. 40. Others maintain that the Saudi military attaché, Brigadier 'Ali al-Sha'ir, was also privy to the coup (Annie Laurent et Antoine Basbous, Guerre secretes au Liban (Paris, 1987), p. 34).
36. Lahhud, op. cit., p. 202.
37. This slight, though with hindsight, inevitable tip in the balance of power against the Maronite militias, occassioned the first dispatch of a high level

Kata'ib functionary directly to Israel on 12 March to appeal for assistance. See Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (New York, 1984), p. 11. The NLP had already received regular caches of arms throughout late 1975 and early 1976 from Israeli gunboats off the coast through the use of makeshift illegal ports. The Israelis insisted that arms shipments must be followed by a highranking political meeting between Chamoun and, in this case, Yigael Allon (Dan Bavly and Eliahu Salpeter, Fire in Beirut: Israel's War in Lebanon with the PLO (New York, 1984), p. 44). The Israelis also maintained that it was King Husayn who had encouraged Chamoun to initiate contacts with Israel (Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community (Boston, 1990), p. 265). In geopolitical terms, Chamoun, the native of Dayr al-Qamar in the heart of Joumblat's turf, felt the most threatened and had opted to open very early secret contacts with Israeli military intelligence. As a result, a high level special government group consisting of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Defense Minister Shimon Peres, and Foreign Minister Yigael Allon, together with representatives of the Israeli intelligence services, formulated a reactive and deterrent policy to developments in Lebanon. Such a group definitely eyed launching a full scale invasion. Rabin had previously signalled his opposition to Syria's PLA incursion last January, but he resisted the pleas of the Maronite militias for massive military supplies because he did not want to endanger Sinai II. Peres hoped to seize the moment and branch out to all the ethnic and religious minorities in Lebanon. He is said to have visited Lebanon secretly four times in the course of the crisis (Akhbar al-Yum, 7 September 1976, as cited by Hilmi Muhammad al-Qa'ud, al-Harb al-Salibiyyah al-'Ashirah [The Tenth Crusade] (Al-Qahirah, 1981), p.48). Allon seemed to have been the most sympathetic to the demands of the Maronite militias. In any case, Colonel Benyamin Ben-Eliazer and other military intelligence officers were sent to appraise the situation on the ground in east Beirut.

38. Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue (London, 1987), 33-39.
39. Syria's staunchest ally would remain no other than President Frangieh himself whose political strength lay in his mountain bastion in the north. (Elie A. Salem, "Lebanon's Political Maze: The Search for Peace in a Turbulent Land," The Middle East Journal 33 (Autumn 1979): 451). The *Kata'ib*, strong in the central regions of Lebanon, would play a balancing role; they developed their secret contacts with the Israelis alongside Chamoun, while supporting the Syrian initiative with Frangieh's prodding (Goria, op. cit., pp. 213-217. See also Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 (Ithaca, 1984), p. 64).
40. On 25 March, all the Maronite militias would coalesce under the umbrella organization of the Command Council of the Lebanese Forces, with Bashir Gemayel in nominal command. He would later fashion the *ad hoc* command into a strict disciplinarian military organization.
41. For an analytical study of Syria's intervention as an "incremental process" see Naomi Joy Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975-76 Civil War (Oxford, 1986), p.139.
42. Ibid., p. 59. Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (Oxford, 1987), p. 61.

43. See text of speech in Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, op.cit., pp. 201-236.
44. Karim Baqraduni, al-Salam al-Mafqud: 'Ahd Ilyas Sarkis, 1976-1982 [The Missing Peace: The Era of Ilyas Sarkis, 1976-1982] (Beirut, 1984), pp. 36, 77.
45. Chamoun, Crise au Liban, op. cit., p. 104. See Itamar Rabinovich, "The Limits of Military Power: Syria's Role," in Lebanon in Crisis, ed. P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider (Syracuse, N.Y., 1979) pp. 55-62. American support for the Syrian role in Lebanon precipitated a crisis between Syrian and the Soviet Union. See Ilana Kass, "Moscow and the Lebanese Triangle," The Middle East Journal 33 (Spring 1979): 364-87; and Galia Golan and Itamar Rabinovich, "The Soviet Union and Syria: The Limits of Cooperation," in The Limits of Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle East, ed. Yaacov Ro'i (London, 1979), pp. 225ff.
46. See also exchange between Chamoun and Frangieh in relating that incident during the 1984 Lausanne reconciliation conference in George Bashir, Filib Abi 'Aql, and Fawzi Mubarak, 'Umara' al-Tawa'if min Janyf 'ila Luzan [Confessional Princes from Geneva to Lausanne] (Beirut, n.d.), p.172. The head of the *Sûreté Générale* and a close ally of Frangieh, Antoine Dahdah, was present during the meeting, and would later relate that evacuation was not mentioned, but that Brown posed 3 questions: what was the current situation of the Christian militias? Were they willing to fight if new arms shipments arrived? Would they accept Asad's entry into Lebanon? Dahdah also explains that during that visit, 2 shipments arrived in Jounieh harbour at night carrying small arms and heavy weapons. Though he does not mention it, the arms ostensibly came from Israel, but apparently with American blessing (Nasif, Sir al-Dawlah, op. cit., p. 469ff.)
47. See Adeed Dawisha, "The Motives of Syria's Involvement in Lebanon," Middle East Journal 38(1984): 228-36.
48. Kamal Joumblatt, Pour le Liban (Paris, 1978), pp. 44-49. In one of the most bellicose statements of the war, the *Fatah* leader Salah Khalaf, alias Abu Iyyad, would declare on 23 May that the road to Palestine passed through 'Aynturah, al-Mtayn, and Junyah (Al-Safir, 24 May 1976)
49. Randal, op. cit., p. 201. It is said that the *Kata'ib* had joined in after a high level secret meeting between Pierre Gemayel and Rabin in July 1976, whereby Israeli military supplies were to be divided equally between the two major Maronite militias: the *Kata'ib* and the NLP (Randal, op. cit., p. 203). The Israelis certainly exploited the situation yet further when Colonel Ben Eliezer attempted to induce Tony Frangieh to close ranks. The northern Maronite militia, however, stuck to their heady alliance with the Syrians (See photos of upgraded Israeli Super-Sherman tanks used against the camp in al-Nahar al-Ittihad al-Lubnani, 13 August 1976).
50. Schiff, op. cit., p. 20. In August, Chamoun met with Rabin and asked for an increase in military supplies that would bring a decisive end to the crisis in Lebanon. Despite the Israeli prime minister's refrain, tanks and heavy artillery pieces did find their way to the Maronite militias and helped bring about the fall of Tal al-Za'tar (Schiff, op. cit., p.20). The Rabin government would supply $150 million of aid to the Maronite militias in the period 1975-77 (Schiff, op. cit., p. 20). At the other end of the spectrum, the two young militia commanders, Dany Chamoun and Bashir Gemayel, rushed to another of their secret meetings

with Rabin to explore the possibility of a major ground operation that would deal with both the Palestinians and the Syrians, but to no avail (Istvar Pogany, The Arab League and Peacekeeping in Lebanon (Aldershot, 1987), pp.83f.).

51. Baqraduni, op. cit., p. 40.
52. Ibid., op. cit., pp. 64f. Joumblat attempted to mend fences with Bashir Gemayel on 2 June on the eve of Syria's overt military intervention, in order to explore the possibilities of mutually coordinating against the Syrians. He seemed to have played a role in withdrawing some of the PLO fighters from Tal al-Za'tar in a last minute but futile gesture toward the Maronite militias before the fall of the camp (See interview with Salah Khalaf (*aka* Abu Iyyad), in Al-Majallah, 3 February 1987). For the Egyptians' declared readiness to intervene, see minutes of meeting held between Presidents Sarkis and Sadat in Cairo as published in al-Ahram, 25 September 1976. The Syrian general staff, on the other hand, toyed with the idea of staging a military coup by Lebanese officers opposed to the traditional bosses allied to the Palestinian-Joumblatt camp, i.e. a coup against the regime itself. However the opposing Christian militias, and the supposedly sympathetic Lebanese officers, were clearly unresponsive to such ideas fielded during meetings held in Damascus in July 1976 (Nasif, al-Maktab al-Thani, op.cit., p. 553f.).
53. Baqraduni, op. cit., p. 72.
54. Frederick C. Hof, Galilee Divided: The Israel-Lebanon frontier, 1916-1984 (Boulder, 1985), p. 97.
55. Hamizrachi, op. cit., p. 73.
56. For the low-keyed nature of these battles, see Fisk, p. 108. It was 1st Lt. Saad Haddad who apprehended a 13-men *Fatah* group led by the incognito Yasir 'Arafat in the village of 'Ayta al-Sha'b in Bint Jubayl qaza, as they were coming out of Israel on 20 July 1966. It is not clear whether they had crossed over from Syria or from Lebanese territory, but they did plant a device nearby the settlement of Kfar Margalit/Margaliyyot(?). 'Arafat claimed his name as 1st Sgt Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman Qudwah (his maternal family) of the Syrian army and did not reveal his true identity except after a lengthy and rough interrogation by Lebanese military intelligence. The members of the patrol were later released after almost 2 weeks because of Syrian pressures (Nasif, al-Maktab al-Thani, op.cit., pp. 225-231).
57. See the declaration of the Lebanese Front after the meeting at the Saydah al-Birah retreat on 21-23 January 1977, in George Bashir et al., op, cit, p. 294.
58. Hamizrachi, op. cit., p. 84. Syrian withdrawal from the area around Nabatiyyah did not prevent General Sa'id, days before his dismissal, from sending Major Sami Shidyaq, known for his loyalty to Bashir Jummayil, to the south via Israel on 14 March 1977, with orders identical to those previously given to Haddad, i.e. cooperation with "status quo forces", sic. Israel. On the date of Shidyaq's arrival, Haddad with Israeli assistance began a campaign that would last for months geared at enlarging the area under his control (Ibid., pp.105-108).
59. For an overall assessment of the nature of relations between Joumblat and Maronite politics, see Farid al-Khazen, "Kamal Jumblatt: The Uncrowned Druze Prince of the Left," Middle Eastern Studies 24 (1988) : 197ff.
60. James Markham, "The War that Won't Go Away," New York Times Magazine, 9 October 1977.

61. Tuéni, Guerres pour les autres, op. cit., p. 55.
62. Rashid Khalidi, "Problems of Foreign Intervention in Lebanon," American-Arab Affairs 7 (Winter 1983-1984): 28f.

IV

NEVER ENDING WARS: FUNDAMENTALISM AND SECTARIAN NIHILISM, 1979-1989

(10)
The 1982 Israeli Invasion and the Expulsion of the PLO

Despite the cessation of general hostilies after the Riyadh conference of October 1976, there would be no return to the *status quo ante* for Lebanon akin to the situation that preceded the June 1967 war. In other words, there would be no reversal to a semblance of normalcy by which the government would exercise its full sovereignty over the entire country. The PLO continued to exercise unilateral military control of the Palestinian refugee camps, and the local Lebanese militias, likewise, retained their own arms, albeit with discretion. The basic premise in Riyadh was to interject the ADF to address security issues that were seen as the cause of the collapse of 1975-76: Israeli intervention in the south on behalf of fringe Maronite militias, the excesses of splinter Palestinian guerilla organizations doing the bidding of Arab or some other international patron, and efforts by the Muslim-leftist coalition to overturn the internal status quo by force. Thus the largely Syrian manned ADF would conduct itself as a police force leaving all others *in situ,* which meant that the militias' capabilities to upturn the security situation would remain unimpeached. Nor would the functioning of the state machinery return to the smooth interconfessional workings of the 1943 National Pact, as both the offices of the president and the prime minister found themselves at loggerheads on how to best conduct foreign policy or how to approach security issues. In addition, Lebanon, though unbereft of wide international sympathy, would never enjoy the unconditional Western support that it had traditionally engendered before 1967.

If, hence, no drastic change was to be expected in the actual domestic, regional, and international politics of things (as had prevailed, for example, throughout the period 1920-1967), then it should come as no surprise that the fourteen year period stretching from the outbreak of the war in 1975, until the promulgation of the Ta'if agreement in 1989, remained a period interlaced by intermittent and sporadic internal crises or fullfledged wars in which Syria, Israel, and the PLO, the Lebanese army and the localized militias played prominent parts; [(1)] not to mention the temporary infusion of US and French Multinational Forces in 1982-83 or the quasi-permanent deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon since the Israeli invasion of 1978. The second invasion of 1982 would finally carry the Israeli army all the way up to the capital Beirut and bring about to the fullest the expulsion of the PLO, eliminating it hereafter as an active pawn on the Lebanese chequerboard. But the invasion left a residue

of bitterness and a swath of destruction in its wake so wide as to induce a continuation of the Lebanese wars in other manners and forms.

Even after the conclusion of the 1989 Ta'if agreement, which came at the culmination of regional efforts led by Saudi Arabia and international efforts led by the US, Israel would remain for another eleven years in southern Lebanon, under the pretext that it had to combat a new form of "fundamentalist" terrorism. In the meanwhile, it would launch massive attacks against the Lebanese infrastructure in 1993 and 1996, and would not fully withdraw in compliance with 1978 UN Security Council Resolution except in the year 2000, and not before strenuous resistance operations conducted largely by the *Hizb Allah* organization. Syria would linger further in Lebanon, until after the assasination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in February 2005, when it was forced to evacuate in full in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1559. Ironically, as the Israeli withdrawal in the aftermath of its 1982 invasion exacerbated interconfessional tensions, Syrian withdrawal in 2005, also occasioned a serious split between the largely Sunni led 14th March movement and the largely Shi'i component of the 8th March movement.

As explained earlier, the incumbent administration of President Sarkis faced insurmountable odds in disarming the PLO and the local Lebanese militias. Convinced that the necessity for the Maronite militias had arisen because of the general lawlessness and irresponsibility of members of the PLO, the president hoped to begin reknitting the army brigades by dismissing the rebel officers of the Lebanese Arab Army. In the first serious political crisis of the regime, the newly appointed Prime Minister, Dr. Selim Hoss shocked Sarkis by refusing to go along unless Major Haddad and his associates were similarly dismissed(2). The president felt further incapacitated by the deterioration of the situation in the south, where the PLO, Israel, the National Movement, and Haddad exchanged strike and counterstrike. Resorting to diplomatic options, the government under Syrian auspices held a meeting in Shtawrah with Palestinian representatives on 20 July 1977. The agreement stipulated that PLO units withdraw from a six mile zone along the frontiers with Israel and that heavy weapons be withdrawn from the Palestinian camps(3).

Despite these declarations, Israel would not allow the ADF to deploy below the Zahrani river or the "Red Line" previously agreed upon with Syria under US auspices the last year. Instead, it preferred the strategy of massive retaliation while providing support to the operations of Haddad's militia. The Likud coalition had won the elections in Israel in May, and the incumbent Prime Minister Menachem Begin would later declare on 8 August that Israel had been providing training, supplies, and artillery support to prop Christian militiamen in southern Lebanon to prevent a "genocide" by Palestinian forces and their allies(4). To defeat Palestinian

nationalism, Begin and his future minister of defense, Ariel Sharon, would finally go after the "source," i.e. PLO headquarters in Beirut[5].

The rising star of the *Kata'ib* militia, Bashir Gemayel, came to believe that a cathartic Israeli operation solely geared against the Palestinians and the Syrians would neither compromise Lebanese sovereignty nor destroy the country's standing in the Arab world. Both he and Camille Chamoun had declared their opposition to the ongoing deployment of Syrian troops in east Beirut, and the whole policy orientation of other Maronite leaders, such as President Sarkis, former President Frangieh, and the elder Gemayel toward accommodation with Syria. The younger Gemayel and Chamoun felt, furthermore, that pressure against the PLO in the south must be stepped up even at the expense of reinforcing Haddad indirectly[6].

The rules of engagement in Lebanon altered drastically with the Egyptian president's surprise visit to Jerusalem on 19 November 1977. Taking a page from Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and Nixon and Kissinger's opening to China, Anwar al-Sadat jolted the slow multilateral approach to the Middle East peace process by opting for direct negotiations with the Israeli prime minister under US stewardship. The immediate result had been to put a temporary freeze to the widening Palestinian-Syrian rift in Lebanon, and the ADF would put on hold all effective measures it was already taking against the PLO in the south or inside the Palestinian camps further north[8]. This would lead necessarily to a heightening of tensions between Syria and the Lebanese Front.

And to make matters worse for the ADF, Lebanese army officers provoked a firefight with a Syrian checkpoint near the barracks of Fayyadiyyah on 7 February 1978. The large loss of Syrian life caused Asad promptly to demand from President Sarkis in no uncertain terms the arrest and the courtmartial of the culprits[9]. This time, Sarkis and the major Maronite leaders of the Lebanese Front closed ranks. The president resisted repeated Syrian demands to strike against the Maronite militias or to dismiss Majors Haddad and Shidyaq in the south. Rather, he would attempt together with Frangieh to mediate between the Lebanese Front and Damascus.

Squeezed militarily in southern Lebanon by the repeated forays of the Israeli army and their allied militias, and isolated politically in the advanced Egyptian-Israeli negotiations over Middle East peace, 'Arafat's stalwarts took dire action and conducted a naval raid on the Tel Aviv coastal road on 11 March 1978. Four days later, the Israelis began their first massive land invasion of Lebanon codenamed "Operation Litani". Their armored forces, in the wake of heavy aerial and artillery bombardment portrayed in graphic detail by the world media, moved all the way up to the Litani river, surrounding but not entering the city of Tyre or its adjacent

Palestinian refugee camps. Half the estimated population of the south fled to Beirut, 80% of villages in the invasion zone suffered serious damage, and casualties reached 1,168 dead[10].

The Lebanese ambassador to the United Nations, Ghassan Tueni, conducted a vigorous stellar diplomatic and public relations campaign at the Security Council for an immediate ceasefire[11]. The Litani operation had been completely out of proportion to the *al-Fatah* raid, thus turning the international climate against the Israel. On 18 March the Security Council agreed on Resolution 425 which called for Israeli withdrawal forthwith and for the establishment under Lebanese authority of a United Nations Interim Force for Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) to ensure the effective restoration of Lebanese authority to the south. But the Israelis held a surprise up their sleeve, for as they withdrew on 12 June, they prohibited the full deployment of UNIFIL right up to the border and handed instead Major Haddad a belt of territory 5-10 km wide, adjoining thereby the three geographically separate enclaves from which his militia had been operating so far.

On the eve of Israel's withdrawal in the south, Bashir put a decisive end to the disarray in the Lebanese Front between the proponents of maintaining the decorum with Syria and those who wished otherwise. For the past few months, the conflict of power between *Kata'ib* partisans and the Frangieh clan had surfaced in northern Lebanon, as armed clashes and local assassinations became commonplace[12]. On 13 June, Bashir launched one of his lieutenants, Dr. Samir Ja'ja', in a surprise raid on Ihdin which resulted in the death of Tony Frangieh, his wife, his infant son, and 23 of their retinue[13]. Former President Frangieh promptly withdrew from the Lebanese Front, expelled all *Kata'ib* sympathizers from the north, and entered into a major rapprochement with his former protagonist Karami in Tripoli.

Partly assuaged by Frangieh's calls for vengeance, and partly alarmed by Chamoun's and Bashir's challenges to their role in Lebanon, a major clash between the ADF and the LF was now in the offing. Sniping against Syrian troops turned into armed confrontation, followed by artillery duels, with the ADF heavily bombarding the Ashrafiyyah quarters in the eastern part of the capital. When the ADF disregarded their nominal Lebanese chief's order to cease fire, President Sarkis tendered his resignation on 6 July, only to withdraw it a few days later.[14].

Fixing his gaze on the southern situation, President Sarkis felt that if he could seal the haemorrhage there, it would go a long way in staving off further Israeli reduction of Lebanese sovereignty, and concomitantly roll back the increase in Maronite anxiety as evidence by the policies undertaken by the Lebanese Front vis-à-vis Syria and the PLO. Coordinating with Asad and the US ambassador, Richard Parker, a battalion of Lebanese army troops moved from the Beqa' toward the south in tandem with UN forces.

In preparation for the move, Sarkis had placated the Lebanese Front by offering to reinstate Major Haddad in the army and had instructed UNIFIL to treat him as such[15]. Once the troops reached on 31 July, the village of Kawkaba in the eastern corner of the qaza of Hasbaya in what may be considered a gap to the south of the "Red Line", Haddad's militia opened up with an artillery barrage, thereby preventing further inroads. Israel had thereby signalled that it would maintain its "security belt" on Lebanese territory with its own military resources in alliance with Haddad. [15]

The mounting pressure against the Syrian presence by Chamoun's NLP remained unabated, and they would in earnest provoke the ADF again in early September, followed by artillery exchanges over Ashrafiyyah and which would continue in rising crescendo until mid-October[16]. The conflagration in east Beirut would finally induce the Security Council to appeal on 6 October for a ceasefire and a restoration of national reconciliation. While the Haddad militia continued to harass UNIFIL in the south, Israeli officials would declare their support for the beleaguered Christian minority and promised that the creeping annexation of Lebanon by Syria would not be tolerated. Despite the furor, Israel having just signed the Camp David Accords with Egypt on 17 September 1978, was in no position to enter into a major military entanglement in Lebanon for the time being.

The member states of the Arab League as a body were completely disenchanted with the Camp David accords; and they began a deliberate policy of isolating Sadat's Egypt, to the extent of moving the League's headquarters to Tunisia. But they were also very concerned about the inroads Israel was making into the Lebanese crisis especially with declarations of support for the beleaguered Christians of Lebanon. In a preliminary meeting at Bayt al-Din on 15-17 October, the Arab foreign ministers called for an end to "collaboration with the Israeli enemy". A few days later, as a conciliatory gesture to the Lebanese Front, Syrian troops withdrew completely from East Beirut and handed their positions over to Saudi units of the ADF, who in their turn, would evacuate their positions also. [17]

Lost amidst the mayhem of the Beirut battles had been the permeating news of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr after a visit to Libya on 31 August 1978. Suspicions abounded that the erratic al-Qadhdhafi had eliminated the Shi'ite leader after a heated conversation over arrears in loan payments extended to his militia *Amal*. Others claim that it was in due to the Imam's growing antipathy to the PLO and their allies who were ultimately responsible for turning South Lebanon into a killingfield that threatened hundreds of thousands of Shi'is with loss of their land and livelihood. Still some suggested that the Iranian intelligence agency, SAVAK, fully occupied with the suppression of the Islamic revolution, had a hand in the deed[18]. Whatever the case, the tracks leading to that crime had

been covered, and the Imam's disappearance became the *cause célèbre* of his community in Lebanon, imbued with past historical parallels of the martyrdoms of many of their reverential imams. The victory in Iran of the Shi'i cleric Ayat Allah al-Khumayni in February 1979, permeated the *Amal* movement with a messianic sense of mission at this critical moment in time, and the militia would witness a resurgence in its fortunes.(19)

Throughout the first half of 1979, President Sarkis would fail in all his diplomatic initiatives to bring about a curtailment of the PLO's quasi independent status, as translated by its launching of military attacks against Israel from Lebanese bases or by the coexistence of Palestinian guerillas and Syrian army units alongside, and sometimes in spite of Lebanese security forces. The political-military initiative in the Maronite areas would thus inexorably pass to the LF and their young commander Bashir.(20) The latter's spasm of activity would bring about the final showdown for supreme control of the Maronite militias in the LF. Despite the warning signals emanating from the intermittent clashes between the *Kata'ib* and their allies over the last two years, Bashir launched on 7 July another surprise attack against major NLP bases in Safra, the Aquamarina, and 'Amshit under the guise of establishing order in the "liberated areas" of Lebanon. Henceforth, the Lebanese Forces' militias would all come under a singular command and there would be no breakdown of order in the areas controlled by the Maronite militias(21).

Sarkis and his *Deuxième Bureau* chief, Johnny 'Abdu, had no choice but to conduct in the last half of 1980 a major rapprochement with Bashir. In the past they dealt with him as one of many leaders of the scores of militias that coexisted or clashed over Lebanese territory for the better part of the last decade and a half. These militias, by their mere *modus operandi*, constituted a direct challenge to the state's monopoly of right to exercise exclusive sovereigny. Now the president and his top security aide were forced to deal with Bashir as a major force in his own right, and were promptly ready, furthermore, to assist him in clearing an opening to the US in lieu of the connections that he had established with Israel(22). Bashir, on the other hand, distrusted the army of the "Shihabist mode", and criticized in his speeches the "compromises" and "lies" which abounded in interconfessional politics, and which had finally led to the complete abrogation of Lebanese sovereignty by the PLO. He was now demanding that the Lebanese army take an active part in maintaining pressure on Syria and the PLO with the aim of expelling them from Lebanon(23).

True to form, Bashir's next moves came on 20-26 December 1980, when his troops fired at the Syrians in Zahleh, the Greek Catholic town astride the Beirut-Damascus highway(24). To avoid the repetition of the Ashrafiyyah battles, the Syrians sealed the city and the artillery exchanges remained low-keyed. But within a few months Syrian troops discovered in

April 1981, a backroad being hurriedly built to link the LF enclave in the heart of Mount Lebanon to Zahleh in the Beka‘ valley. Artillery duels expeditiously broke out in Beirut and Zahleh simultaneously.

A sharp debate broke out among Israeli officials of whether to pick the gauntlet and rush forward to forge a linkup on land with the LF in Zahleh[37]. The approaching general elections, and the fear of an untimely war with Syria in the Beqa‘, finally induced Begin to temporize. On 8 April, he sent David Kimche, director general of the Israeli foreign ministry and former head of Lebanon’s Mossad station during the 1970’s, to east Beirut with a message that read that Israeli airpower could only be used in the event the Syrians employed their airforce against Zahleh[25]. On 25 April, Asad deployed paratroops on the Sannin mountain separating Zahleh from the LF enclave. Three days later, the Israeli airforce pounced on two Syrian helicopters carrying supplies to Sannin, and the Israeli prime minister followed it with a declaration that Israel would not allow the Syrians to take Lebanon or annihilate the Christians. On 29 April, Asad advanced three SAM (surface-to-air-missiles) batteries into the Beqa‘ which, aside from signalling a disavowal of a major precept of the “Red Line” agreement, created an international crisis induced by the high risk of a breakout of war between Israel and Syria.

Although the American president, Ronald Reagan, sympathized with Israel’s declared anti-terrorist policies and had extended generous amounts of military aid during his administration, he still did not envisage an allout war breaking out. He recalled from retirement Ambassador Philip Habib and sent him as a special envoy to help ameliorate the crisis. While firing threats against an impending strike against the SAMs, Begin would overreach and sent his fighter bombers against the Osirak nucleur facility near Baghdad on 6 June. But the Israeli airforce did conduct non-stop air raids in the south which prompted Palestinian artillery to open up against Israeli targets in the Galilee. On 17 July the Israeli airforce returned with a vengeance against *al-Fatah* and PFLP headquarters in the heart of the Fakahani district of west Beirut. Pinpoint accuracy demolished three buildings that housed the headquarters with 150 civilians lost in the process.

Ambassador Habib finally arranged a general ceasefire on 25 July with the assistance of Saudi Arabia which amongst its provisions called for the withdrawal of Bashir’s forces from Zahleh[26]. This took place among much media fanfare, and Bashir emerged as having successfully engineered an international and regional crisis which ultimately partook him as a key player to be reckoned with. The US government also took note[27], and Bashir arrived in Washington on 3 August as an official guest. He had come to court openly American support, for with the approaching end of the Sarkis administration, his sights were fixed on the greatest prize of all: the presidency.

If the LF had insistingly called for the outright withdrawal of Syria and the PLO from Lebanon, and for the restoration of complete sovereignty, the appointment of General Ariel Sharon as minister of defence in August 1981, signaled an Israeli readiness to finally go to war in the northern theater, and in particular the Lebanese battlezone. The general staff urged a strike against Syria in Lebanon[28], but since Begin and Sharon preoccupied themselves with the annexation of the West Bank, an armed conflict generated against Syria in Lebanon or Syria proper constituted a mere strategic waste of military resources. The PLO would remain the primary target. By September, Sharon alternated between two plans: "Little Pines" that envisaged an invasion of southern Lebanon up to the Awwali river, or a few kilometers north to the Zahrani river; and "Big Pines" that entailed a thrust up to the Beirut-Damascus highway, with the possibility of a clash with the Syrians. In October, Sharon would speak to his aides with familiarity about Lebanese parliamentary procedure and the number of votes needed to elect Bashir president. On 5 December 1981, Sharon stunned Ambassador Habib by making him privy to his plans [29].

The final Israeli battle plan, "Oranim", struck a compromise. Sharon would drive the army up to the outskirts of Beirut, destroy Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon, and exert all forms of military pressure to bring about the evacuation of the PLO from the capital. In his autobiography, Sharon would list what might be a post mortem rendering of his major objectives as being: the annihilation of the entire Palestinian "terrorist" infrastructure, the neutralization of the Syrian through threatening maneuvers while avoiding a real fight with them, in order to remove all northern settlements from shelling range. He then lists the other objectives pertaining to Lebanon and to the intersectarian structure of the Lebanese state as follows[30]:

> *4. These operations should be carried out so that Shi'ites, Druze and Christians will not be harmed.*
>
> *5. We have no interest in keeping forces for long periods of time in areas we would capture. Our success in achieving all the above mentioned goals will enable us to withdraw.*
>
> *6. The operation is not aimed at guaranteeing the integrity or the sovereignty of the government of Lebanon over all its territory. This is a matter for the Lebanese themselves..*
>
> *7. Linking up with the Christian zone in the north is the precondition for attaining all the above mentioned objectives, since that is the only way to cut off Beirut and the only way to cut the Beirut-Damascus highway without tackling the main Syrian deployment in the Bekaa.*

One might casually observe that the almost glib listing of the previously mentioned first three objectives in Sharon's memoirs had been

quite direct and prescient. But the other four objectives pertaining to Lebanon, were, strictly speaking, being addressed in an oblique and assymetic manner. They might be considered as mere explanatory points, probably lifted from the Oranim plan, but hardly part of a judicious outline of war aims. It is therefore highly probable that Sharon had intentionally obscured the war aims pertaining to Lebanon[31]. Yet three of these four "Lebanese" points are extremely illuminating: they envisage no return to full Lebanese sovereignty and hence no return to the *status quo ante* before the outbreak of the war of 1975-76. Similarly, and in complementary terms, it is quite obvious that the desire to keep Syria in the Beqa' would serve as a pretext for Israel remaining in force in the south, implying that Israel really wanted to remain in Lebanon as an occupying force. Finally, despite all past coordination with the LF, the aim of the operation was solely to "link" with the Christian zone, without unnescessarily damaging other Lebanese sects such as the Shi'is and the Druzes. This begs the question whether all future declarations about the restructuring of Lebanon under a strong Christian government at peace with Israel as constituting one of the top national objectives of his campaign, had seriously been in the offing?[32].

On 12-13 January 1982, Sharon went in secret to meet Lebanese Front leaders in east Beirut to measure their willingness to participate militarily in the campaign[33]. He made it clear to his interlocutors that the invasion was aimed solely at the Palestinians and that the Israelis would neither enter Beirut nor go to war with the Syrians, but that they would be prepared to assist the LF enter the capital if it so wished. The Israeli general pledged that he would protect their backs by preventing Syrian reinforcements to their beleaguered garrison. In reply, Bashir argued that he could not deploy the LF, or prospectively the Lebanese army if he received the defence portfolio in an emergency government under Sarkis, if sizable Palestinian and Syrian forces threatened his eastern and northern flanks. He stressed that even if Israeli troops reached the presidential palace in Ba'bda, it would not ensure his election as president. Sharon, thereupon, revised his plans to incorporate one thrust in the central sector across the Shuf mountains to 'Ayn Zahlta and a parallel second thrust in the Beqa' to prevent the possibility of a Syrian counterattack on the flanks. Sharon, however, insisted that there would be no entry of the IDF into west Beirut but he pointedly hinted that the Phalangists might consider undertaking this mission since they would be then fighting to liberate their country[34].

In March and April 1982, a steady stream of Israeli officials travelled to east Beirut to finalize their plans. They discovered that the LF had begun to hesitate, and Bashir even called on one occasion for the Israeli army to expel the Syrians outright from Lebanon by advancing all the way up to Tripoli, or else not to come at all[35]. US officials also seemed to be leaking the details of the Israeli battleplan to which they had been briefed by

Yehoshuri Saguy, head of Israeli military intelligence during a secret visit in February[36].

Seizing upon the botched assassination of the Israeli ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov, by the Abu Nidal group, a dissident anti-'Arafat faction within the PLO, Begin launched the invasion of Lebanon on 6 June 1982, with two days of massive aerial bombardment of Beirut. Begin codenamed the operation "Peace for Galilee," and declared that the intention was to clear a zone of 40 km from PLO artillery positions that threatened Jewish settlements in northern Israel. By 8 June, Israeli ground forces went beyond the prescribed zone, investing the port city of Sidon and becoming locked in fierce battles in the refugee camp of 'Ayn al-Hulwah. To protect the flanks of the Israeli armored thrusts, their air force destroyed the entire SAM battery network in the Beqa' on 9 June, downing in subsequent aerial battles one quarter of Syria's airforce.

Achieving complete air superiority, Sharon's men shocked observers by their arrival at the gates of the presidential palace of Ba'bda on 12 June, and by the next day had taken over the "green line" separating east and west Beirut, thus completing the encirclement of the PLO and their allies in the capital[37]. Further battles with Syrian troops dislocated them from the Beirut-Damascus highway in the upper Shuf on 22-24 June, whereupon Asad finally accepted a ceasefire arranged by Ambassador Habib. This left only the Syrian 85th Brigade garrison in the capital to carry on the fight alongside the PLO.

When Bashir and Sharon finally established their juncture, the LF commander appeared at their first meeting since the beginning of the war with reservations. He hesitated to deploy against west Beirut, although Eitan had conveyed this insistent Israeli demand since the commencement of hostilities[38]. Sharon, perhaps sympathized with Bashir's predicament, but Begin had expected some form of military cooperation as soon as their forces had reached Damur. The rising international and Arab condemnation for the invasion meant that only the LF could provide some sort of political rationale for the advance beyond the 40 km zone. Bashir obliged with a coordinated thrust into the Hay al-Sullum area of southern Beirut on 15 July, but otherwise, the LF stayed put and aloof[39].

Realizing his military plight, 'Arafat made a "preliminary" pledge to Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan that the PLO would withdraw from Beirut, thereby lending credence to Saudi and American mediatory efforts to bring about an end to the hostilities[40]. The Israelis, however, subjected the capital to massive land, sea, and air bombardment for six weeks, making localized advances against the defense perimeter. They cut water and electricity services from the civilian population, returning them only after strenuous objections by Wazzan, who threatened to halt his mediatory efforts. President Reagan also protested directly to Begin over Israeli harshness

against the civilians, and dismissed Secretary Haig when the latter seemed to prefer maintaining the pressure on the PLO rather than a slow exploration of the diplomatic option with Saudi assistance[41]. It was Ambassador Habib who finally patched an agreement on 12 August which stipulated for the sea evacuation of PLO fighters (10,876 men) to various Arab countries and the transfer by land of the 85th Brigade (2,700 men) to the Beqa' [42]. The naval and land convoys left in the period 21 August-1.September under the scrutiny of a multinational buffer force (MNF) composed of the US, France, Great Britain and Italy.

The evacuation of the PLO and the ADF from Beirut seemed to have vindicated Bashir's policies to date, even though he had obtusely avoided any commitment to the fighting on the ground. His presidential campaign roared unhindered except for the boycott of former prime minister Sa'ib Salam who urged consideration of other nominees. Salam prevented the deputies of west Beirut, Tripoli, and the Frangieh bloc from establishing a quorum in the chamber on 18 August, construing Bashir's candidature as a virtual Israeli *diktat*. To the extreme delight of east Beirut, however, Bashir amply outmaneuvered Salam with the help of the speaker of parliament, Kamil al-As'ad, and on 23 August succeeded in marshalling the necessary parliamentary votes (57 to 5) to elect him as the youngest president in Lebanon's history[43].

A week after his election, Bashir was invited by Begin to a meeting at Nahariyyah on 30 August. The Israeli prime minister, who was facing insurmountable pressure from his home front and condemnation from international public opinion over his extremely unpopular war in Lebanon, brought along Major Haddad, with whom Bashir were not exactly on the best of terms. Bashir resisted all attempts by Begin to sign a separate peace treaty, issue a statement thanking Israel for its efforts, or appoint Haddad as commander responsible for security in the south. He would only accept gradual normalization of relations and address legitimate Israeli security interests in the south[44]. An agitated Begin and a flustered Bashir exchanged sharp words and the meeting turned into a dismal failure. To further embarrass Bashir, Sharon leaked to the press the occurrence of the meeting, which the president elect had expressly wished that it remain undisclosed. Bashir, however, did convey to his entourage and to his former opponent Salam, the gist of his conversations with Begin, promising that he would remain true to Lebanon's Arab orientations and to democratic fairplay before embarking on any proforma relations with Israel[45].

In a whirlwind postelectoral campaign, Bashir's charisma showed as he extended overtures to his former enemies, promised to rule justly and firmly, heralding the restablishment of a modernized Lebanese state over the entire 10,452 square kilometers expanse of territory[46]. Meeting with the American secretary of defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, Bashir offered to

turn Lebanon into a strategic base for the US in exchange for a firm commitment to protect the country[47]. But Bashir's meteoric rise came to an abrupt end on 14 September. A blast in the *Kata'ib* headquarters at Ashrafiyyah during a ritual party meeting killed the president elect and 26 others. Weeks later, LF security picked up Habib al-Shartuni, a member of the SSNP with connections to Syrian military intelligence, and charged him with the assassination[48].

Sharon and Begin ordered their troops to invest west Beirut on the day after the assassination in violation of Habib's ceasefire agreement under the pretense of maintaining law and order. But law and order were lacking, as the embittered and shocked LF units and some of Haddad's troops who were flown in by helicopter into Beirut airport, deployed in the camps of Sabra and Shatilla and went on a rampage for three days, massacring 700-1500 Palestinian and Muslim Lebanese civilians. They had been earlier briefed by Israeli officers who had instructed them to root out PLO guerrillas left behind after 'Arafat's evacuation[49]. And the massacres, furthermore, took place under distant scrutiny of Israeli commanders from Northern Army Command. Once the news of the massacre had become exposed, international ire of Israel's war was restoked, and the MNF was brought back to oversee Israel's ultimate withdrawal from Beirut.

Amine Gemayel capitalized on his martyred brother's restored national credibility and succeeded on 21 September to the presidency with a higher number of votes from the chamber of deputies (77 to 3)[49]. The ramifications of the Sabra-Shatilla massacres, however, continued to spell a burning international desire to assign moral responsibility. Nonchalantly, Begin attempted to brush away the whole incident, but the Israeli public found that hard to stomach. An unprecedented 400,000 Israeli citizens demonstrated on 24 September to signal their disavowal of Sharon's war and to demand the setting up of a judicial inquiry. The Israeli prime minister obligingly formed the Kahan Commission which published its report in February 1983, delivering a scathing condemnation of the top Israeli military brass. This finally led to the resignation of Sharon and to the dismissal of other highranking officers such as Eitan and Saguy. When the disappointment of Lebanon had sunk in, and the mounting casualty list of the Israeli army of occupation proved unbearable, Begin soon followed with his own resignation and eventual retirement in September 1983.

Amongst the Lebanese civilian population and the Palestinians in the affected refugee camps, the war had left in its wake 17,825 killed, 30,203 wounded, and 500-800,000 refugees[51]. The Israelis had lost 368 killed in action, while the Syrians lost 201[52]. Never had Lebanon in its modern history witnessed, up and until the war of 2006, such a rolling juggernaut of destruction. Even the demise of the architects of the invasion offered little consolation to the Lebanese people who would continue to

suffer in the years to come as the warring sectarian militias gained power at the expense of the central government and fought it out amongst themselves for the spoils left by the skeletal form of the state. Two Israeli journalists had coined a fitting epithet to the whole truculent affair, that "Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon was anchored in delusion, propelled by deceit, and bound to end in calamity[53]."



Map 12: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, 6 June-25 August 1982


BAYRUT
QAZA AL-MATN
QAZA BA'BDA
QAZA 'ALAY
QAZA AL-SHUF
QAZA
Zalqa
Bsalim
Jdaydah
Jamrah
Al-Ballut
Ba'bdat
Qa'qur
Mtaynas
Bolonya
Rumyah
Dahr Al-Bashiq
Fanar
Bayt Meri
'Ayn Sa'adah
Brummana
'Arbaniyyah
Salima
Arsun
Juwar al-Huwa
Qurnayl
Ras al-Mata
Falugha
Btakhnay
Bmaryam
Shibaniyyah
Dikwanah
Hazmiyyah
Mar Jaqub
Jamhur
Beirut River
'Abadiyyah
'Araya
Ba'bda
Hadath
Tahwitah Al-Ghadir
Wadi Shahrur
Kfarshima
Bsus
'Alay
Hammana
Mudayrij
Sawfar
Bhamdun
Shanay
Majdal Bana
'Ayn Dara
'Azuniyyah
Sharun
Mansuriyyah
Bteter
Meshrafah
Ramliyyah
Runaysat Na'man
Sharton
Reshmaya
Kfar Nis
'Ayn Zhalta
Majdal al-Ma'ush
'Amiq
Birah
Brih
Kfar Qatra
Fuwarah
Kfar Nabrakh
Baruk
Batlun
Dayr al-Qamar
Bayt al-Din
Ba'qlin
Damur
Damur River
Kfar Matta
Kfar Faqud
Sa'diyyat
Naqmah
Fsaqin
'Abay
'Aramun
'Aynab
Baysur
Qabr Shmun
Remhala
Khaldah
Bshamun
'Ayn 'Anub
Dayr Qubil
Shuwayfat
Nabi Yaqzi
'Ayt al-Shaab
Suq Al-Gharb
Kayfun
Ghaben
Bkhshtay
Runaysat
Ba'lshmay
Kfarshima
Aley
Abadiyyah
Ras al-Mata
Arsun
Qurnayl
Falugha
Shibaniyyah

1. Israeli analysts consider the 1982 invasion as the first assymetrical war fought against guerilla groups organized into paramilitary structures instead of regular armies (See Dr. Reuven Elrich (Col. Ret.), The Road to the First Lebanon War (1 August 2012))
2. Pogany, op. cit., p. 88.
3. Baqraduni, op. cit., p. 122. In his autobiography, the long-standing minister for foreign affairs in the Sarkis administration, Fu'ad Butrus, dwells much over the issue of the dismissal of the Lebanese officers, and the widening of the gulf between the Maronite president and a relatively "technocratically inclined" Sunni prime minister, namely Dr. Selim Hoss. Butrus considers that Hoss increasingly took a stridently political posture *vis-à-vis* the president and the Lebanese Front because of pressures emanating from Syria, the PLO, and the National Movement (Butrus, op. cit., pp. 219, 296, 303, 307). For Hoss's version of the conflict over the dismissal of the Lebanese army officers, see Al-Nahar al-'Arabi wal-Dawli, 26 March-1 April 1984.
4. Israeli officialdom parcelled out its Lebanese connection among various agencies: Mossad championed the *Kata'ib* and Bashir Gemayel (Schiff, op. cit., p. 20), military intelligence, known as AMAN, retained its contacts with the NLP (Raviv, op. cit., p. 266), while Northern Command, responsible for the day-to-day military operations in the south, favored Haddad and other status quo forces willing to cooperate with the Israeli army (Randal, op. cit., p. 219). Raviv maintains that AMAN had trained Haddad's troops, who earlier had been in close contact with the then minister of defense, Camille Chamoun.
5. Sharon described it on 4 September 1982, as a "caesarean" operation destined to insure the election of Bashir Gemayel president (Albert Bourgi et Pierre Weiss, Liban: La cinquième guerre du Proche-Orient (Paris, 1983), p. 220).
6. David Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured Country (New York, 1983), pp. 145f.
7. See the "secret" agreement arranged by Vance between the PLO, Israel, and the Lebanese government in Baqraduni, op. cit., p. 132. The cornered Lebanese president had implored American good offices and the US secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, succeeded in arranging a temporary ceasefire in the southern enclave on 26 September, whereby all parties to the conflict agreed to observe the truce. To circumvent Sarkis's diplomacy, Bashir reinforced the Haddad enclave on 28 September with 50 of his Israeli-trained *Section Kataeb Securité* (SKS) men, who proceeded to vaunt themselves in military operations in the south (Hamizrachi, op. cit, p. 153).
8. Rabinovitch, War for Lebanon, op. cit., p. 89. Asad was also forced to disengage from his alliance with the Maronite militias for particularly internal reasons as envisaged in the rising opposition by the Muslim Brotherhood and objections by some quarters of the Syrian armed forces to their intervention on the side of the Lebanese Front (Elie Chalala, "Syrian Policy in Lebanon, 1976-1984: Moderate Goals and Pragmatic Means," Journal of Arab Affairs 4 (Spring 1985): 77).
9. Baqraduni, op. cit., p. 153.
10. Lebanon, Ministry of Information, South Lebanon, 1948-1986: Facts and Figures (Beirut, n.d.), p. 11. In preparing for its retaliatory strike, Israel requested Bashir to supply her with 800 of his fighters, especially since his SKS men had played an instrumental part in the rising tensions such as the incident

in the southern village of Marun al-Ra's, but Bashir did not comply (Hamizrachi, op. cit., pp. lllf).

11. See Ghassan Tuéni, Peace-Keeping Lebanon: The Facts, the Documents (New York, 1979). p. 257.
12. For a background of the Gemayel-Frangieh conflict, see Nicolas Nasr, Faillité Syrienne au Liban, 1975-1981, 2 vols. (Beyrouth, 1982) 1: 93-100. Ja'ja' had been wounded and knocked out early in the raid. *Kata'ib* apologists insist that the leaderless raiding party overreacted and the military operation turned out of control, since Bashir wanted to capture Tony alive (Randal, op. cit., p. 141). It said that the Mossad played a role in the decision to eliminate the northern Maronite militia and unite the Chrisian militias under Bashir (Richard Labévière, La tuerie d'Ehden ou la malédiction des Arabes chrétiens (Paris, 2009), p. 161). Suleiman Franjieh is said to have received warnings from President Sarkis and the head of the *Deuxième Bureau* Johnny 'Abdu that Bashir was preparing a military operation, but he dismissed the *Kata'ib* militia as "boy scouts" (See memoirs of Karim Baqraduni in al-Sharq al-Awsat, 15 July 1990).
13. Baqraduni, op. cit., p. 161. Chamoun, however, vilified the president for not demanding the outright withdrawal of the ADF. The overflight of two Israeli Kfir jets breaking the sound barrier over Beirut finally did bring about a temporary halt to the fighting, but clashes continued throughout the month of July.
14. Hof, op. cit., p. 92. See secret memorandum of understanding between Haddad and UNIFIL commander General E.A. Erskin on 12 June 1978 in Hamizrachi, op. cit., pp. 188f.
15. It is said that General Raphael Eitan countermanded Defense Minister Ezer Weizman's orders and approached Begin directly requesting to fire on the approaching Lebanese army. The Israeli prime minister gave him the go ahead (Weinberger, "Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon," op. cit., p. 503). The Israelis had relayed earlier on 30 June an indirect warning to the Lebanese army to use the Nabatiyyah-Qa'qa'iyyah al-Jisr road in the central sector in the south and that no units be deployed on the Kfar Mashki-Kawkaba road. On the 14th August, Parker delivered to Butrus an eight points memorandum from Eitan to the US military attché which goes at length on the military situation in the south. The setback at Kawkaba greatly embarrassed Sarkis and much of the blame fell on Parker who had been fed wrong information about Israel's acquiescence to the Lebanese army deployment. He would later ask to be relieved of his post (Butrus, op.cit., pp. 319-324).
16. Seeking to capitalize on Begin's coming visit to Camp David to meet with Sadat and Carter, Chamoun travelled incognito to Israel on 23 August for an audience with its prime minister to explore Israel's posture versus Syria given its rejection of Egypt's peace plan (Menassah, Paix d'Israel, op. cit., pp. ll0ff).
17. Gilmour, op. cit., p. 155. Although his engineering of the crisis would eventually force the Syrians out of east Beirut and prompt, in the near future, the phased withdrawal of the Arab contingents of the ADF from Lebanon, Chamoun made Ashrafiyyah pay a heavy price in loss of life and material destruction. French and American officials criticized his provocative policies and his overreliance on Israel. This miscalculation on Chamoun's part led to

the loss of his position as the preeminent radical arbiter in the Lebanese Front in favor of the young commander of the LF, Bashir Gemayel (Randal, op. cit., pp. 214f. See also statement by the French foreign minister Louis de Guiringaud (Washington Post, 17 October 1978)). Chamoun would still make one more trip to see Begin on 27 December 1979, accompanied by his son Dany together with Bashir. They submitted a memorandum outlining future relations between the Lebanese Christians and Israel, criticized US laxity in support of the militias, and argued for the installation of a strong Christian government in the upcoming presidential elections that would rule a federated or confederated Lebanon (Shiffer, op. cit., p. 52). On 7 February 1980, Begin would fire another bellicose statement that Israel would come to the aid of the Christians in the south and in the north if they were in danger and would not under any circumstances allow them to be compromised (New York Times, 8 February 1980).

18. For theories of the disappearance of al-Sadr, see Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin, 1987), pp. 52-56, and Peter Theroux, The Strange Disappearance of Imam Moussa Sadr (London, 1987), pp. 119-139.
19. See Georges Corm, Géopolitique du conflit libanais (Paris, 1986), pp. 137-140. The increasing tempo of its battles with some parties of the National Movement, such as the pro-Iraqi *Ba'th*, meant that *Amal* was seeking to court the thousands of impoverished Shi'is who formed the mass base of many of the leftist-radical parties. That would also put it in confrontation with the PLO in the south, and *Amal* would henceforth consistently call for the PLO's "organized", i.e. restricted, presence in the south.
20. President Sarkis still hoped to convince the respective Arab governments in the Arab summit in Tunis on 22 November 1979, to exert some control on the PLO in Lebanon. For his efforts, the Arab states could not bring themselves to confront Arafat in lieu of Sadat, but they pledged instead $2 billion in aid to compensate Lebanon for the destruction and dislocation imposed by Israel (For the diplomatic maneuverings of the Sarkis administration, see the autobiography of his foreign minister, Fu'ad Butrus, op. cit., passim). The Syrians themselves had begun to feel the pinch at home, with the Muslim Brotherhood, enhanced by the Iranian experiment, and abetted by Jordan and Iraq, would conduct an active military campaign against the al-Asad regime. This entailed a major redeployment of the ADF away from south and to the thinning out of their forces in Beirut in early February 1979 (Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (London, 1988), pp. 324f).
21. Special care insured the capture of Dany Chamoun alive to avoid a new Ihdin, but hundreds of the Tigers militia partisans were gunned down. The rest were forcibly incorporated into the LF, with their former commander going into exile and the patriarchal head, Camille, grudgingly acquiescing to the *fait accompli* by holding unto the ceremonial post of leader of the Lebanese Front. The lawyer Karim Baqraduni would later relate that he had warned Dany in a meeting with him in Farayya that Bashir was preparing a military strike and asked him to control his party members. (See memoirs of Baqraduni in al-Sharq al-Awsat, 15 July 1990). President Sarkis, furthermore, attempted to deploy the Lebanese army to shield a nascent NLP militia at 'Ayn al-

Rummanah in east Beirut, only to have Bashir's men overrunning those army positions on 31 October. The codename for the attack against the NLP was "Lina", in emulation of the operation by Ben Gurion against the ship Altalena carrying cargo to Begin's Irgun in 1948 Altalena was also the literary pseudonym of Begin's mentor Vladimir Jabotinsky.

22. The CIA had approached Bashir during a 1974 sojourn to practice law in a Washington firm. He would be considered according to the Washington Post reporter a "regional influential" asset (Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York, 1987), p. 204).
23. Baqraduni rationalises the Sarkis-'Abdu turnaround that there were enough LF sympathizers in the armed forces rumored to have been ready to conduct a *coup d'état* in Bashir's favor (Baqraduni, op. cit., p. 216).
24. William Harris, "The View from Zahle: Security and Economic Conditions in the Central Bekaa 1980-1985," The Middle East Journal 39 (Summer 1985): 274ff. Before the second round of the "Battle for Zahleh", the Israeli chief of staff, General Raphael Eitan visited east Beirut in March 1981 (Schiff, op. cit., p. 31). Eitan had once before visited Lebanon in November 1980, on ghe heels of a high-ranking Israeli delegation that preceded him with a visit to Jounieh on 5 September 1980 (Shiffer, op. cit., p. 191).
25. David Kimche was stationed in Jounieh in early 1976 (Shiffer, op. cit., p.34).Some Israeli officials insist that Bashir dragged Israel into the Zahleh crisis. See Major-General Avraham Tamir, A Soldier in Search of Peace: An Inside Look at Israel's strategy (London, 1988), p. 115.
26. The Arab foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria arrived in Beirut on behalf of the Arab League during the crisis and requested from President Sarkis that the Lebanese Front issue a retraction of any scheme to collaborate with Israel (See the heated discussions between Khaddam and the Lebanese president and prime minister as cited in Laurent, Guerres secretes, op. cit., pp. 148f.). Bashir hurriedly met with Begin, and both parties agreed on a released LF statement that would include no outright condemnation of Israel (See memoirs of Joseph Abu Khalil in Al-Hayah, 20 July 1990). In addition to his Israeli connections, Bashir possessed backchannels with the Saudi ambassador in Beirut, General 'Ali al-Sha'ir (Bourgi, op. cit., p. 210).
27. The Americans insist that they were the ones who had played matchmaker between Bashir and the Mossad, and not the other way around (Woodward, op. cit., p. 217). The Israelis, on the other hand, say that it was them who played a major role in mobilizing American support in exchange for Bashir's collaboration in the future invasion of Lebanon (Newman, op. cit., p. 158).
28. Evron, op. cit., p. 115.
29. Schiff, op. cit., p. 66.
30. See Ariel Sharon, Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon (New York, 1989), p. 436.
31. If allowed for an instance to digress and to speculate, one could venture and say that the war aims included the breakup of Lebanon into ministates. Though this is merely unsubstantiated analysis, the caveat in Sharon's list precludes it. For official Israeli analysis into the prospects of dividing Lebanon into five ministates, see Oden Yinon, "Strategy for Israel in the

Nineteen Eighties," Kivvonim (Winter 1981-82), as translated from the Hebrew in Journal of Palestine Studies, 44-45 (Summer-Fall 1982): 209-14.

32. For an analysis of whether the Israelis wanted a strong central government in Beirut, see Jim Muir, "Lebanon: Arena of Conflict, Crucible of Peace," The Middle East Journal 38 (Spring 1984): 211, fn. 6. See also discussion of Israel's motives in Yaniv, op. cit., pp. 20ff.
33. Tamir, op. cit., pp. 118f.
34. Sharon argued that to achieve Israeli objectives, i.e. to insure the election of Bashir and the expulsion of the PLO, he need only reach Ba'bda and Yarzah. That would put him in a position to control the Beirut-Damascus highway. He did visit together with Bashir sites overlooking Dahr al-Baydar where Syrian troops occupied the high points of the mountaineous crest leading from the Beqa' (Shiffer, op. cit., pp. 19-22). However, as early as 20 December 1981, Eitan and Sharon had already submitted to their cabinet details of an invasion up to the Beirut-Damascus highway (Muir, op. cit., p. 210, fn. 3).
35. Schiff, op. cit., pp. 50-54. Bashir also argued that his expansion into the Maronite heartland of the north under the control of his self-declared enemy Frangieh was absolutely essential for the creation of a strong Christian government in Beirut (Shiffer, ibid., p. 16). Bashir held meetings with several Palestinian and Syrian officials in February 1982, to extract maximum political concessions under the looming threat of an Israeli invasion. In all probability, he wished to limit the extent of the damage his connections with the Israelis have had on his presidential prospects. This might have occasioned his mistrust by Israel's military intelligence, headed by Yehoshuri Saguy, who began to lean to Chamoun's NLP (Schiff, op. cit., p. 88). LF commanders even outlined matter-of-factly to their Israeli interlocutors that they would condemn the invasion once under way, elect Bashir president, form a national unity government, and then simply ask the Israelis to leave. Mossad director, Yitzhak Hofi, one of Bachir's firmest supporters, began to join the head of military intelligence, Saguy, in voicing concern about the reliability of Israel's newest ally, especially since the Phalangiats had begun to leak the contents of their conversations with the Israelis.
36. When Sharon visited the American secretary of state, Alexander Haig, Jr., in May 1982, he found a receptive ear and would construe this for all practical purposes as US acquiescence to his plans (George W. Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon: An Analysis of Israel's Invasion of Lebanon and the Implications for U.S. Relations (Washington, D.C., 1984), pp. 34f). The American secretary of state insisted, though, that there could be no invasion without an internationally recognized provocation (Alexander Meigs Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York, 1984), pp. 335, 345).
37. Even Israeli cabinet members claimed they were bewildered by these rapid moves, and rattled that they had not given their approval in the cabinet meetings for such an advance toward Beirut (See Shai Feldman and Heda Rechnitz-Kijner, Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon (Tel Aviv, 1984), p. 5). The head of Lebanese military intelligence, Johnny 'Abdu, was also not sure whether the Israelis would head for Beirut, though he had already been informed by Bashir that an invasion was being planned as early as February 1982, and they had both relayed this information, albeit indirectly, to

the Syrians and the Palestinians. Bashir claimed to 'Abdu that he had told the Israelis from the outset that if they did not go beyond the Beirut-Damascus highway (i.e. expel the Syrians completely from Lebanon), he was not prepared to sign a peace treaty with them (Nasif, al-Makatb al-Thani, op.cit., 678).

38. Tuéni argues that shortly after Bashir's visit to Israel (presumably to meet Eitan), US ambassador Robert Dillon requested an audience and informed the LF commander that any participation by these forces in the war with Israel would cause irreparble damage to Muslim-Christian relations and would bring a violent death to Bashir himself *(sic)*. The US had also signalled to Bashir its willingness to assist him in becoming president if he distanced himself from the Israeli adventure (Tuéni, Une guerre, op. cit., p. 239). The latter's warning may have been conveyed either from highly placed Syrian or Palestinian sources promising Bashir a fate similar to that meted out to Sadat. It is Dillon who later arranged for Bashir to travel to Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, on 12 July where he was promised Arab support for his candidacy if he would agree to a symbolic military Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Bashir turned down the offer, but he had at least won a preliminary Arab-Islamic umbrella to his future election as president.
39. Sharon, op. cit., p. 436. Other observers insist that by that time Sharon, and two of his closest advisers, Eitan and Uri Dan, had already turned against Bashir (Newman, op. cit., p. 159).
40. For Palestinian debate over their withdrawal from the city or their turning it into a "Stalingrad," see Rashid Khalidi, Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking during the 1982 War (New York, 1986), pp.110-113.
41. Ball, op. cit., p. 45f. Haig, op. cit., pp. 310f.
42. Lebanon, Ministry of Information, South Lebanon, op. cit., p. For a discussion of the actual number of fighters evacuated, see Fisk, op. cit., p. 350. A memo by a European intelligence service titled "A Military System and a Marginal Economy in Lebanon," published in the late 1980's gave its own estimates of the members of the military forces operating in Lebanon: 45,000 Syrians in the ADF, 10-20,000 PLO, 2-3,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards, 1,500-2000 IDF in the southern security zone, 65,000 foreigners without proper legal permits, 8,000 Lebanese army, 8,000 LF, 25,000 SLA, 2,000 SKS under orders of Elias Hobeiqa in the LF, 5-6,000 *Amal*, 2-3,000 *Hizb Allah*, 4-5,000 PSP, 2,000 SSNP (Labévière, op. cit., pp. 194f).
43. Bashir was so delighted that he seemed to have extended promises to Shi'i leaders, via Father Bulos Nu'man, that he would seriously consider appointing a member of their sect prime minister (Jean-Pierre Peroncel-Hugoz, Une croix sur le Liban (Paris, 1985), p.76).
44. Tamir, op. cit., p. 139; Schiff, op. cit., pp. 233ff.
45. Randal, op. cit., p. 10. Shiffer implies that Bashir took along with him a professor at the AUB, Dr. George Frayhah, to signify the increasingly American orientation that his foreign policy would take in contrast to the pro-Israeli policies of the past (Shiffer, op. cit., pp. 199ff).
46. Yet the *Kata'ib* still expected that the Israeli army would remain in Beirut until the new president could neutralize his political opponents. Thus Bashir would send the LF to the Christian villages of the Shuf, formerly under control

of Joumblat's PSP, a step that would lead to serious Druze-Maronite clashes in the future (Tamir, op. cit., p. 138. It is Eitan who encouraged Bashir to send his troops to the Shuf (Raphael Eitan, A Soldier's Story: The Life and Times of an Israeli War Hero (New York, 1991), p. 298)).

47. Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York, 1990), p. 146.
48. Initially, most residents of east Beirut assumed that Israel had wanted to rid itself of Bashir because of his string of broken promises culminating in the failed meeting at Nahariyyah. Fisk argues that the Phalangists had artfully suggested that the Israelis assassinated Bashir as a retort to Israeli incrimination of the Phalangist role in the massacres of Sabra and Shatilla (Fisk, op. cit., p. 464). But the accusations that it was Israel had surfaced as soon as the news of the assassination spread.
49. Some of Haddad's men had definitely participated with LF units in the massacres (Amnon Kapeliouk, Sabra & Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre (Belmont, 1984), pp. 29f, 64). In an interview between Haddad and Fisk very soon after the massacres, the former did not deny the possibility that 10-20 of his men had remained in Beirut either to join the *Kata'ib* operation in their "independent" capacity or for the expressed purpose of removing some of their families from west Beirut (Fisk, p. 377).
50. The Israelis distrusted Amine but they agreed not to veto his candidature in favor of Camille Chamoun after *Kata'ib* officials privately promised Sharon that they would sign some form of peace treaty with Israel. Upon withdrawal from the presidential race, the erstwhile Chamoun published a cryptic statement in the press that he chose not to run because any incumbent president would be forced to sign a peace treaty with Israel, hinting, therefore, that Amine would have to do precisely that. The *Kata'ib* president did insinuate to the Israelis through Fadi Frem that he would sign such a treaty (Paul 'Andari, Al-Jabal…Haqiqah la Tarham [The Mountain… An Unmerciful Truth] (n.p., 198?), p. 35). In another version of these highlevel deliberations, Amine stated that he insisted in meetings with Sharon and the future prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir, following Bashir's assassination, that a treaty would split Lebanon and cause a rift with the Arab countries (See Amine Gemayel, L'offense et le pardon (Gallimard, 1988), pp. 82f).
51. Al-Nahar, 2 September 1982.
52. Lebanon, Ministry of Information, South Lebanon, op. cit., p. 27.
53. Schiff and Ya'ari, op. cit., p. 301.

(11)
Fratricidal Wars, the Ta'if Accords and the Reestablishment of National Entente

If the Israeli invasion of 1982 had propitiously destroyed the PLO infrastructure and brought about the expulsion of its leadership from Lebanon, the proponents of the theory that the root of all evils had emanated from the PLO's compromise of Lebanese sovereignty in 1970, and the threat that it had posed to overturn the interconfessional balance of power, would soon fall to grief. The "cathartic operation" had removed only one exernal actor and at great cost, but it left the Israeli and Syrian forces and the citizen militias collaborating with them in place, while injecting at the same time an international MNF composed of US, French, and Italian contingents, without mentioning the United Nations Interim Force deployed in the south. Elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards volunteers had already appeared in the Beqa' during the war of 1982, and they would soon indoctrinate and replenish a new quasi-military formation—the *Hizb Allah*. And into this maze of local, regional, and international actors plunged a hybrid Lebanese state, at odd and ends forced to accomodate the local sectarian militias, and at other times willing and able to confront them.

It was a ready recipe for disaster. Over the next eight years, Lebanon would enter into a series of intermittent and protracted wars and clashes that would involve in and between themselves: the newly nascent Lebanese army, the galaxy of localized militias, the forces of the MNF, the Syrian army, remnants of the PLO in Tripoli, and naturally the Israeli army of occupation. In true Hobbesian form, it was "a war of all against all," so similar to the confused and shifting alliances that pervaded the warring Italian city states in 1494-1559, or the international, regional, and domestic complexities encountered in Germany during the Thirty Years War in 1618-1648. The Lebanese economy faced complete collapse, its basic infrastructure destroyed, and the incredible sufferings of the civilians caused them to immigrate abroad in increasing numbers. The fissures of inter-confessional tensions paralyzed the works of the state machinery and ultimaltely caused a constitutionalist split towards the end of the Gemayel administration in 1988, when two governments were headed by two premiers who contested what was left of the state legitimacy.

In the final book section, I will attempt to synthesize the events that took place in the 1983-1990 period, wherein this tragic and unhappy chapter

of Lebanon's history closed when the surviving deputees of parliament agreed to the national reconciliation agreement in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia in October 1989. Though digressing from the main theme of this work, namely the interplay of domestic, regional, and international politics (for it is a period marked by war rather than by politics or diplomacy), the Ta'if in itself was a culmination of Arab intervention taking the form of Saudi Arabian stewardship and Syrian acquiescence, as well as international 'behind the scenes' maneuvering by American, French and Vatican diplomacy. But as had been repeatedly expostulated, regional and international developments would perenially bring about a restructuring of the sectarian balance of power. Ta'if was no exception and would introduce Christian-Muslim parity in the legislature, curtail the powers of the president *vis-à-vis* the prime minister, and transfer some of these presidential powers to the council of ministers as a whole. But as will be seen later, even these changes would not establish a permanently stable state of affairs or consolidate Lebanese sovereignty to the fullest.

But before the national reconciliation agreement reached at Ta'if, there was put forth another formula for power distribution after the 1982 invasion and the concomitant expulsion of the PLO: President Amine Gemayel and the LF felt the need for a strong Maronite president of a rejuvenated and fully independent Lebanon. For modicum purposes, Prime Minister Wazzan, who had emerged with enhanced prestige because of his conduct during the siege of Beirut was reinstated. Otherwise, the president filled sensitive government posts with the party faithful and demanded moreover that the chamber of deputies pass statutes that would allow him to rule virtually by decree(1)

In this venture by President Gemayel to completely overhaul the Lebanese regime on new foundations, the US had been at first positively inclined and it saw fit to help expand, refurbish and hurriedly retrain an integrated multiconfessional Lebanese army(2). President Reagan assured Sheikh Amine that he would resist Israeli pressures for maximum concessions in the approaching negotiations for the withdrawal of their troops(3). Partly embarrassed by its tacit approval of Israel's adventure; and partly sympathetic to Lebanon's plight, the Reagan administration would attempt to link progress in Lebanon with an overall plan he announced on 1 September 1982, which proposed a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation in peace with Israel(4).

The most pressing problem naturally, aside from a massive program of reconstruction, was the negotiations for the withdrawal of Israeli troops and other foreign forces from areas under their control away from the capital Beirut. Ambassadors Habib and Morris Draper shuttled between Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Jerusalem to help ameliorate the discrepancies in the protagonists' positions. The Israelis were putting forth extreme conditions as

they wanted to link their own withdrawal from Lebanon with simultaneous Syrian-Palestinian withdrawals from the north and the Beqa‘, and with full normalization of relations with Lebanon in lieu of a peace treaty. This met the abject refusal of Wazzan and Salam, who convinced Gemayel that Lebanon badly needed financial and construction aid from Saudi Arabia already being funneled through Rafiq al-Hariri, a multimillionaire contractor from Sidon who had earned the unpetered trust of the Saudi royal family.

The president’s procrastination led the Israelis to issue veiled threats on 24 November 1982, that they were preparing to withdraw precipitously from the Shuf mountains without coordination with Lebanese authorities(5). The LF had already spread into many Christian villages in the Shuf, and relations with their Druze neighbours had stretched to the breaking point(5). Israeli Druze, many of whom served in the army, protested directly to Begin in late October 1982 against the harassment of their coreligionists. The Israeli army turned therefore a blind eye to the reinforcement and arms supplying of Joumblat’s militia by Druze officers, and even went so far as to arrange a security agreement between the PSP and the LF(7). Damascus similarly did not neglect to send arms and supplies to the PSP to help them resist the encroachments of the LF.

As a result, Amine decided to open a backwards channel to the Israelis and dispatched his business partner, Sami Marun, to secretly meet Sharon on 12 December. When Habib arrived a fortnight later, on one of his routine trips to temper Israeli demands, Begin and Sharon brandished in his face the secret memorandum achieved with Gemayel(8). Embarrassed by the revelation, Habib urged the Lebanese president to adhere to diplomatic decorum and to allow him to conclude his mediatory efforts(9).

The official Israeli-Lebanese talks began in Khaldah on 28 December 1982, and would continue at Kiryat Shimona within the framework of the 1949 Armitice Agreement. Gemayel formed a negotiating team, below ministerial level, to meet their Israeli counterpart, David Kimche in the presence of Ambassador Morris Draper. The preliminary part of the negotiations witnessed Israeli procrastination as their ally Major Haddad expanded his control in the south up to the city of Sidon(10). But with the casualty list of their army rising because of small ambushes and sniping by fringe Lebanese resistance groups, (11) and as the cabinet crisis in Israel threatened to do away with their government, Israeli negotiators stopped dragging their heels and began to demand an early conclusion to the agreement as envisaged(12).

On 18 April 1983, a car bomb, commandeered by a suicide driver, exploded underneath the American embassy in Beirut, killing 46 people, amongst them key CIA operatives of the Middle East. This blow induced the American secretary of state, George Shultz, to lend his weight to the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations, and finally cajole the Lebanese-Israeli

delegations to sign an agreement on 17 May at Khaldah and Kiryat Shimona[13]. The Israelis, in exchange for their phased withdrawal to their northern borders, succeeded in dividing the south below the Awwali river into two security zones: one zone limited the number of troops the Lebanese could deploy in, and the other zone allowed for the creation of a territorial brigade similar to Haddad's militia, operating under the scrutiny of Israeli observers. Declaring an end to the state of war, both sides would open liaison offices in preparation for the full normalization of relations between the two countries[14].

Shultz believed that he had arrived at the optimum formula possible, considering any amelioration of the conditions set forth as surrender to Soviet and Syrian pressures. He expected Gemayel and other Arab states to convince Asad that he must withdraw the ADF from Lebanon[15]. The Israeli prime minister, however, insisted on a side letter with the US government that he would suspend implementation of the accord unless the Syrians withdrew too[16]. The Syrians promptly exercised the veto power afforded them by the Israelis and the US: they rejected the letter and the substance of the 17 May accord as abject surrender to Israeli hegemony over Lebanon[17].

By the summer of 1983, the initial shock of the Israeli invasion had begun to wear off, and Lebanese opposition forces disputing the policy of Gemayel and the LF began to crystallize. On 23 July, Joumblat, Karami, and Frangieh, together with the LCP and the SSNP, formed the National Salvation Front in Zhgarta, demanding that the Israeli-Lebanese agreement be abrogated forthwith. Cornered between the Israelis and the LF who demanded immediate ratification of the 17 May agreement, and the Syrians and their allies who called for its cancellation, the president opted for temporization even though parliament had already ratified the agreement. This marked the beginning of a turning point in US-Lebanese relations, as Lebanese diplomats tellingly observed that it swung official American support, which had so far bolstered Lebanon's policies, in favor of the complying party, namely Israel[18].

Exacerbated by the complacency of the Lebanese government, the Israelis decided to conduct a unilateral withdrawal from the outskirts of Beirut to the Awwali river[19]. The *Kata'ib* knew that the ensuing power vacuum would favor the Joumblatis, and they hoped at the last minute to send the army and the MNF to the Shuf to maintain the status quo on the ground[20]. Moshe Arens, the Israeli defense minister, would make one more clandestine visit to Lebanon but he failed to extract any Lebanese commitment to ratify the 17 May accord[21]. On 28 August, the neo-Nasirite *Murabitun*, *Amal*, and other leftist militias rebelled in west Beirut, forcing the Lebanese army to suppress them with some difficulty. A few days later, the Israelis abruptly withdrew on 3 September from the Shuf causing the

outbreak, in their wake, of the "mountain war" between the forces of the LF and those of Joumblatt.

In one week of heavy fighting, the PSP, assisted by Syrian tank artillery and pro-Syrian Palestinian fighters, overran most of the Christian villages of the Shuf mountain. The fully mobilized Druze fought ferociously since they considered that their survival hung in the balance. However, massacres took place on both sides, especially in the Greek Orthodox town of Bhamdun, which would ultimately leave a legacy of deep and sustained bitterness. Bypassing the remnants of LF units under Ja'ja' and thousands of terrified Christian refugees ensconsed in Dayr al-Qamar[22], Druze arms almost carried them to the presidential palace at Ba'bda. US naval bombardment and the defense of an army brigade under Colonel Michel 'Awn, however, stopped the PSP in their tracks at the outskirts of the strategic village of Suq al-Gharb.

The mountain clashes spilled over to involve attacks against bunkered American troops of the MNF bivouacked at the airport and subject to the harassment of Shi'i militias reappearing in the southern suburbs. To arrest the security deterioration and alleviate domestic American concerns for the security of the marines, the US government succeeded in arranging a ceasefire with Asad on 25 September. They agreed that a conference of national dialogue between all Lebanese intersectarian factions would be held soon and that the government would be broadened[23]. Nevertheless, the American government did not neglect to bolster their naval flotilla off the coast with the battleship New Jersey in preparation for a more active military participation on the side of the Lebanese army. But even there, cracks had already appeared in the newly trained armed forces, when Druze officers and enlisted men defected to Joumblat and loosely formed an independent brigade stationed in the village of Hammana[24].

To avoid the repetition of their seemingly obtrusive performance in the Shuf, the Israelis undertook tougher measures against the occupied population of the south[25]. One particular incident in the town of Nabatiyyah inflamed the situation further. On 16 October Israeli APC's waded through the Shi'i crowds celebrating the traditional religious festival of *'Ashura'* which commemorated the martyrdom of Imam Husayn and opened fire. If they had hoped to cow any sympathy for the militant Shi'i militant groups in the Beqa' that were deemed responsible for the burgeoning military operations against the Israelis in the south, the response came more brutally than expected. On 23 October, two suicide truck bombs blasted the American marine compound ane the French contingent headquarters of the MNF in Beirut, killing with one blow 241 Americans and 58 French soldiers. An obscure Islamic Jihad Organization, most probably a front for the *Hizb Allah*, claimed responsibility[26].

The great loss of life in Beirut jolted the American people and the Congress, invoking the Reagan administration into an agonizing reassessment of US involvement in Lebanon and an investigation into the political and security causes of the disaster[27]. The first reflex had been to respond to the threat of terrorism from wherever source it emanated from, in that case Iran aided by Syria, who had succored the *Hizb Allah*. But Reagan could not drag the US into localized battles with sectarian Lebanese militias especially after the CIA had calculated that 50,000 American troops were needed for such a role instead of the meager 1,200 marines already in place[28]. American-Iranian relations were already at low ebb, with the US inclining toward Iraq during the battlefield reverses it had met in the middle phases of the Iran-Iraq war in 1982-84.

Under this somber note of American procrastination, President Gemayel convened the first national dialogue conference in Geneva on 31 October 1983, attended by the representatives of the Lebanese Front (the elders Sheikh Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun), the National Salvation Front (Joumblatt, Frangieh, and Karami), *Amal* (now being led by Nabih Berri, a lawyer by profession), and two independents, Sa'ib Salam and 'Adil 'Usayran[29]. A Syrian-Saudi team of observers, including the Syrian foreign minister, sat on the proceedings. Most of the meetings were devoted to the 17 May accords, and they recessed on 4 November with the understanding that they would allow the president time to convince the American administration to endorse Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon without their recourse to the undue step of abrogating a nonratified agreement engineered by Shultz[30].

President Gemayel's third official visit to Washington, however, found Reagen under public pressure to withdraw from the Lebanese quagmire, while at the same time, the Israelis were adamant at keeping the 17 May agreement in place without further amendment. Reagen found the only recourse was to stiffen Gemayel's government against Syria's allies in the opposition. [31] The final showdown in Beirut came when the Lebanese army deployed around the southern suburbs of the capital to deny *Amal* a ground link with Joumblatt's PSP. When the militias attempted to disrupt that deployment, the army began an indiscriminate bombing of the southern district of the city. Berri called on Muslim officers and men to halt their operations, whereupon a large number of the rank and file withdrew to the barracks of the Sixth Brigade. The Muslim militias seized the opportune moment and staged an insurrection on 6 February 1984, seizing all of west Beirut within a few hours. Ten days later, defections from the Fourth Brigade stationed in the Iqlim al-Shahhar, to the west of the Shuf, destroyed that unit's cohesion, and the road to the sea was open to Joumblat's PSP. [32] The MNF conducted a few sporadic air raids against Syrian targets and directed naval and ground counterbattery fire against the militias'

positions[33]. But the die was cast, and US marines reembarked to ships offshore on 25 February 1984.

The events of "6 February" put a blunt in the Gemayel-LF drive to rejuvenate the Lebanese state around the centralized rule exercised by a Maronite presidency. The pendulum had swung away from the exclusive concentration on the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces and assigning full responsibility of all the country's ills at the doorsteps of the 'outsiders', towards an immersion in the implosive effects of intersectarian disequilibrium. The resounding defeat of the LF in the Shuf mountain, the army splintering for a second time, the clamouring threats of the opposition to remove him from power, and the phased withdrawal of the MNF, were more the reaons to finally force the Gemayel administration to accept Syria's original terms: a reconvening of a national reconciliation conference in Lausanne (13-20 March 1984) and the outright abrogation of the 17 May accord[34].

Gemayel designated Karami prime minister (30 April 1984-2 June 1987) with the task of forming a cabinet of national unity from those who attended the reconciliation conferences in Geneva and Lausanne with the understanding that the new government would be entrusted with studying and implementing a new reform program for the redistribution of power. On 16 October, the chamber of deputies elected Husayn al-Husayni, who had earlier opposed the 17 May agreement, as speaker thus completing the change in the top ruling positions of the state. The commander at Suq al-Gharb, General 'Awn, replaced Ibrahim Tannus as army commander, but his powers were curtailed with a newly formed military council that represented, alongside him, the six major religious confessions (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Sunni, Shi'i and Druze). It was to be considered at the time the first step in political reform since it was understood that the military council would reduce the exclusive powers of the president to order the army as he deemed fit.

The change of the guard in the high offices of the state did not mute the quest for additional constitutional and political reform that came primarily from Shi'i quarters. Their active resistance against the Israeli occupation in the south, their sizable and strategic population concentrations in the capital, the support of revolutionary Iran and Syria, had given them a strong impetus for a larger share of power. In their own political parlance, the 1943 Maronite-Sunni dichotomy had turned into an anomaly, and nothing sort of its abolition sufficed. Allied to the PSP, Berri would steadily impose rigorous military control of west Beirut while Joumblat, despite his membership in Karami's cabinet, continued to exert military pressure in the Suq al- Gharb area on the Lebanese army units there and intermittent clashes and artillery exchanges across the rejuvenated green lines would become commonplace.

Syria's steady intrusion into the affairs of Lebanese politics was concomitant with Israel's policy of concentrating its army in an 'invisible arc' drawn around the Litani river in a hitherto unspecified 'security zone' controlled by its allies, the SLA. In the face of active Shi'i military resistance in the south, the Israeli cabinet had decided on 15 January 1985, on further unilateral and precipitious withdrawals without waiting for official Lebanese coordination[35]. On 15 February they would withdraw from the areas around Sidon down to the Litani river, and on 3 March from the eastern Beqa' to the village of Nabatiyyah, ceding to the Shi'ite militias and the resistance movement a great moral victory[36]. Instead of receding, resistance operations in the remaining areas under Israeli occupation, i.e. south of the Litani, increased in tempo, enjoining the retreating Israelis to apply an "iron fist" policy that employed arbitrary arrests and mass retaliation against the villages still under their occupation[37].

When President Gemayel seemed on the verge of accepting the reform proposals for a new Lebanese constitution that would curtail the powers of the Maronite presidency, the LF's chief of staff, Ja'ja', conducted a coup on 13-15 March 1985 against any nominal authority Gemayel might still have held over the militia. In part to alleviate the possibility of a concerted reprisal action from the government or from the Syrians, the LF opened an offensive via Israeli lines against the port city of Sidon on 25 March. Entrenched in a cluster of Christian villages to the east, the LF bombarded Sidon for weeks. Nonetheless the Israelis did not intend to obstruct their prescribed timetable, and on 26 April withdrew from Jazzin toward the Haddad enclave. Whereupon, Palestinian, Druze, Shi'i and Sunni militias overran the villages of 'Abra and al-Hilaliyyah, prompting a new exodus of Christian refugees to follow the Israeli troops to the town of Jazzin, still defended by the SLA under Major Antwan Lahad who had succeeded in command after the death of Haddad in December 1983. The Sidon debacle led to the ouster of Ja'ja' on 9 May 1985, and to his replacement by Hubayqah, chief of security and intelligence, who proceeded to declare his willingness to reach an accommodation with the opposing Muslim militias[38].

The disarray in the militias of east Beirut and the intermittent clashes in the south did not portend well for the militias of west Beirut. On 20 May the ascendant *Amal* with the assistance of the now largely Shi'i corps of the Sixth Brigade, advanced against the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla to prevent their falling one more time under effective PLO military control[39]. *Amal* laid a siege that lasted for several months with thousands of casualties on both sides in a virtual "war of the camps", another military sideshow testimony to the deterioration of security throughout Lebanon[40].

President Gemayel perceived the disarray in west and east Beirut as reason for him not to be forthcoming on the issues of internal reform, hoping that his various opponents would continue to battle it out amongst themselves, although the implication was that the Lebanese capital would be left in a state of utter chaos with the attending breakdown of law and order[40]. The exasperated Syrians turned to Hubayqah, commander of the LF militia, and invited him to Damascus on 22 October for a round of talks that would soon include Berri and Joumblat. Despite reservations from his command council and other Christian leaders, the LF leader surged forth to sign a tripartite agreement in Syria on 28 December 1985, with *Amal* and the PSP. The agreement set up a general ceasefire between the militias, promising their eventual disbandment, placed a definite timetable to eliminate the practice of allocating government posts according to confessionalism, heralded a return to a bicameral legislature equally divided between Christians and Muslims with the same number of seats for the Maronites, the Shi'is, and the Sunnis, and finally called for the closest strategic and cultural cooperation with Syria.

Despite holding a virtual monopoly of power in east and west Beirut, the three militias could not force President Gemayel to endorse the tripartite accord after they had completely ignored him throughout their negotiations. In a trip to Damascus on 1 January 1986, he did not conceal from Asad his opposition to the tripartite agreement, but offered to submit it to parliament for debate, with the sure knowledge that it would be scuttled[42]. Upon his return, he would lend his support to Ja'ja' in heralding a second coup within the LF which would overturn Hubayqah and send him to exile and, in the process, tearing the tripartite accord into shreds[43].

President Gemayel faced a grave reaction from his government colleagues angered by his position on reforms. Prime Minister Karami, the Muslim ministers, and Frangieh's representative in the cabinet, Dr. 'Abdallah al-Rasi, decided to boycott any cabinet meeting called for by the president. The paralysis, furthermore, did not augur well for security in west Beirut. Fierce tank and mortar duels raged unabated between *Amal* and the Palestinian in Burj al-Barajnah and Sabra. Shadowy organizations, some with connections to the *Hizb Allah* (Islamic Jihad and Revolutionary Justice Organization)[44] or with Libyan sponsored groups (Revolutionary Commando Cells and Revolutionary Association of Socialist Muslims)[45], engaged in deliberate attacks against foreign embassies and started the spate of kidnapping Western hostages, executing them or holding them in prolonged incarceration. In June 1986, Karami appealed to the Syrians to restore order in west Beirut, wherefore two hundred soldiers were dispatched to the capital for the first time since their withdrawal four years ago. This raised the ire of Gemayel, who considered the move unconstitutional on behalf of a

prime minister without due regard to the presidency, reinforcing thereby his own estrangement from the Muslim side of the cabinet[46].

The mayhem produced by the clashes of the sectarian militias would continue unabated. In September, Hubayqah launched a surprise attack against east Beirut and withdrew back to the west after the Lebanese army intervened to seal the gaps in the "green line". *Amal*'s fortunes similarly relapsed after heavy fighting with Palestinian fighters in the refugee camps in Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre in October-November 1986. This encouraged a coalition of PSP, LCP, and former *Murabitun* to rise up against *Amal* in west Beirut on 14 February 1987, and in one week of bitter fighting almost wrested all of its positions[48]. The ferocity of the fighting finally brought Karami and other Muslim leaders to Damascus to appeal for a general ceasefire amongst the warring militias. Asad decided on 21 February 1987, to send an additional 7000 troops to west Beirut to restore order and prevent at the same time the collapse of a major ally, namely Nabih Berri[49].

After three years in office, and burdened by the complete collapse in security, the deterioration of the economy, and the lack of progress on reforms, Karami tendered his resignation on 4 May. On 1 June, he was assassinated by a calibrated bomb designed only to kill him under his seat in an army military helicopter while travelling from Tripoli to Beirut[50]. Some hoped that any successive prime minister would end the boycott of the president, allowing the normal refunctioning of the paralyzed state machinery. Karami however was overtaken by a member of the cabinet, Dr. Selim Hoss, as caretaker prime minister without serious objections from Gemayel; and the presidential boycott hence remained in place.

The paralysis of the Lebanese state meant that the chaotic lordship of the militias would continue unhindered. This time it was succeded with a major fallout within the Shi'i sect. The reentry of Syrian troops into the capital was not a welcoming portent for the pro-Iranian *Hizb Allah*, given the fact that it had become clear that most of the western hostages were in fundamentalist territory and that the United States did not object strenuously to the positioning of Syrian troops in the Lebanese capital for precisely that reason[51]. The tensions between *Amal* and *Hizb Allah* finally exploded on 6 May in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Until a ceasefire brought about by Iranian-Syrian mediation held through, the better disciplined *Hizb Allah* had already overrun their antagonists's positions except for a foothold in the Shiyah quarter of southern Beirut.

President Gemayel was now approaching the end of his six-year presidential term in office, and there was real danger that if the chaotic conditions in the country prevailed, then no presidential elections could be held. The president turned to Shultz, whom he met on 8 April 1988, in Cyprus, to demand this time his interlocution with the Syrians. On 20 May,

US envoy Vernon Walters visited Damascus for discussions over two issues: the possibility of Syrian troops intervening to release the Western hostages by force and the prospects for holding presidential elections in Lebanon. Asad stressed the need for implementation of basic reforms of the Lebanese political system before undergoing a serious appraisal of the candidates or of a possible renewal of Gemayel's mandate. The Lebanese president indulged in several projects of constitutional reforms with al-Hariri and the US Department of State(52), but he also continued to bide his time, resisting all commitments as matters incrementally approached the brink.

As the feared deadline of 23 September 1988 approached, Gemayel and the LF again appealed to Washington to dispatch Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy to embark on mediation with Asad on 14 September. (53) Starting his mission with the clear understanding that no candidate would be dismissed, Murphy arrived in east Beirut to find that Gemayel and the LF had each respectively vetoed one candidate: General Michel 'Awn and Raymond Eddé. The undersecretary went to Damascus with a list of five names which did not include Frangieh, and after strenuous discussions again returned on 18 September with one compromise candidate: Deputy Mikha'il al-Dahir of 'Akkar. The Christian leaders meeting at the seat of the Maronite patriarch at Bkarki unanimously rejected the imposition of one candidate as a Syrian-American *diktat* and Murphy's mission collapsed as the deadline approached with no viable candidate in sight that could muster a quorum.

Gemayel requested a final meeting with the Syrian president and made his last official trip as president to Damascus on 21 September, one day before the end of his term in office. He found Asad adamant about the Murphy proposal and the visit was hence deemed fruitless. Hours before the termination of his presidency, Gemayel and the senior Christian leaders meeting with him at the presidential palace at Ba'bda discussed many options including forming a national unity cabinet under a Maronite instead of a transfer of the highest executive power to the acting prime minister as stipulated by constitutional provision in the case of the president's vacancy(54). Ten minutes before midnight, Gemayel shocked his entourage with the issuance of a decree appointing the army commander, General 'Awn, with whom he had conducted a bitter rivalry over the past two years, as the new prime minister, and his five colleagues on the military council as ministers(55).

If the outgoing president had performed an act technically permitted by the constitution, for the Muslim politicians he had broken faith literally at the last minute with the vision of Muslim-Christian cooperation and partnership as expostulated by the 1943 National Pact. The unwritten custom had been that the prime minister would be a Sunni, and the constitution had stipulated that in case of a presidential vacuum, the premier

would become caretaker. Hoss therefore refused to step down or recognize the Ba'bda *fait accompli*. For the Maronite leadership, the unwritten law prescribed that the highest position in the land would be held by a member of their community,[56] and in any case, Gemayel, 'Awn and the LF and their supporters considered that they were the custodians of Lebanon's independence, projecting themselves from a liberated free zone where no foreign force could impose its will. However, the three Muslim members of the military council, Brigadier General Muhammad Nabil Quraytam, Colonel Lutfi Jabir of the Sixth Brigade, and Druze Chief of Staff Mahmud Tayy Abu Dargham, refused to join 'Awn; they would support Hoss. Only Major General Edghar Ma'luf and Colonel 'Isam Abu Jamrah accepted to serve in their new capacity as caretaker ministers.

To add to the desperation of the moment, parliament failed on 18 October 1988, to attain a quorum to select a new head of parliament, forcing Husayni with no other alternative but to retain the position as caretaker. Thus with one stroke, the two highest offices of the state, the presidency and the head of parliament, had become vacant, and the third highest office had become a consitutional and political bone of contention. Most of the Arab states and the world community, however, would abstain from recognizing either the 'Awn or the Hoss governments. Only the president of Iraq, Saddam Husayn, recognized 'Awn as the legitimate government and began the supply of weaponry by sea to the LF and to the Lebanese army in early October 1988. Victorious from his costly eight years war with Iran, and resenting the fact that Syria had extended crucial aid to his enemy, the Iraqi president fathomed that he could deal Syria a painful blow to her turf in Lebanon.

The looming crisis between the two Lebanese governments induced the Arab League in Tunis to invite both 'Awn and Hoss to its headquarters in an effort to patch them by some ingenious mechanism and to quickly bring about presidential elections. [57] The trappings of power, the presidential palace, the ministry of defense, and the basic infrastructure of the state services rested in east Beirut under the 'Awn administration. The Central Bank, however, lay in the western part of the city which gave Hoss some means of counterpressuring the army commander, without excluding the support he obtained from the Muslim ministers and the representative of Frangieh in the cabinet.

'Awn in effect began his showdown with the LF in February 1989, upon his return from Tunis. He demanded that they surrender the lucrative proceedings of Pier 5 of the Beirut port and stop taxing the population of the enclave of the free zone. In the face of the army's advances, Ja'ja' quickly surrendered ground and asked for the intercession of Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Sufayr who appealed to the general to desist. The general's strike against the LF lacked the appearance of a full-fledged campaign and he forthwith

turned his sights *volte-face* on west Beirut. In rapid succession he reopened the joint marines and air operations room, ordered sea patrols outside illegal ports of *Amal*'s al-Uwza'i and the PSP's al-Jiyyah, and declared the closure of Beirut International Airport. On 14 March, he declared a "war of liberation" from Syria, and in alliance with the LF began an artillery duel against the Syrians and the militias in west Beirut.

For the first few days, Syrian and Lebanese artillery batteries exchanged rounds over purely military targets. But in consecutive order, Ba'bda, the ministry of defense at Yarzah, schools and residential quarters, gas storage tanks, and electric stations were struck without mercy or respite. Appeals for a ceasefire by the Arab League and France finally induced 'Awn to relent on 6 April to a temporary ceasefire(58). A month later, artillery battles resumed with guns of heavier calibers, the Syrians throwing in for measure a naval and land blockade of the enclave to prevent Iraqi arms shipment. Thousands of terrorized Christian residents fled the combat zones by sea to Cyprus, while equal numbers of west Beirut residents sought refuge to Sidon and the south, some camping in miserable conditions on the Awwali river.

Because the Arab League realized the gravity of the situation, it held an emergency summit meeting in Casablanca on 23-26 May 1989, wherein Saddam Husayn condemned the role of Syria in Lebanon and called for its outright withdrawal. While conceding the merit of the need for the eventual departure of Syrian troops, the Arab leaders could not follow Iraq's lead, ignoring, *inter alia*, the Israeli occupation of large swaths of southern Lebanon. The summit approved the formation of a tripartite committee from Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria, to help attain a ceasefire(59). In spite of the diplomatic intercessions of the tripartite committee's special Algerian envoy, al-Akhdar al-Ibrahimi, 'Awn would brush them aside and resume his artillery war in early June.

Despite the sympathetic support of French President François Mitterand, the Lebanese general could not bring the US to distant itself from the Arab position at Casablanca or to fully vindicate his strategy of refusing to negotiate internal reforms before a complete Syrian withdrawal(60). Pressures from the American administration and the interlocutions exerted by the tripartite committee on Syria finally brought about 'Awn's acceptance of a ceasefire sponsored by the Arab League on 22 September 1989(61). The peace plan included the lifting of sea, air, and land blockades and the convening of the parliamentary deputies in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, with the aim of drafting a "charter of national reconciliation."

Amongst 71 surviving deputies, 62 parliamentarians attended the meeting in Saudi Arabia, engaging in acrimonious debate in the period 30 September-12 October over the perennial issues of internal reform and the setting of a fixed timetable for Syrian withdrawal. They finally adopted a

plan that would increase the number of deputies in parliament to 108 members: a prescient number arrived at to divide equally the number of deputies between Muslims and Christians, and to retain equal number of seats between the Maronites, the Shi'is, and the Sunnis in congruence with their numbers, and later with arithmetic precision the distribution of the other seats to the remaining fourteen sects of Lebanon. Executive powers would devolve on the council of ministers(62). The deputies also agreed to a security plan which would include a greater Beirut devoid of all militias under control of the Lebanese army, after which Syrian troops would redeploy to the Beqa' within a two year period(63).

Although consulted throughout the proceedings by the Christian deputies, General 'Awn was not pleased with the peace plan. He lashed out at the deputies before their return and encouraged his supporters to force them into temporary exile(64). Unperturbed, the deputies vowed to hold a session toward electing a president, whereupon the general dissolved parliament in accordance with his presumed constitutional powers on 4 November. The deputies collected the next day in the Qulay'at airbase in northern Lebanon and proceeded to elect as president René Mu'awwad, a close ally of Frangieh.

The new president reinstated Hoss as prime minister on 13 November, but at the end of the festivities on the the occasion of the 46th anniversary of independence wherein all the resident diplomatic corps had showed up as a signal of international and Arab recognition for the new regime, Mu'awwad was assassinated in his departing motorcade by a bomb implanted in his car. Refusing to be cowed into another constitutional vacuum, the deputies reconvened two days later on 24 November in Shtawrah in the Beqa', and elected Deputy Ilyas al-Hirawi of Zahleh president.

The new president vowed on 26 November to depose 'Awn within 48 hours, but his newly appointed army commander, General Emile Lahhud, did not possess sufficient troops to bring a military conclusion to the affair without Syrian support. And already, the US had signaled its refusal to the use of non-Lebanese troops. The threats against 'Awn brought out an outpouring of popular support, with tens of thousands of civilian demonstrators surrounding the presidential palace to obstruct any attempt at his forced removal. The LF, the deputies, and the patriarch expected the general to be more accommodating to the settlement achieved at Ta'if. 'Awn, however, seized on the public mandate in the enclave to spurn all conciliatory offers emanating from Hrawi and Hoss to join the new government.

The peaceful folkloric festivities at Ba'bda, celebrating 'Awn's defiance of the new Ta'if arrangements turned sour when the general launched an offensive against Ja'ja''s positions on 31 January-3 March and

succeeded in splitting his protagonist's front. But he failed to occupy the LF's major headquarters at Karantina in the heart of east Beirut. On 14-20 March, 'Awn made another inconclusive push against the LF and halted only after Bkarki's threats of excommunication. That new round of fighting brought great destruction to the infrastructure in the enclave and new battlelines emerged in areas of Jubayl and Kisrawan which had hitherto been untouched by war, and had witnessed no ground combat since the beginning of the Lebanese war in 1975.

'Awn's failure to bring a decisive conclusion to his attrition war with Syria and to his offensive *à outrance* against the LF, left him exposed to the concerted push by the Syrian army and Lahhud's brigades. He counted on the sympathy of France and the Vatican to sustain him, but the scales tipped against him further when on 2 August 1990, his closest Arab ally, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The international coalition mustered by the US included Syria, thus permitting Asad free rein in the east, and provided assistance to Hirawi in launching a massive operation on 13 October against Ba'bda and the enclave. The general escaped to the French embassy, and was later allowed to leave the country to exile in France.

The intersectarian wars for hegemony and the fratricidal squabbles for hegemony within each sect, together with the increasing economic hardship of the civilian population across the board, ultimately cost the militias a heavy portion of their legitimacy and popularity(65). This ultimately paved the way towards the introduction of the arrangements agreed upon by the Lebanese deputies, despite the fact that there was a virtual political opposition to the implementation of these reforms, namely by the Lebanese army commander and his supporters. But it is to the lasting credit of Ta'if that it had ushered the quasi-stable "Second Lebanese Republic," thereby putting a close to that latest chapter in the spiral of mayhem violence that had continued unabated from 1975 to 1989.



Map 14: War in the Shuf, al-Shahhar, and the ʾIqlim



Map 15: The Removal of General Michel ‘Awn, 13 October 1990

1. Amine considered rule by national consensus necessary but not sufficient to restore Lebanon's security and sovereignty (Wadi D. Haddad, Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors (New York, p. 85)). In the early part of his presidency he relied heavily on Wazzan to express the traditional Muslim partnership in the regime as envisioned by the 1943 National Pact (See As'ad Abu Khalil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-Day Lebanon", Arab Studies Quarterly 7 (Fall 1985): 38). However, he intended to govern alone with a number of close advisors (Foreign Minister Elie Salem, National Security Advisor Dr. Wadi' Haddad, and Ghassan Tueni).
2. The Americans committed themselves to train four new Lebanese army brigades and the French one. See Public Law 98-119 of 12 October 1983 as cited in Pelcovits, op. cit., pp. 154-57, which details US assistance to Lebanon.
3. Lebanon, Wizarah al-Kharijiyyah-Wizarah al-'A'lam Kitab Abyad [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Information White Book], Watha'iq Itifaq Jala' al-Quwat al-Isra'iliyyah [Documents of the Evacuation of Israeli Forces Agreement] (Beirut, 1983), p. 12. See also principles for negotiations with the Lebanese government issued by the Israeli cabinet on 28 December 1982 in ibid., p. 111.
4. For some discussions of the change in American policy towards increasing their engagement in Lebanon, see Menassah, Paix d'Israel, op. cit., pp. 19f.
5. See "Note d'analyse de la situation de la relations des chrétiens au Liban avec Israel," as cited in Ghassan Tuéni, Une guerre pour les autres (Paris, 1985) p. 293f. Tuéni conveys that Secretary of State George Shultz sent a letter on 27 November to Begin defending the position of the Lebanese government in response to the threats conveyed in that note (Ibid., p. 285)
6. The LF considered that for the first time the war in Lebanon had produced a clear victor indicating that they would not surrender their vigilant role in support of the new regime (Lewis W. Snider, "The Lebanese Forces: Their Origin and Role in Lebanon's Politics," The Middle East Journal 38 (Winter 1984): 29. In conjunction with this spirit, Amine's handpicked army commander, General Ibrahim Tannus, proceeded to forcibly disarm the Muslim-leftist militias and conduct arbitrary mass arrests in west Beirut.
7. For text of the agreement held on 7 February 1983, see 'Andari, op. cit., pp. 77-79. In the eyes of the LF, the agreement threatened whatever hopes they held for exerting sole control over the Shuf and linking the enclave to the large concentration of Maronites in the Jazzin area to the south. Press reports in Israel, in conjunction with the Kahan Commission, also began to unravel past collusion with the Maronite militias, revealing hitherto unknown secret details that had been well guarded and which damaged the credibility of the Gemayels' persistent denials in the past of the existence of these liaisons (Laurent et Basbous, Une proie pour deux fauves, op. cit., pp. 196f). Some have ascribed the Israeli revelations as designed to discredit the *Kata'ib* and to concentrate rather on building the Israeli security in the south under the SLA (Fisk, op. cit., p. 375). Others contend that the revelations had been kept discreet in order not to damage Bashir's chances for the candidacy (Bourgi, op. cit., p. 219).
8. The agreement was called "Basic Elements and Guidelines: A Working Paper," as cited in The New York Times, 20 December 1982 (Seale, Asad, op. cit., p.

405). Amine defended himself that his signature had not been on the document and that he was not bound by it. He delivered to Habib a three page note with all the Lebanese objections to the contents of the 'Sharon Paper'. He reiterated his complete reliance on the support of the US and on Habib personally (Tuéni, Une guerre, op. cit., p. 299). Ironically, it was Ambassador Morris Draper who suggested to Amine to attempt a backdoor channel to the Israelis (Rubin, op. cit., p. 4), and it may hint to a divergence in policy making between Habib and Secretary of State Shultz on how to proceed in Lebanon.

9. Hearing that Gemayel had backtracked, Sharon went directly to Shaykh Pierre in Bikfaya on 23 December, and demanded that the Lebanese adhere to the agreement. Facing the Gemayels' recalcitrance, the Israeli defense minister left angrily declaring with ominous premonition that Amine would become solely lord over Ba'bda (Schiff, op. cit., p. 291).
10. The Israelis warned that security in the south had become the responsibility of the Shin Bet, which was already maintaining security in the West Bank and Gaza, implying that southern Lebanon had become permanent occupied territory (Tuéni, Une guerre, op. cit. p. 312) .
11. A particularly painful operation for the Israelis was the attack led by a suicide driver which destroyed the Israeli headquarters in Tyre causing 75 military casualties. This indicated the new modus operandi of the Shi'i resistance groups and foretaste of what was to come.
12. Sharon visited Pierre Gemayel on 30 January 1983, for the express purpose of convincing the Lebanese to accept Israeli monitoring stations on their territories. He again warned that Shaykh Pierre's son will not be ruling Ba'bda for long if he persists in his policies (Laurent, Guerres secrètes, op. cit., p. 220). On 10 March, Foreign Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Moshe Arens, visited Washington. They laid open their readiness to withdraw from Lebanon in exchange for normalization of relations, and introduced their minimum demands for security arrangements in southern Lebanon that would incorporate a role for Haddad, arrangements as such would keep the Israeli government afloat. The success of their mission had not yet become apparent to the Lebanese delegation headed by former prime minister Salam, who, in his meeting with President Reagan on 11 March, received assurances of American sympathy and support for Lebanon's negotiating position to refuse normalization of relations and security arrangements for Haddad
13. An obscure and secretive Islamic Jihad Organization declared its responsibility for the suicide attack which would be a harbinger of things to come. American officials attribute Israel's Mossad lack of cooperation as one of the major reasons why they were caught unprepared for the suicide attack conducted in the future against their marine headquarters. Friction between Israeli troops and American marines deployed in the airport reflected the seriousness of US policy to ameliorate Israeli pressures on Lebanon
14. The two parties also entered into secret protocols guaranteed by the US in separate memoranda of understanding (Schiff, op. cit., p. 296).
15. In a second visit to Washington on 20 July, Gemayel, accompanied by his prime minister, received additional assurances of support and American intentions to counter Syria's diplomatic offensive that had successfully isolated Lebanon in the Arab world (Wadi Haddad, op. cit., p. 97). It is said that

Gemayel received a secret letter from Reagan guaranteeing the US would not allow Lebanon to be attacked or to suffer as a result of its conclusion of the 17 May accord (Woodward, op. cit., p. 248). Tuéni reads the visit in starker terms. Gemayel had always raised the fact that normalization with Israel would lead to a breakup of Lebanese national consensus, meaning that the Muslims would not consent to it. Reagan's reply suggesting the formation of a strong central Government was understood to imply that the US favored normalization of Israeli-Lebanese relations (Tuéni, Une guerre, op. cit., p. 356).

16. For text of 17 May side letter from David Kimche to Ambassador Draper, see al-Gemayel, L'offense, op. cit., p. 93.
17. Seale, Asad, op. cit., p. 408. If in the initial phases of the Lebanese-Israeli talks, there existed tacit Syrian acquiescence to the Israeli-Lebanese talks, and the Lebanese keeping officials in Damascus informed of the progress of the talks (See Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities 2nd ed. (Bloomington and Indianopolis, 2010), p.64), the massive rearmament of Syria by the Soviet Union and its supply of advanced SAM-5 missiles changed the strategic equation and encouraged Syria to take a tougher stance. Asad would refuse to link his withdrawal from Lebanon with that of Israel's (Tuéni, Une guerre, op. cit., p. 330).
18. Tuéni, ibid, op. cit. p. 337.
19. Weinberger hints that Israel had a major role in exacerbating Druze-Maronite tensions (Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, op. cit., p. 158).
20. 'Andari, op. cit., pp. 107-109. High level negotiations occurred in Europe amongst most of the parties involved in the Shuf crisis on 26-28 August 1983, with the aim of finding a peaceful resolution to the crisis, but to no avail (See Wadi Haddad, op. cit., pp. 10lf).
21. Bashir, op. cit., p. 33.
22. Ja'ja' and his men (4,000?) and the refugees (25,000) were later evacuated to the enclave on 2 December 1983, after the convocation of the national dialogue conference in Geneva (Tuéni, Une guerre, op. cit., p. 387).
23. William Quandt argues that high-level discussions between the US and Syria in early September 1983, had led to the understanding by which Asad would accept a ceasefire and recognize Gemayel's legitimacy in exchange for the broadening of the government to include the opposition (William B. Quandt, "Reagan's Lebanon Policy: Trial and Error," The Middle East Journal 38 (Spring 1984), p. 247). The Lebanese president maintains that he could not understand the emanations from the US government since August which were calling for a broad based government and for power sharing (Gemayel, L'offense, op. cit., p. 123). Asad would score another triumph in northern Lebanon, when on 17 December 1983, rebellious *Fatah* forces with Syrian assistance expelled 'Arafat and 4000 of his fighter from the city of Tripoli when they took shelter with an anti-Alawite Sunni fundamentalist organization, Harakah al-Tawhid al-Islamiyyah, led by Sheikh Sa'id Sha'ban, who was controlling the city for many months.
24. Yosef Olmert, "Lebanon," in Middle East Contemporary Survey: Vol. 3: 1983-84, Haim Shaked *et. al.* eds. (Tel Aviv, 1986), p.560. The number of Druze

officers and men was around 1,000. They were later reincorporated in the Lebanese army as the Eleventh Brigade.

25. Volunteers of the Iranian revolutionary guards, stationed in Ba'lbak since the Israeli invasion, had begun to indoctrinate Shi'i cadres into the ways of the Islamic revolution, setting up in the process an irontight and disciplined militia, later known as the *Hizb Allah* (Party of God). In the village of al-Nabi Shit, a schismatic group called Islamic *Amal*, set up headquarters under the leadership of Husayn al-Musawi who protested the mother movement's secular bent and willingness to supposedly compromise with the new Gemayel regime. The defection did not weaken *Amal* in the southern suburbs of Beirut, wherein its new leader, Nabih Berri, a lawyer by profession, continued to mobilize the community around his revitalized militia, *Amal* (Abu Khalil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Leadership," op. cit., pp. 39-41).
26. In fact, the Israelis employed the same tactics with the southerners as they did in the Shuf, by turning a blind eye and encouraging the proclivities of the various sectarian groups, i.e. the Druze, the Shi'is, the Sunnis, the Christians, and even the Palestinians! (Joseph Schechla, The Iron Fist: Israel's Occupation of South Lebanon, 1982-1985 (Washington, D.C. 1985) p. 55).
27. On the French side, President François Mitterand, could never fathom the reason why France had been singled out for the attack (Gemayel, L'offense, op. cit., 161). The French later conducted retaliatory air raids against *Hizb Allah* positions in the Beqa'.
28. Woodward, op. cit., p. 248.
29. For the minutes of the conference, see Bashir *et. al.*, op. cit., pp. 41-116; Talal Salman, Junayf-Luzan al-Mahadir al- Sirriyyah al-Kamilah: Thartharah fawq Buhayrah Liman [Genvea-Lausanne the Full Secret Minutes: Chattering over Lake Leman] (Beirut, 1984), pp. 90-220.
30. Wadi Haddad, op. cit., p. 114.
31. Gemayel, L'offense, op. cit., p. 177. Gemayel must have realized the severe blow to morale in the event the US withdrew from Lebanon. The Lebanese ambassador to the US, Dr. 'Abdallah Buhabib, would later bitterly express in the media the wish that the marines had never been sent in the first place. Gemayel's advisors were already ridiculing the idea of national reconciliation shortly after the end of the meeting in Geneva. Tuéni argued that Gemayel understood from his trip to Washington that his only recourse was to exert his authority over those areas where the Syrians and the Israelis did not occupy, namely west Beirut. If he succeeded, he would expect additional American support and the eventual smooth ratification of the 17 May agreement. On the eve of his departure, however, press reports predicted his failure and the subsequent partitioning of Lebanon. The president surmised that a strike against the Shi'i militias in the southern suburbs in apparent retaliation for the operations against the MNF would sway American officials to his side. He had insisted several times to American officials that he desired a treaty with Israel but was obstructed by the Muslim opposition and by the exigencies of Lebanon's relations with the Arab world (Tuéni, Une guerre, op. cit., p. 382).
32. Olmert, "Lebanon," op. cit., p. 552. Prior to the fall of al Shahhar, the Lebanese president seems to have sent the US Ambassador in Beirut, Donald Rumsfeld, to Israel to obtain indirect assistance against Palestinian troops deployed in that

area. The Israelis no longer trusted Amine, and they relayed the facts of the matter to Joumblat, who in his turn informed Damascus, which promptly announced in its press the details of the mission (Laurent, Guerres secrètes, op. cit., p. 220).

33. Quandt, "Reagan's Lebanon Policy: Trial and Error," op. cit., p. 249.
34. For the minutes of the Lausanne conference, see Salman, op. cit., pp. 221-437. The tone of the discourses in Lausanne had exhibited greater bitterness than the sentiments expressed in Geneva, especially since the sectarian consciouness of the participants had heightened, and they were meeting more as representatives of their different sects rather than antagonistic political blocs (Wadi Haddad, ibid., p. 123). When the powers of the presidency fell under circumspect scrutiny, Asad's closest Maronite ally, Frangieh, withdrew in protest prompting all the participants to return home empty handed. Although claiming to have coordinated directly with Asad, Frangieh's position jeopardized temporarily his relations with the Syrians. On 13-17 July, clashes broke out between the SSNP and the Zgharta Liberation Front, resulting in the intervention of the Syrian troops to restore order and exercise a closer watch on political events in northern Lebanon.
35. For a discussion between Israeli officials about whether to forsake the SLA and allow *Amal* to control the south, or to retain the security zone, see article by Thomas L. Friedman in New York Times, 16 January 1985, and 10 July 1985.
36. By 14 February, the Israelis had lost 614 dead and 3, 675 wounded (Lebanon, South Lebanon, op. cit., p. 38).
37. At this particular juncture, the CIA, in cooperation with Lebanese intelligence, attempted on 8 March a car bomb assassination of Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadl Allah, the charismatic spiritual guide of the *Hizb Allah*. Although the shaykh escaped, eighty people died and two hundred were wounded. Director of the CIA, Richard Casey, seemed to have recruited payment from the Saudi ambassador in Washington, Prince Bandar ibn Sultan, to finance the operation. Confessions published in the Washington Post (12 May 1985) two months later by Lebanese intelligence officers about their responsibility, in cooperation with American intelligence, in the assassination attempt might been designed to embarrass the administration into more assistance to Gemayel. Casey, according to Woodward was certainly morbid. The Saudis were also embarrassed and seemed to have passed information to Fadllallah about the names of the operatives and also extended cash payment ($2 million) to prevent terrorist attacks against Saudi or American targets (Woodward, op. cit., p. 396f).
38. Secret contacts between Hubayqah and Damascus had already begun in the spring of 1986 (See memoirs by Karim Baqraduni in al-Sharq al-Awsat, 24 June 1990). For Hubayqah's version on the war of Lebanon, see Alain Ménargues, Les secrets de la guerre du Liban, 2 Tomes. (Beyrouth, 2012).
39. The fighting was undertaken by the 63rd Battalion of the Sixth Brigade (Yosef Olmert, "Lebanon," in Middle East Contemporary Survey: Vol. XI: 1987 (Boulder, 1989), p. 523).
40. In the midst of this "war of the camps," a faction of *Amal* hijacked a TWA airline to the airport of Beirut, holding the crew and passengers hostage until Israel released 700 Shi'i prisoners. Forced into negotiations with Berri, the US

helped obtain the release of the prisoners on 1 July, but it retaliated with a diplomatic campaign that isolated Beirut international airport, thereby increasing the economic stranglehold already gripping the country in the wake of the collapse in general security. The highjacking of TWA flight 847 and the abduction by *Hizb Allah* of seven American citizens between March 1984 and June 1985, triggered the secret supplying of Israeli arms to Iran with American approval. Kimche, National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, and his aide Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council, designed an elaborate scheme to trade arms for hostages and divert funds to aid the Contras in Nicaragua. Eventually three hostages in Lebanon were released, but other American hostages took their place shortly thereafter in September 1986. The kidnappers had insisted on their original demand to release seventeen members of the fundamentalist Shi'i Da'wah party, imprisoned in Kuwait in connection with the bombings of the US and French embassies there. The secret exchanges remained under wraps for more than a year until rival Iranian factions leaked the news to the Lebanese weekly al-Shira'a which hit the stands on 4 November 1986. The exposure brought about a serious crisis for the administration of President Reagan and the consistency of its foreign policy, leading to a widerange investigation by Congress entailing the resignation of several high-ranking national security officials.

41. In two trips to Damascus on 31 May and 8 August, Gemayel deemed it paramount to establish security and console Christian apprehensions before proceeding with substantial discussions on the modification of the confessional system. The president complained that the repeated vows by fundamentalist groups (i.e. the *Hizb Allah* and the *Tawhid* in Tripoli) to turn Lebanon into an Islamic republic weakened his authority and fueled the extremism of Christian militants. To allay such fears and to deal a blow to their own fundamentalist enemyat home, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, the Syrians decided to strike against the fundamentalist Sunni militias of the Tawhid. After a ten days bombardment, Syrian allied militias, the 'Alawi Arab Democratic Party, the SSNP, the *Ba'th*, and the LCP, overran the port on 13 January 1986, forcing the surrender of the fundamentalist Sheikh Sa'id Sha'ban to Syria's dictates.
42. Gemayel, L'offense, op. cit., p. 109.
43. Some reports circulated that the coup enjoyed the full backing of Secretary Shultz who considered it a well deserved riposte to Syria's derailing of the 14 May agreement that he had sponsored. For details of the coup, see memoirs of Karim Baqraduni, in al-Sharq al-Awsat, 1 July 1990.
44. The Revolutionary Justice kidnapped Brian Kennan, an Irishman, on 11 April 1986, Joseph James Cicippio, comptroller at AUB, on 12 September, and Edward Austin Tracy, on 21 October. Islamic Jihad kidnapped chief Middle East correspondent of the Associated Press, Terry Anderson, the previous year on 16 March 1985.
45. Arab Revolutionary kidnapped Frank Herbert Reed, director of International College on 9 September 1986. Another captive, Librarian Peter Kilburn of the AUB was killed in retaliation of the American raid on Libya. Revolutionary Association kidnapped Alec Collet, a Briton, on 25 March 1985.

46. Gemayel countered his internal isolation with a flurry of diplomatic activity in the US, Europe, and the Arab world (Yosef Olmert, "Lebanon," in Middle East Contemporary Survey: Vol. 10: 1986 (Boulder, 1986), p. 467).
47. The period began to witness calls in east Beirut for a "Free Christian Lebanese Society" zone. See the "Christian Peace Initiative" presented by the Lebanese Front and the LF on 14 May 1986, proposing a decentralized form of government (Ibid., p. 469).
48. The strength of the Shi'ite community and likewise that of *Amal* led some analysts to assume that the militia possessed the ability of forming the core of a new Lebanon because of its political secularism and cross-sectarian appeal (Frederick Schiff, "The Lebanese Prince," Journal of South Asia and Middle East studies 12 (1989), p. 21-25).
49. The weakness that had gripped the respective militias because of internecine clashes allowed a quintessential 'new' rapprochement between Asad and Gemayel through intermediaries to discuss reforms. See Gemayel's paper of 6 December 1986, as cited in al-Sharq al-Awsat, 6 August 1989. Arafat accused American envoy April Glaspie of having undertaken a secret mission to Damascus wherein was agreed on the renewal of Amine's presidential mandate by two years in exchange for a rapprochement with Syria (See Shu'un Filastiniyyah 168-169 (March/April 1987): 162-65). The president would write up new proposals on 14 June 1987, shortly after Karami's assassination, and delivered them to Asad through the mediation of al-Hariri (See text in al-Sayyad, 6 November 1984).
50. Leaders in east Beirut urged the president to appoint a new more malleable prime minister, but Gemayel hesitated since none of the major Sunni figures would accept to form a new government.
51. President Reagan had sent a letter to Asad on 26 June 1987, on the eve of Syrian troops entering Beirut, requesting Syrian aid in releasing the American hostages.
52. See proposals submitted by April Glaspie, Director of Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon in the State Department on 2 May 1988, as cited in al-Sharq al-Awsat, 6 August 1989.
53. Damascus clearly preferred that their most reliable Maronite ally, Suleiman Frangieh, return to power. Although Frangieh counted on the support of a large number of deputies in parliament, the maneuvers of the LF prevented the mustering a quorum on 18 August 1986. Constitutional stipulation that power would temporarily resort to the council of ministers in case the presidency becomes vacant, induced Dr. Hoss, as caretaker prime minister, to withdraw his demised predecessor's resignation on 2 September. See William W. Harris, "Lebanon (*Al-Jumhuriyya al-Lubnaniyya*)," in Middle East Contemporary Survey: Vol. XII: 1988, Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, eds. (Boulder,. 1988), pp. 615-642.
54. Hoss had faced a similar trial in 5-14 May 1978, when President Sarkis submitted his resignation in protest to the Syrians' bombardment of east Beirut. Sarkis assumed that Hoss would follow suit, allowing the president to form a government headed by a Maronite as happened in 1950 with General Chehab who headed a caretaker government and later resigned upon the election of

Chamoun. Hoss's position partly explains why Sarkis retracted and withdrew his resignation (Butrus, op. cit., p. 311-315)

55. The Maronite candidates to the post were either Deputy Pierre Hilu or Dany Chamoun. Chamoun even contacted Hoss with an offer of accepting him as prime minister if he would expand the cabinet to include several ministers proposed by the conferees in Ba'bda. Hoss declined since the list included several Muslim ministers already resident in east Beirut and thus considered under their influence and proposed to Chamoun an alternate list that would be more representative. That would be the last contact with west Beirut before the president made his final choice. For Hoss's version of the events of the night of 22 September 1988, see Al-Majallah, 17 July 1990. See also version of Hoss's advisor, Muhammad .Qabbani, in ibid., 31 July 1990.
56. Ja'ja' being present in the presidential palace to consecrate the deal, surmised on the spot Gemayel's move as designed to put his LF militia on a collision course with the army in a final bid for power in east Beirut. While declaring his support to 'Awn in exchange for the general's assurances that his militia would be treated as comrades in arms and let bygones be bygones, the LF commander took leave to settle accounts with Gemayel's supporters yet remaining in the LF. On 7 October, the LF took over all of the *Kata'ib* offices in the turf of President Germayel in the Matn area still loyal to him, placing the president under virtual house arrest and later forcing him into exile. For details of the night of 22 September in the presidential palace, see memoirs of Karim Baqraduni in al-Sharq al-Awsat, 10 June 1990.
57. 'Awn's program is said to have been expressed in a book published the year before by Fu'ad 'Awn, Wa-Yabqa al-Jaysh huwa al-Hal [And the Army remains the Solution] (Beirut, 1988), which expostulated that only the Lebanese military is capable of rule in a fractitious country such as Lebanon. In Tunis, it is said that the Arab ministers had promised 'Awn that if he placed the LF rigidly under his control, they would support his campaign for the presidency.
58. The extent of devastation forced the Maronite patriarch and the Christian deputies to jointly call for an end to the war of liberation on 17 April. The general had no intention of holding his peace at this particular juncture until the Syrians fully withdrew from Lebanon.
59. The tripartite committee succeeded in extracting from Asad's Syria a preliminary commitment to withdraw within two years if elections and reforms do take place.
60. By mid-August the intensity of the exchanges had reached such heights that French military intervention became a distinct possibility while the Syrians alternately prepared a ground assault against the enclave at Suq al-Gharb.
61. 'Awn induced his supporters to demonstrate in front of the American embassy annex in east Beirut and threatened the employment of "Christian terrorism" to take American hostages in his turn. Ambassador John McCarthy preemptively withdrew all diplomatic staff on 7 September, shutting down the embassy complex.
62. Many of these points had been discussed at length by various politicians and scholars (Ghassan Salame, "The Lebanese Crisis: Interpretations and

Solutions," in Politics and the Economy in Lebanon, eds. Nadim Shehadi and Bridget Harney (Oxford, 1989), p.66).

63. For text of the Ta'if agreement, see Lebanon, Majlis al-Nuwwab [Chamber of Deputies], Wathiqah al-Wifaq al-Watani [National Reconciliation Charter] (n.p., 1990?).
64. 'Awn's supporters attacked the residence of the patriarch after his recognition of the new president, forcing upon him a hasty and humiliating escape.
65. See excellent study on the civil and militia/war society in Lebanon by Salim Nasr, "The Political Economy of the Lebanese Conflict," in Politics and the Economy in Lebanon, Nadim Shehadi & Bridget Harney, eds. (Oxford, 1989), pp. 43-50; and an earlier article, idem, "The Social Dynamics of an Internal War," American-Arab Affairs 24 (Spring 1988): 19-21.

Short Postscript:
The Hariri Assassination and the Withdrawal of Syria, 2005-2014

Before concluding, it may be opportune to refer briefly to the period after the adoption of the Ta'if agreement, although it distinctly falls beyond the scope of this work. The period concerned is historically too contemporaneous to allow a detached and impassionate analysis, but the conclusion is inescapable: the "Second Lebanese Republic" after 1990, does not resemble in its inner workings the state of affairs after the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. Gone was the obtrusive bipolarity of a Christian-Muslim division in the state and its attendant intersectarian fissures. In its place, there emerged a new hybrid tripolar sectarian system wrapped in a seemingly enigmatic bi-confessional distribution of power. Thus the Maronite president, the Shi'i head of parliament, and the Sunni head of the council of ministers, would cooperate to run the country, and, at the same, contest amongst themselves on how best to divide the spoils and distribute patronage. Any setback to any one of them, immediately translated itself into a sectarian outcry against the injustice and the humiliation suffered by each one's respective community. And conflicts did arise, which threatened to bring about a paralysis in government, had it not been for the mediation and scrutiny of the head of the Syrian military security and intelligence apparatus in Lebanon, General Ghazi Kanaan, who began to increase the tempo of his interference in the minutest details of Lebanese politics, including the appointment of ministers and promulgation of electoral laws.

The major problems to be confronted after the guns went silent in 1990, were to be, on the one hand, the disarming of the militias and the reimposition of full-fledged state control over Lebanese territory; and the second task was how to come forward with a massive economic reconstruction program. The former task was undertaken by the new army commander, Emile Lahhud, with the assistance of the Syrian ADF. Lahhud disentangled the de facto "sectarian" nature of the different brigades of the army which had inadvertently developed in the years 1983-1990 (the 6th becoming largely Shi'i, the 7th and the 9th Christian, the 12th Druze, etc.), and he amalgamated the brigades to become once more multiconfessional. The disarming of the militias proceeded in a slow but deliberate pace, and some of their members were recruited into the regular armed forces. The potent

display by the militias of their checkpoints, their arms, and their hardware receded gradually, for a time, from the limelight.

The Hirawi's regime other task was to be undertaken by the business tycoon and philanthropist Rafic Hariri who had played a singular role during the Ta'if deliberations in lieu of the confidence he enjoined by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Appointed by President Hirawi in October 1992, as successor to Prime Minister 'Umar Karami, Hariri hatched a ten-year master plan for national revitalization, which would remain vivrant until his resignation in October 2004. He would concentrate on attracting Arab investment primarily from Saudi Arabia and fom the oil-rich Gulf countries, and encouraged foreign as well as kindred emigré Lebanese businessmen to invest. He simplified tax codes, and provided investors with tax breaks, and awarded numerous contracts in important industries such as energy, telecommunications, electricity, airports and roads. A mixed publicly and privately owned Solidere company was set up to focus on redeveloping Beirut's downtown which had been completely ravaged by the wars of 1975-1989. It would turn into an iconic glittering urban center to serve as a hub to the country's reemergence. He maintained strict regulations on bank reserves and inter-bank interest rates to curb inflation, and succeeded in preserving the foreign exchange value of the Lebanese pound in order to prevent an economic collapse similar to what had happened in 1985-1987. His economic policies succeeded to a large degree, but it also exacted a heavy price as the national debt soared to new heights despite the increase in real national income.

The first setback to Hariri's rapid reconstruction program came in June 1993, when Israel, still entrenched in its security zone in southern Lebanon, launched "Operation Accountability" that struck the expensively maintained electric power stations that fed Beirut, in addition to other infrastructure targets of its own choosing. The government had since exempted *Hizb Allah*, from the policy of militia disarmament because they were shouldering the brunt of the operations against the SLA and the Israeli army in the 'bulge' area they occuppied south of the Awwali river. At the helm was al-Sayyid Hasan Nasr Allah, who had succeeded to the leadership after Israeli helicopter missiles had struck and killed his predecessor, Al-Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi in February 1992. The Israeli counterstrikes in "Operation Accountability" would cause the displacement of 300,000 largely Shi'i residents from South Lebanon. US intercession finally induced a ceasefire that would bring about the end of cross-border missile and rocket attacks, and promulgated an unwritten understanding to refrain from attacking civilian targets on both sides.

Syrian "trusteeship" during the regime of President Hirawi reached its apex with the signing in May 1991, of a "Treaty of Fraternity, Coordination, and Cooperation" which gave Syria major economic

concessions and political inroads into Lebanon's political affairs in the midst of that period of reconstruction. This did not meet the approbation of the Fee Patriotic Movement (al-Tayyar al-Watani al-Hurr), under which coalesced the supporters of the exiled General 'Awn now resident in France. The LF was also in the opposition, and in 1994, its leader Ja'a' was accused of instigating a bomb attack against Our Lady of Deliverance Church in the town of al-Zuq. He was put on trial and accused of implication in the assassinations of Rachid Karami and Dany Chamoun, and despite his denials, given four life sentences. Former president Amine Gemayel was also in exile, and thus with one stroke three major 'strongmen' in the Maronite community were either exiled or imprisoned, a fact which did not harbor well for the smooth unfolding of the Ta'if arrangements after 1990.

In October 1995, Hariri would propose and successfully pass in parliament a constituional amendment to extend Hirawi's mandate for half a term i.e. three years. This would raise the ire of General Lahhud who was now aspiring to the mantle of the presidency. An enduring hostility between the two men pervaded, underpinned by the army's commander continuous demands for consolidation of the armed forces and Hariri's penchant to divert all available resources to economic recovery. The speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri was not in opposition *per se* to the renewal of the presidential mandate, as the 'truimvirate' he had formed with Hirawi and Hariri, operated easily in his favor, permitting him to widen his influence as harbinger of Shi'i interests in state affairs.

The same *casus belli* in the guise of *Hizb Allah* operations inside the occuppied security zone would cause Israel anew to launch "Operation Grapes of Wrath" in April 1996. The Israelis imposed a sea blockade of the ports of Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut, and they repeated their waves of strikes against the economic infrastructure, causing once more the displacement of 500,000 residents from the South. One ugly episode had been the indiscriminate Israeli shelling of the Fijian battalion headquarters in Qana, causing the death of 106 Lebanese civilians who had harried there, flailingly it would tragically turn, to seek UN protection. The US would again bring about a ceasefire and an unwritten "April 1996 Understanding" which established a monitoring committee composed of the US, France, Syria, Israel and Lebanon to observe the agreement.

Upon the closure of Hirawi's second term, General Lahhud was elected by parlaimentary majority in 1998 to succeed him as president. From the start, he relied on a group of four handpicked generals who headed the security agencies: Jamil al-Sayyid, the first Shi'i head of the Surêté Générale, 'Ali al-Haj, chief of internal security forces, Raymond 'Azar, head of army intelligence, and Mustapha Hamdan, the first Sunni head of the presidential guards. The president restored Hoss to the permiership, and hints abounded that he would begin legal proceedings against Hariri and his

associates charging them with financial mismanagement and waste. The president, by his reliance on the security agencies, who in their turn were cooperating with their Syrian number, had by now departed from the "truimvirate" of the Hirawi period and came close to reestablishing a pre-Ta'if presidential system of government.

Hizb Allah's resistance operations in the south finally induced the exapserated Israelis to decide on final complete withdrawal from South Lebanon in accordance with UNSCR 425. The Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, pulled the troops back precipitiously on 24 May 2000, presenting Hizb Allah with a great morale boost which would uplif their standing in Lebanon and the Arab world. The Lebanese government refused to enter into negotiations with Israel over the withdrawal and insisted on its forthwith unconditional application to the internationally recognized borders. But after 32 years of occupation and war, the borders markers had become derelict and UN cartographers were called in to establish the "Blue Line", or the line of withdrawal, since many topographical changes had changed the contours of some of the border points and their exact location on the relevant maps. Sheb'a farms, a 24 square kilometers area at the southernmost eastern sector of the border, became a bone of contention, with Lebanon claiming them as its own and demanding that Israel should withdraw from them forthwith, while Israel insisting that the area was Syrian.

If Lahhud would consider the Israeli withdrawal as his penultimate moment, his campaign against Hariri was shortlived, as the latter, in August 2000, won in a landslide victory all the parliamentary seats in Beirut against Hoss and his allies. The president had no choice but to enter into a rapprochement with Hariri, and to restore him to the premiership, but the relations between the two men over the next three years remained tense and wary. With the end to his mandate approaching in the autumn of 2004, Lahhud, as had been exampled previously by Hirawi, hoped to renew his term with Syrian assistance. President Bashar Asad and his new lieutenant in Lebanon, General Rustom Ghazalah, employed strong arm tactics to force the required 2/3 quorum of parliamentarians to aquiesce. Some deputies were naturally inclined, but others such as Joumblat, Hariri, and the Maronite opposition, were not. Nor was the international climate in the president's favor: now that Israel had withdrawn from south Lebanon, the rationale for the maintenance of the ADF had become moot. On the eve of the vote for the amendment in October 2004, US and French diplomatic endeavours produced UNSC Resolution 1559, which called for free presidential elections and for all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.

On 14 February 2005, Hariri, who had subsequently tendered his resignation from the premiership after the amendment vote, was assassinated by a Mitsubishi truck carrying 1000 Kg of explosives that targeted his motorcade in west Beirut. The ensuing popular uproar was directed against

Syria, the caretaker government of ‘Umar Karami, and more particularly against the generals at the head of the security apparatus. Entirely flushed by widening international condemnation and by massive demonstrations in Beirut, President Asad would declare on March 2nd that the Syrian army would pack and leave in three weeks. On March 8th, *Hizb Allah* and *Amal* organized a massive demonstration attended by a million people to show support and gratitude for Syria’s past role in Lebanon. The rebuttal came a few days later on 14th March, when more than a million and a half demonstrated for the dismissal of the Karami government and for the resignation of the generals in the security apparatus.

The Hariri assassination had brought about a permanent vertical political schism between the supporters of the ‘8th March Movement’ and the ‘14th March Alliance’ as they were respectively called. The latter constitued the majority of the Sunni based support created over the past decade by Hariri, in addition to Joumblatt, the *Kata’ib*, and the various members of the Christian opposition. The LF joined in the person of Ja‘a‘ upon his release from prison by a parliamentary decree of amnesty in July 2005. 8th March would constitute the largely Shi‘i *Hizb Allah* and *Amal* organizations, joined later by General ‘Awn and his Free Patriotic Movement (*al-Tayyar*) after his return from exile in May 2005.

Each of the two movements could rely on a quasi-permanent base of popular support, but the 14th March, buttressed by wide international acclaim and sympathy, possessed an absolute majority in parliament which permitted the formation of a government of its own choosing headed by Hariri’s former finance minister, Fu’ad Siniora, and later by his son Sa‘d Hariri. Their governments, paradoxically, included ministers from the ‘8th March’ movement, for no Shi‘i minister could serve if he did not meet the approbation of Hasan Nasr Allah and Nabih Berri. Likewise, General ‘Awn would come to possess a sizable parliamentary bloc, and he too would become represented in the cabinet.

The marginal ascendancy of the 14th March alliance would suffer over the years from a spate of assassinations that targeted many of their prominent members which included among others: al-Nahar journalist Samir Qasir, LCP leader George Hawi, editor of al-Nahar Jubran Ghassan Tueini, Minister Pierre Amine Gemayel, deputy Walid Eido, and head of the information branch Wisam al-Hasan. Failed attempts had also been launched against journalist May Chidiyaq and defense minister Elias al-Murr. 14th March would retain their quantitative edge until Joumblat’s bloc changed sides in 2008, and the absolute majority shifted to ‘8th March’. They formed a government under Najib Mikati that excluded 14th March who had refused to join a government bereft of Sa‘d Hariri. Mikati would continue until February 2014, when Joumblat again shifted sides, and ‘14th March’ formed a government under Tamam Sa’ib Salam under roughly the

same conditions ascribed to the previous governments in the aftermath of the Hariri assassination, i.e. a hybrid of "8th" and "14th" March blocs.

Many observers had linked the spate of assassinations suffered by prominent personalities of '14th March' to the formation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, created in February 2006, by the UNSC after the UN International Indepenent Investigation Commission published its preleminary finding on 20 October 2005, citing indications that the assassination was organized by Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services. The 4 top star generals of the security apparatus, al-Sayyid, Hamdan, 'Azar, and al-Haj, were arrested in 2005, and remained in prison until released by the tribunal in 2009, for absence of reliable proof against them. In 2011, the Special Tribunal issued an indictment against four member of the *Hizb Allah* and requested the Lebanese government to procure them before the court which would begin its sessions in February 2013.

On 12 July 2006, *Hizb Allah* laid an ambush at the outskirsts of the Sheba' Farms, killing two Israeli soldiers and capturing a further three. The "Second Lebanon War" began in earnest with heretofore unparalleled airstrikes and artillery fires on targets all over Lebanon. Vital bridges and all strategic road networks were targeted thereby slashing the land communications lifelines, which was followed by the imposition of a full naval and air blockade. The largely Shi'i populated quarter in south Beirut were flattened unmercifully, as well as many villages in the south. But when the Israelis began their ground assault, all their armoured thrusts suffered heavy losses at the hands of the rocket-carrying *Hizb Allah* guerillas. The latter also subjected the Israeli interior for the first time since 1948, with a windfall of Katyusha rockets, which the Israeli airforce failed to neutralize. The issuance of UNSC Resolution 1701 on 14 August 2006, ordered a ceasefire without the concomitant termination of hostilities, but *Hizb Allah*'s perseverence raised its standing in the Arab world one more time and it reemerged with its prestige enhanced.

Despite the closing of ranks in the face of the Israeli onslaught, the war left a bitter legacy between '8th' and '14th March'. The former accused the government of being intentionally lax in its diplomatic efforts to bring a halt to military operations. And '14th March' accused *Hizb Allah* of instigating an unnecessary and costly conflict. When Prime Minister Siniora attempted an activation of the agreement with the Tribunal in February 2007, Shi'i ministers and their allies boycotted all further government meetings, leading to a near paralysis of the cabinet. This was followed by large numbers of Shi'i demonstrators picketing outside the Siniora's headquarters in the Grand Sarrail for almost one year.

The crisis persisted for a further eight months even after the end of Lahhud's tenure in October 2007, when neither '8th' nor '14th' March were able to muster a 2/3 quorum in parliament to select their own presidential

candidate. The conflict turned violent, when in May 2008, the government attempted to clamp down on the *Hizb Allah* communications network, considering it illegal, to be dismantled by force if necessary. *Amal* and *Hizb Allah* reacted by a violent clampdown on all the Hariri offices in west Beirut and on Joumblat's in the Shuf mountain. The clashes led to the death of 63 civilians. The crisis and the presidential vacuum were finally ended with the intercession of the Amir of Qatar, who invited all the Lebanese political parties to Doha where they agreed on the election of the army commander, General Michel Suleiman, as a president of 'compromise and national consenus'. The parliamentarians also agreed to promulgate a new law that would specifically redesign certain electoral districts to reflect a more equitable distribution of seats between '8th' and '14th'.

To recapsulate, the above synopsis highlights the fact that the post-Ta'if arrangements and the Hariri assassination had introduced new, and albeit complex, rules of political engagements which differed drastically from the pre-1990 period. In other words, a serious analysis will necessarily digress away from the main theme of this book on the interplay of domestic, regional, and international politics, *non sequitur*. The gap between 8th and 14th March had become so unbridgeable, especially with their political rivalry becoming entangled with regional Iranian-Saudi tensions, the growing Sunni-Shi'i sectarian divide, and the repercussions of the Special International Tribunal for Lebanon. In addition, the extremist Islamic fundamentalist militias and armed groups that have mushroomed after the revolutions of the 'Arab Spring' in 2011-2015, had recently targeted Christian and other religious minorities in Syria and Iraq, which naturally caused anxiety to the Christians of Lebanon who fear a spillover from across the eastern borders.

Conclusion:
Deus Ex Machina, Intersectarian Balance, and the Interplay of Domestic, Regional, and International Politics

Lebanon and the term "Lebanization" have become coterminous with terror, social fragmentation, the collapse of the state and nihilistic ethno-sectarian war. Lebanon had been consistently dismissed as a fragmented and fractured country, a beleagured and improbable nation; and disparaged as a precarious republic. This had been in complete converse to the 1920-1965 period, when Lebanon was admired internationally and envied in the Arab region as a model of consociational democracy and of a working balance of power-sharing among religious sects. Indeed the legal government in the period 1975-90 had lost its sovereign control over most of its territory and its population trasnfered its loyalty to the militias. Some analysts had predicted the final disintegration of the country, if not as a result of intrinsically domestic reasons, then by virtue, at that particular moment of time, of a prospective division amongst its two strong neighbours, Syria and Israel[(1)]. Paradoxically, if this fratricidal conflict is to continue for one reason or another, the long-term suffering of the Lebanese people have bound them in a commonality of fate that transcends the social and sectarian barricades which had been set up over the decades.

There can be no doubt that the wars had permanently changed the Lebanese political landscape of 1920-1974, even though it is not yet known in what final manner will the Lebanese ultimately fashion their political order in the post 1990 arrangements arrived at Ta'if. There are calls at present for the convocation of a new "constituent assembly" that would reorder the political and constitutional system. A return to an atavistic sectarian order is always possible and probable, since the proponents of the Ta'if agreement had insisted that the accord is merely a framework for the establishment of peace and the restructuring of the state rather than the final idealistic republic to which all *bona fide* citizens aspire. The full discarding of the confessional system will certainly streamline the political process, and turn it into a more rational and equitable one, but the abolition of confessionalism does not seem to be at present a viable or pressing solution.

In historical retrospect, the wars will certainly be perceived as catastrophic for the Lebanese people, and as traumatic for their historical consciousness as perhaps the Thirty Years War was to Germany. Foreign powers who had cynically manipulated the combatants or who had,

conversely, attempted to engineer a political solution, have also been severely burned by the consuming fire. But partitioning or cantonization among the sects is only a prescription for further conflict and mutual self-destruction, as there are no sharp geographic delineations separating them even after sixteen years of conflict spread across the time period 1975-1989. While no sect would ever be capable of overcoming to the detriment of all others, Lebanese of all sects would no sooner mingle freely whenever the heavy hand of political antagonisms was lifted.

The sects who constitute the primordial units of conflict are not per se the root of all evil. Perhaps the confessional system itself is structured in such a way as to encourage the breakdown of a potentially civil society while promoting its self-declared pluralistic democracy(2). Nevertheless, no matter how inculcated the Lebanese individual has become to attribute all social good to his self or to his own sect, party, militia, or class, while heaping all machiavellian motives unto his enemies, there can be no justification for the lack of the most elemental civic loyalty to the common good.

In many ways the sectarian structure of the Lebanese state and the partitioning of the Arab Middle East according to the Sykes-Picot agreement are somehow inextricably linked. The confessional system, or the distribution of power among the various religious sects, originated with European intervention in the 19th century to protect the Christian minorities of the sprawling Ottoman state. Sectarianism, or the distribution of the political posts according to the the individual's sectarian identity rather than to his affinity to the program of a political party in the modern sense, has been advanced as a "compromise" formula whereby the quid pro quo would be the creation of cantons and ministates. What began as a European induced formula to solve in part the 'Eastern Question' as it had been perceived in Lebanon, would soon be culminated with the partitioning of the Arab provinces of the Middle East and the promise to create a Jewish national home in Palestine. This "purely" confessional solution could be considered a rehearsal for perpetual war, as the present bloody upheavals that are unraveling in the states of the 'Arab Spring' clearly indicate, and therefore the "sectarian formula" does not make it a viable solution at all; or a compromise solution for that matter.

The notion that certain offices of the Lebanese state belong as the exclusive patrimony of some sects is certainly prohibitive to the emergence of a collective national will, since each candidate is eager to satisfy his sectarian community as the only means by which he could assume and hold office. The holders of power, however, no longer regard their assumption of office as guarantees for their individual sects, but privileges bestowed upon them to which they must exercise to the fullest. Any dereliction of their duty or a relaxing of their guard, would translate into a loss of prestige

for them and for their sects. That in itself pits every sect an enemy to all other sects.

Diehard Lebanese nationalists, partly inspired by the Westphalian nation-state model, have adhered to the notion, as preeminently expressed by the French Orientalist Henri Lammens, that Lebanon had always been independent of its surrounding milieu and that when that was not the case, then the Lebanese people were ruled under duress. It is striking that the historical point of departure is usually the Arab-Islamic conquest of the seventh century, and not before, and thus the implication abounds that "Christian" Lebanon has always been separate of the Arab Islamic ethos. Islam, however, is an integral part of Lebanon's history as much as Christianity has been, and the Eastern Christian churches of all denominations have been as interactive with their surrounding neighbours in the region as one could expect from any unique or vibrant religious intellectual movement.

That is not to say that the ideal republic will be finally introduced once sectarianism is eradicated. Rather, that government can only be maintained through upholding the highest ideals of morality and justice. In creating Greater Lebanon in 1920 as its exclusive domain of interest, France might have envisaged it constituting a magnet for all eastern Christians. But it had to compete for influence with Great Britain and her sponsorship of the Zionist movement, as well as the indigenous Arab nationalist movement with its multi-confessional character. Indeed most of the Anglo-French confrontations over Lebanon's southern borders had been derivative of Britain's desire to fulfill maximalist Zionist geographic objectives up to the Litani river. The French had always declared that they had enlarged Lebanon to strengthen their protégés amongst the Maronite community and to grant them additional security. But the possibility exists that they also expanded Lebanon's frontiers to limit British Zionist encroachments.

The withdrawal of France from Lebanon after World War II, expectedly brought about a new confessional formula. As a compromise interconfessional rapprochement, the National Pact accompanied Lebanese independence part and parcel, but it retained the sectarian nature of the regime and kept it *in situ*. The 1948 creation of the state of Israel and the expulsion of a sizable number of the Palestinian population to Lebanon stirred anew Zionist longing to reach the Litani and constrict the Christian presence in Lebanon ever north.

The political developments leading to the limited armed clashes of 1958, occured when the US was progressively replacing Great Britain and France as the exclusive patrimonial power of western interests. The Arab states feared Israeli expansion more than they feared the Soviets', and thus did not subscribe readily to American strategy of containment. U.S. support for President Chamoun's reelection as a reward for Lebanon's joining the

Eisenhower doctrine proved extremely unpopular both in Lebanon and the Arab world. The abrupt loss of Hashimi Iraq to a military coup did spell the end of efforts to establish a Middle East defense organization. The landing of American marines in Beirut, however, signalled that the US would not tolerate any change in the territorial status quo by Arab nationalism. The National Pact was reaffirmed, nevertheless, and Eisenhower reached an accommodation with Egypt's Nasir which kept the peace in Lebanon and the its immediate environs for nearly a decade.

The 1967 war proved a turning point. Israel now possessed free rein to operate northwards into Lebanon, especially since France, Lebanon's patrimonial protector, had lost all modes of pressure with Tel Aviv's exclusive reliance on the United States for military assistance. The latter helped Israel retain the newly occuppied territories and maintain her strategic supremacy over the combined strength of her Arab neighbours. Conversely, the budding Palestinian resistance movement was accurately gauged by Israeli intelligence, and massive Israeli punitary raids embarassed the Lebanese government and paradoxically strengthened rather than weakened the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

The 1970 Cairo agreement, which the Israeli government continuously vilified, was merely a formula by which Lebanon aspired to stiffen Palestinian resistance inside the occuppied territories rather than a belligerent attitude on Lebanon's part, i.e. opening a war front on the southern frontiers. After exposing the weakness of the Beirut regime in responding to her retaliatory strikes, Israel began to issue threats that if the Lebanese failed to mete out a 'Jordanian solution' to the Palestinian military presence, they faced the prospects of a full scale invasion. Since the Lebanese army was physically incapable of performing what was deemed required, it lost face. Private militias were encouraged to flourish and the seeds for the bloodiest and the most protracted internal war were thus planted.

It is difficult to dismiss the notion that the Palestinian military presence had been both the excuse and the means by which Israel strategy in particular helped explode the Lebanese arena. The fighting militias, small in number but allowed by the technology of modern weaponary to develop excessive firepower, achieved inconclusive results in 1975-76. Syrian intervention, with tacit American-Israeli approval, helped solidify the military status quo and temporarily postponed the timing of a massive Israeli invasion to June 1982. When the Israeli army finally crossed the Lebanese borders en masse they hoped to destroy the PLO infrastructure, but they were nonetheless quite aware that the sectarian fissures in the country would become deepened. The partial failure of the invasion's objectives and the inability of the US and Israel to lure the Lebanese government into an arrangement similar to the Camp David accords, plunged Lebanon one more

time into a vicious war wherein purely sectarian militias struggled to achieve a barren and inconclusive military victory.

By 1989, Lebanon faced two hard choices: either a war against Syria, led by the army commander or a painful rearrangement of the sectarian distribution of power which would take into account the recent historical changes in demographic growth in the past decades. The Israelis, after withdrawing from parts of the south under the pressure of the Islamic and national resistance, remained well entrenched in a security zone along the border and even beyond. General 'Awn's costly failure in his "war of liberation" finally led the United States and Europe to coordinate with Saudi Arabia and the Arab states to bring about a ceasefire and the agreement sponsored at Ta'if. Once the new arrangements were put in place, there was conducted on the one hand a massive reconstruction heralded by the Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and on the other hand a mounting resistance in the south led by the *Hizb Allah* which would bring full Israeli withdrawal in accordance with UN Resolution 425.

One cannot but conclude, then, that in every rearrangement of the confessional system in Lebanon, i.e. in 1920, 1943, 1958, or finally in 1990, the West had always played an active role. The West, however, while claiming credit for the introduction of modern and democratic forms of government in the Middle East, cannot refuse to share some guilt from the internecine sectarian conflicts generated by the inadvertent application of these very same political principles. It is extremely difficult to ascertain, if ever, whether interfaith dialogue in the Middle East and the achievement of peace in Palestine amongst the three monotheistic Abrahamic religions, would be served by the profileration of sectarian and quasitribal political entities that is being witnessing today.

In sailing the crest of the stormy waves of exclusivist religious fundamentalism that is sweeping the Arab states, the experience of Lebanese multisectarian balance and crossconfessional democracy as it existed in the decade of the 1960's holds great promise and still remains a beacon of hope for the region. It is true that Lebanon's social-political status remains singularly distinct from the rest of the Arab states, but if the Lebanese people can reach a viable and enduring domestic rapprochment, they may still be capable with international assistance of playing a proactive role aimed at restoring peace in the Middle East region. It is upon this final aspiration for mutual tolerance and constructive dialogue that I lay at rest the culmination of my 35 years of public experience as a Lebanese diplomat.

In conclusion, Lebanon's permaeability and sovereignty had perennially rested on the interplay of Western patrimony, the dynamics of the regional Arab state system itself, and on the balance, albeit precarious, between the diverse Lebanese sects. That had been throughout the main theme of this

book. And on this interplay rests Lebanon's Janus-like gaze: backwards towards war or forward towards peace.

1. Nurit Kliot, The Territorial Disintegration of a State: The Case of Lebanon (Durham, 1986), p. 1
2. Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York, 1988), p. 72.

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